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ABSTRACT 
 
KATHERINE MCFARLAND: Cultural Contestation and Community Building at LGBT 
Pride Parades 
(Under the direction of Dr. Andrew J. Perrin) 
 
 
In 2009, over six million people attended an LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender) Pride parade in 110 cities in the U.S.  This dissertation is the first 
comprehensive sociological study of the Pride parade phenomenon.  I draw together 
observations of six LGBT Pride parades across the country, interviews with parade 
participants, and content analysis of crowd photographs.  I add to this an investigation of 
the first Pride events in New York City and Los Angeles in 1970.  Integrating cultural 
sociology with the study of social movements, I describe Pride parades as cultural protest 
tactics that aim to achieve cultural, rather than legal/political, equality.  I examine both 
external and internal dimensions of Pride parades.  Externally, I analyze the cultural 
messages communicated through these events and the ways these messages contest wider 
culture.  Internally, I analyze the ways that Pride parades are a site to build collective 
identity among LGBT people and their straight allies.  I conclude by outlining a 
theoretical framework for the study of other cultural protest tactics and suggest multiple 
avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 At the 2011 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) Pride march in New 
York City, police officer Alissa Hernandez paused as she was marching with the Gay 
Officers Action League to get on her knee and propose to her girlfriend in front of 
cheering crowds (Agins 2011).  One month later in San Diego, 250 active duty and 
retired military service men and women had a similarly warm reception as the first 
openly gay military contingent to march in an American LGBT Pride parade (Graham 
2011).  At any other parades, these scenes would stir the crowds but be otherwise 
unremarkable.  But at these parades, the proposal and the military contingent were 
symbols of how far the LGBT community had come. 
 Forty-two years earlier near the spot of Hernandez's proposal, police carried out a 
routine raid on a gay bar. Instead of the public shaming of a few deviant homosexuals and 
a payoff from the bar's owners that they were expecting, the raid sparked a full blown 
riot.  Patrons of the bar and local gay activists seized on the raid as an opportunity to fight 
back against years of police harassment and widespread cultural condemnation 
(Armstrong & Crage 2006; Carter 2004; Duberman 1993).  A year later activists in New 
York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles held the first gay Pride marches to commemorate 
the riots and carry on the spirit of liberation and pride they set off (Armstrong & Crage 
2006; Carter 2004).   
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 In 2011 Alissa Hernandez proposed to her girlfriend two days after the New York 
state legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage and Governor Cuomo signed 
it into law.  Active duty military marched in San Diego's parade two months before the 
federal government officially ended the “Don' Ask, Don't Tell” policy that prohibited 
gays and lesbians from serving openly in the military1.  Despite these legal gains, same-
sex marriage and gays in the military remain hotly contested political and cultural issues 
(the former much more than the latter).  These two scenes illustrate much of what Pride is 
about.  Externally, it is a public demonstration to contest the cultural marginalization of 
LGBT people.  Through their acts, Hernandez, San Diego military, and the crowds that 
supported them took a stance for visibility and celebration of queer sexuality in contrast 
to cultural messages to silence and condemn it.  Internally, Pride is a grand celebration 
for the LGBT community in which all who count themselves members or supporters 
gather to honor their achievements and support one another in difficult times.    
 This dissertation is an examination of the history and contemporary work of 
LGBT Pride parades in the United States.  Through interviews with participants, archival 
evidence, crowd analysis, and field observations, I analyze the meaning of LGBT Pride 
parades and consider the ways they challenge literature in social movements and cultural 
sociology.   
Definition of the Phenomenon 
 LGBT Pride parades are an established annual occurrence in many places around 
the world.  Since 1970 Pride events have intended to carry on what activists understood 
                                                 
1   Though the ban was technically still in effect when they marched, enforcement had nearly ceased and 
openly gay military members participated with little fear of discharge. 
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to be a new era of the gay and lesbian activism (Armstrong & Crage 2006; Carter 2004; 
Duberman 1993).  Pride marches enacted what this new era was about: the joyous and 
unashamed public declaration of gay and lesbian identity instead of the apologetic stance 
of activists before Stonewall (Armstrong 2002; Armstrong & Crage 2006; Browne 2007; 
Carter 2004).  According to Armstrong (2002), this new era also expanded the field of 
movement activity to include all members of the LGBT community, not just activists who 
regularly engaged in more traditional tactics.  As a show of community spirit and unity, 
Pride parades are not exclusive to committed activists2. 
 Six million total marchers and spectators participated in 110 Pride parades in 2009 
(author data).  The stated purpose of these parades is to promote the visibility and 
validate the existence of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people (Carter 2004; 
InterPride 2009).  Pride events take the form of either marches or parades – a distinction 
that, according to parade organizers, is largely technical and determined by the civic 
permitting process (Trisha Clymore, personal communication May 12, 2009).  In general, 
parades include motorized floats and marches do not.  At most Pride events one will find 
contingents representing most facets of the LGBT community – marching bands, church 
groups, Gay-Straight Alliances from local high schools and colleges, plus the more 
distinctive “Dykes on Bikes” and “Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence” - organized groups of 
lesbian women riding motorcycles and drag queens dressed as nuns, respectively.  
Though often thought of as Mardi Gras-like spectacles of hypersexuality that lack serious 
                                                 
2 Pride parades are frequently the site of boundary work within the LGBT community as organizers 
debate the inclusion of more extreme members of the community such as those involved with BDSM or 
polyamory. I discuss this further in chapter 6. 
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purpose, scholars in sociology, geography, and leisure studies have treated these events as 
serious attempts to claim public space and challenge dominant attitudes towards 
homosexuality (Brickell 2000; Browne 2007; Herrell 1992; Johnston 2005; Joseph 2010; 
Kates & Belk 2001; Kenney 2001; Suganuma 2006)3.    
Aims and Assumptions 
 This dissertation is an exploration of the Pride parade phenomena and a 
consideration of their significance to social movements and cultural sociology.  It is a 
theoretical work in which I examine the case of Pride parades in order to consider social 
movement theory on the role of culture in collective action.  Pride parades seem to lie 
somewhere in the middle of protest marches and festive parades as they mix a serious 
purpose and plenty to outrage with frivolity and entertainment. In this dissertation I 
describe the meaning and cultural work of Pride parades by investigating their beginnings 
in 1970 and their contemporary external and internal dimensions. 
 A few assumptions ground this research.  First, Pride is an important phenomenon 
for the LGBT community, literature on social movements and cultural sociology, and 
American political culture.  I look at Pride as both an externally directed public display 
and an internally directed community event.  Second, Pride is part of the LGBT social 
movement.  Though it has received scant attention from scholars, it is a collective action 
advocating for social change.  I treat Pride as part of the larger LGBT movement rather 
than a separate community event.  I justify this assumption throughout this dissertation, 
                                                 
3 The notion of using the parade form for a contentious purpose is not unique to Pride events. Davis 
(1986) documents the use of parades in nineteenth-century Philadelphia by both marginalized and 
dominant groups to communicate power.  See also Abdullah 2009, Nagle 2005, O’Reilly & Crutcher 
2006 for similar treatments of power and space at popular parades. 
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but as a starting point I assume their significance for social movements.   
Social Movements and Social Change 
 Social movements are collective attempts to change social conditions through 
primarily non-institutional means (Benford, Gongaware, & Valadez 2001; Snow, Soule, 
& Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1998).  As such, a central concern in the study of social 
movements is the ways that collective actions are influenced, or even determined, by 
social conditions.  Spearheading research into this connection, scholars working within 
the political process/political opportunity model argue that the opportunity structures of 
local or national political systems allow for or discourage the success of movement 
activity (McAdam 1982; 1983; Meyer 2004).  More specifically at the level of particular 
movement tactics, scholars working in contentious politics, multi-institutional politics, 
and new social movements theoretical models match the political and economic 
conditions of Western nation-states with the repertoire of tactics employed by social 
movements activists. 
With their contentious politics model, Tilly and collaborators elaborated what they 
call the modern tactical repertoire (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 
1978; 1986; 1995; 2008).  This repertoire includes all collective tactics used by social 
movement groups, including institutional lobbying and petition drives and non-
institutional collective marches and rallies. According to Tilly (1978; 1986; 1995; 2008), 
the modern repertoire was developed in response to changing political opportunities of 
the modern state such as centralized government and the right to assembly. While 
previous eras saw power diffused among local landowners and collective action directed 
at private citizens, in the modern state power coalesced in the hands of the government, 
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so social movements used collective tactics to make claims toward the state. 
Critics of the contentious politics program argue that its scholars overemphasize 
tactics that target the state for political/legal change and thus neglect tactics oriented 
toward other targets.  For Armstrong & Bernstein (2008), a broader “multi-institutional 
politics” approach means understanding that power exists across society's dominant 
institutions and thus advocacy is directed at both cultural and political targets (see also 
Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor 2004; Walker, Martin, & McCarthy 
2008).  For instance, Binder (2003) illustrated the ways that activists targeted the 
educational system by working through local school boards to include afrocentrism and 
creationism in public school curricula.  Similarly, bishops organized during the Second 
Vatican Council to pass progressive reforms (Wilde 2004).  In both instances, activists 
worked for cultural change through the official policies of powerful social institutions 
rather than seeking legal/political change.  Like contentious politics advocates, these 
scholars match the tactics used by social movements with the diffusion of power across 
society.  Activists are thought to target those institutions which have the power to act on 
their grievances. 
In the now much maligned new social movements paradigm, theorists went one 
step further by arguing that identity movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
fought for change primarily in the cultural rather than political sphere (Melucci 1985; 
Offe 1985; Pichardo 1997).  For these theorists, the West was in a postindustrial era in 
which people were subject to cultural domination rather economic or political inequality.  
Though critics pointed out that there was not necessarily anything “new” about 
movements of the 1960s and ‘70s, the emphasis on challenges to the cultural sphere may 
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be salvaged (Pichardo 1997: 427). 
While theorists of multi-institutional politics and new social movements have 
sparked a great deal of theoretical debate about the targets of social action, most 
empirical research on collective action has continued to focus on actions that seek formal 
institutional change with clearly defined demands.  The effect is to make it seem as 
though all collective actions target formal institutions, principally the state, and that the 
corresponding biggest barrier to change for marginalized groups or causes is the state.  
With no specific state or institutional target, Pride parades do not fit this model.  Their 
target is more diffuse as participants proclaim their support for and celebration of LGBT 
identity against a culture with a long history of condemning this identity.  This 
dissertation is an empirical investigation of a case in which the target of social movement 
actions is dominant culture.  All three theories reviewed have in common the theoretical 
proposition that activists use collective tactics to meet the challenges of their social 
conditions.  Thus, I investigate the social conditions faced by LGBT people and consider 
the ways in which Pride parades match these conditions.   
Types of Equality 
 Social inequality exists when individuals in one group have greater access to 
social benefits such as physical and economic security, cultural respect, and public 
decision making.  My argument in this dissertation rests on a distinction between three 
types of social equality: structural, cultural, and political/legal.  Structural equality 
centers on individuals' relative economic conditions, cultural equality on the respect 
afforded by other members in society, and political/legal equality on their citizenship 
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rights4.  Table 1.1 summarizes these three types of equality. 
 
Table 1.1. Structural, Cultural, and Political/Legal Equality 
Type of 
Equality Arena Equality looks like Role of the state Example 
Structural Economy 
Same economic resources;   
$ not necessary to access 
social benefits 
Indirect: Set regulations for 
economic markets; 
redistribute wealth through 
tax policy and welfare 
Labor movement – minimum 
wage, workplace protections, 
progressive tax policy 
Cultural Culture 
Individuals treat one another 
with respect regardless of 
cultural difference 
Indirect: Confer cultural 
legitimacy through official 
recognition, citizenship 
Civil Rights movement – 
prohibit discrimination in 
private businesses 
Political/ 
Legal State 
Individuals are treated the 
same under the law, have 
equal access to tights of 
citizenship 
Direct:Grant voting and other 
citizenship rights 
Women's suffrage – gain 
women the right to vote 
 
 In Table 1.1 I delineate three features that distinguish types of equality.  Each type 
of equality operates in a different arena with its own logic in terms of the goals for action 
and the rules for fair play (Bourdieu 1990[1980]).  Equality in each arena is achieved 
when individuals are free of barriers and thus able to access social benefits through the 
same logic of action.  Structural equality refers to the economic arena in which the goal 
of action is to acquire material goods for wants and needs.  When individuals all have the 
same economic resources or when those resources do not determine their material 
condition we can say that there is structural equality.  Cultural equality exists in the 
symbolic meaning systems that we label culture.  Inequality is present when individuals 
are treated better or worse by others based on their membership in cultural groups such as 
race, gender, and so on.  Thus, cultural equality is achieved when group difference is not 
a basis for poor treatment.  Finally, legal/political equality belongs to the arena of the 
                                                 
4 See Fraser (1995), Fraser & Honneth (2003) and Taylor (1992) for full theoretical discussions of this 
discussion. 
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state.  While structural and cultural inequality may be present in societies without formal 
government, legal/political inequality cannot.  Centralized governments confer legal and 
political rights on their citizens such as the right to vote and basic standards of treatment 
under the law.  Legal/political equality exists when all citizens have the same rights 
regardless of their membership in different social groups (either cultural, such as race or 
structural, such as class). 
  The ability of the state to affect each type of equality depends on the extent to 
which it controls the mechanisms of inequality.  Since legal/political equality is in the 
arena of the state, it has total control and can directly affect equality.  The movement for 
women's suffrage, for example, sought and achieved direct legal equality in the form of 
voting rights. However, since both structural and cultural equality operate arenas at least 
partially outside government control, the state can play at most an indirect role in 
effecting both types of equality.  For structural equality, for instance, the state may play 
an indirect role by regulating industry to mandate a minimum wage and workplace safety.  
The state may also play no role at all as when labor unions strike for higher wages or 
better working conditions.  Unless the state has full control of the economic system it 
cannot directly address structural inequality, but it can play a role to the extent that it has 
the power to redistribute wealth and regulate the market.   
 Likewise, the state does not control culture and thus cannot directly ensure 
cultural equality.  Its role is confined to its ability to confer cultural legitimacy through 
legal and political equality. Before the civil rights movement cultural inequality was 
legally enforced through Jim Crow laws and poll taxes, among other ways.  The passage 
of the Civil Rights Act removed these forms of legal/political inequality and protected 
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Americans from some overt acts of cultural inequality by making it illegal to discriminate 
by race in the provision of public services by private businesses.  Civil rights activists 
also made direct claims to cultural equality, such as the black protester who held the 
iconic sign declaring “I am a man” and therefore deserve respect.  However, the state is 
limited in its ability to influence cultural inequality.  In 2012 African-Americans have 
formal legal/political equality, but they still experience cultural inequality through 
prejudice and discrimination.  The state can legally protect Americans from overt 
discrimination based on their membership in cultural groups, but it cannot eradicate the 
prejudice that motivates this discrimination. 
 Scholars have dubbed campaigns to achieve structural and cultural equality 
through political action the politics of redistribution and recognition, respectively (Fraser 
1995; 2000; Taylor 1992; Zurn 2005).  These labels summarize what social movements 
have asked for from the state: in the case of structural, class-based inequality they have 
demanded that the state use its economic power to redistribute wealth among its citizens; 
in the case of cultural, identity-based inequality, activists seek state recognition of 
difference.  Redistribution and recognition are two ways that the state can act to redress 
injustices in arenas it does not fully control.   
 Structural, cultural, and legal/political equality are ideal types; social groups 
experience multiple types of inequality simultaneously and these types often intersect.  
As Fraser (1995: 73-73) articulated: 
[F]ar from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and 
cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce one another 
dialectically. Cultural norms that are unfairly biased against some are 
institutionalized in the state and the economy; meanwhile, economic 
disadvantage impedes equal participation in the making of culture, in 
public spheres and in everyday life. The result is often a vicious circle of 
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cultural and economic subordination. 
 
For example, cultural bias that relegates women's “proper” role as in the home leads to 
structural wage inequality.  Earning less money, women are more dependent on men and 
thus less able to challenge cultural bias.  Feminist activists who seek protection against 
unequal pay are striving for both structural and cultural equality.  When they seek this 
protection from the state, legal/political equality is the means through which activists 
challenge the other two types of equality. 
 The bulk of research in social movements addresses petitions to the state for 
remedies to structural or cultural inequalities.  While movements engage in campaigns for 
expanded legal rights, in countries with universal suffrage and equal rights of citizenship 
there are few (if any) movements devoted solely to legal/political equality.  Instead, 
movements seek legal/political equality as a means to the end of structural or cultural 
equality.  Same-sex marriage, for example, is about much more than the legal rights of 
same-sex couples; both sides see this issue as one of the cultural legitimacy of same-sex 
unions and the state plays a role through official recognition (Hull 2006; McFarland 
2011). The problem in social movement literature, I argue, is one of over-emphasis on 
actions that target the state.  Theorists of multi-institutional politics and new social 
movements rightly point out that power is located in non-state institutions and in the 
culture, not solely in the state.  The state plays a strong role in securing structural and 
cultural equality, but it does not directly control these arenas and thus does not have total 
power to guarantee equality.  Therefore, it is possible that movements may engage in 
collective action directly aimed at structural or cultural inequality without petitioning the 
state.  
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 The subject of this dissertation is achieving cultural equality for LGBT people in 
the U.S.  Many have studied the ways LGBT activists have sought legal/political equality 
as a way to achieve ultimate cultural equality (e.g. Bernstein 1997; 2002; Fetner 2008; 
Ghaziani 2008; Rimmerman, Wald, & Wilcox 2000).  Through the removal of sodomy 
laws and passage of non-discrimination statutes and relationship recognition for same-sex 
couples, activists have sought to have sexual orientation and gender identity recognized 
as positive axes of diversity that warrant legal protection and, by extension, cultural 
respect (Button, Rienzo, & Wald 2000; Bernstein 2002).  Another way to promote 
cultural equality is by directly targeting cultural attitudes, norms, values, and codes.  The 
state is a powerful cultural entity but is only one part of the entire culture.  I look at one 
tactic, LGBT Pride parades, that does not target culture apart from the state. 
How Culture Works. 
 The term culture refers to the set of interpretive schema through which individuals 
make sense of and act on the world (Becker 1982; Swidler 1986; 2001).  Meaning is 
central to culture: bringing culture into analysis entails finding out how people interpret 
their own and others’ actions.  Culture enables individuals to act collectively through a 
system of shared meanings, but also constrains individual behavior by these same 
meanings that define what is possible and desirable (Alexander 2003; Giddens 1984; 
Sewell 1992).  The paradox of culture is that it is both ultimately knowable only 
subjectively but also is fundamentally collective (Ritzer 1981).  
 Culture is used to name a host of phenomena at multiple levels of social 
groupings.  To parse this out there are three important distinctions within the concept: 
where culture resides, how it is measured, and the size of the social group that can be said 
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to have culture.  Culture resides in the mind and in the world.  In the mind culture resides 
as norms, values, attitudes, and views on the world (Bachrach 2011; Earl 2004; Wuthnow 
& Witten 1988).  Each individual is socialized as a member of society and once she 
internalizes these interpretive schema she owns them.  Culture in the mind means that an 
individual can choose in what ways to act on his norms, values, attitudes, and worldviews 
and can try to change them.  In another sense, culture resides in the world explicit 
language, symbols, codes and rituals (Bachrach 2011; Earl 2004; Geertz 1972; Wuthnow 
& Witten 1988).  This sense of culture is the property of a collective; an individual cannot 
change a symbol on her own. Culture in the mind and culture in the world interact with 
one another.  Individuals internalize the collective meanings of symbols and they create 
new symbols to communicate their own understandings.   
 The second distinction is in how culture is measured. Culture can be either 
explicit in the form of directly observable and measurable products such as writings, 
works of art, or public rituals or implicit in the form of more impenetrable norms, values, 
and attitudes (Elias 1994[1934]; Smith 2001; Wuthnow & Witten 1988).  Culture in the 
mind is always implicit and depends on one communicating individual meanings to 
others.  Researchers attempt to indirectly measure culture in the mind by asking 
individuals their attitudes in surveys or observing behaviors that communicate norms 
(Wuthnow & Witten 1988).  As a product of a collective, culture in the world is both 
explicit and implicit.  A cultural product like a public ritual is can be directly observed 
and described in terms of actions taken, words uttered, and signs held – all explicit and 
objective features.  It is also implicit in that the collective meanings of the ritual can only 
be known through indirect measures.   
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 Crucial to the concept of implicit culture in the world is the idea of publicness.  A 
public is more than an aggregation of individuals, and thus there are meanings that 
belong to a public that do not directly translate to individual meanings (Perrin & 
McFarland 2011; Swidler 1995).  Cultural codes are collective meanings that are defined 
and enforced by dominant society (Swidler 1995).  Individual members of a culture do 
not need to agree with a cultural code for it to affect their behavior.  For example, in his 
study of Christmas gift giving in Middletown, Caplow (1982) found that middle class 
Americans did not buy in to the collective meanings of this act.  As a cultural code, 
Americans give one another gifts at Christmas to communicate that a personal 
relationship is important.  Though they criticized the commercialization of gift giving and 
grumbled over the burden of shopping for gifts, subjects in Caplow's study continued the 
tradition because of its collective meanings.  This study is an example of how implicit 
culture exists on multiple levels – residing both in individual minds and in the collective 
world – making this analytical distinction important. 
 The third distinction regarding culture is the number of individuals involved in 
what we would call a culture.  Culture in the world always involves more than one person 
as the meaning is intersubjective and thus agreed upon.  But it matters how many people 
are involved. On the micro level, small groups create their own interpretive codes and 
norms of behavior that allow individuals to work together as a group (Eliasoph & 
Lichterman 2003; Perrin 2006).  In a small group all individuals are known to one 
another and create both implicit and explicit forms of culture to facilitate interaction.  On 
the meso level there can be many subcultures composed of large groups of individuals 
who occupy the same structural location or share an identity or personal interest.  
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Individuals within a subculture do not know everyone else in that subculture but the 
group develops both implicit cultural norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes and explicit 
symbols, language, and rituals to communicate these to one another (Macdonald 2001).  
On the most macro level, culture is a society’s distinctive way of life that is made up of 
language, symbols, and customs (Bennet 1995; Williams 1983).  In this sense scholars 
talk, for instance, of U.S. political culture that has a strong “democratic code” that 
privileges individual liberty and rights claims (Alexander & Smith 1993).  Differential 
structural power in society means that the subculture of a structurally dominant group 
(e.g. whites in terms of race, heterosexuals in terms of sexuality) can dominant to the 
extent that it is society-wide and thus macro level culture (Fantasia 1988; Gramsci 1971).   
 The implicit meanings and explicit uses of the term “family” illustrate these three 
distinctions.  On the macro level of society-wide culture, the “family” is an explicit word 
to communicate the implicit meaning of a close group of individual united by a 
permanent bond.  The most popular usage is to indicate bonds of blood, marriage, or 
adoption.  On the meso level, the LGBT community as a subculture uses the term 
“family” to indicate fellow members of the community (Nardi 1999; Weston 1991).  This 
implicit meaning is known only to subcultural members and communicated explicitly 
through merchandise like stickers with the word “family” in rainbow letters.  LGBT 
individuals may call strangers “family” as shorthand to communicate mutual 
identification and trust.  On the micro level, a small group of roommates, best friends, or 
blood relatives may use the word “family” to communicate the closeness of their bond to 
themselves and others.  As an implicit group meaning, it is specific to the individuals 
involved; in its explicit use, it draws on macro-level cultural meaning.  Finally, in each 
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individual's mind, “family” can mean anything; one may accept, reject, or modify the 
meanings of her small group, subculture, and macro culture to come up with a personal 
definition of family. 
 Most cultural sociologists treat cultural change as an adaption to altered structural 
conditions rather than a result of concerted effort (Eyerman & Jamison 1995).  The most 
common version of cultural change holds that structural changes in economic production 
and political organization open up spaces for new kinds of individual action and group 
organization.  With greater freedom to act in new ways, individuals create the symbolic 
meanings, rituals, and norms to provide subjective, meaning-based structure to their 
social groups (Elias 1994[1939]; Inglehart 1977; 1990; Wuthnow 1989).  These new 
meanings may come in conflict with older cultural constructions that still dominate much 
of society, but the real conflict is between the structural locations of those groups.  For 
example, the culture wars hypothesis proposes that there are two (or sometimes three, 
four, and more) distinct cultures in America: one is rural and conservative, holding to 
traditional notions of sexuality and gender roles; the other is urban and liberal and 
privileges tolerance and respect for diversity over set codes of sexual and gender norms 
(Dombrink, 2006; Mouw & Sobel, 2001).  Proponents of the culture wars hypothesis 
generally argue that distinct cultures arose from changing structural organization of the 
country due to industrialization which brought people to the cities.   
 These three distinctions about culture – culture in the mind vs. culture in the 
world; implicit vs. explicit culture; and culture in the world on micro, meso, and macro 
levels – allow for more nuanced understanding of the ways that social movements use 
culture and act upon culture in pursuit of their goals.  This dissertation is about the 
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collective use of an explicit cultural production – LGBT Pride parades – in order to 
challenge macro level implicit semiotic code about homosexuality and to build 
community by developing meso-level implicit and explicit culture.   
Social Movements and Culture 
 According to cultural sociologists, structural changes in society open spaces for 
cultural change.  These “free spaces” are opportunities for social movements to push for 
change (Polletta 1999; Rochon 1998).  Free spaces are cultural and often geographically 
defined areas that removed from the direct control of dominant groups and thus allow for 
a degree of cultural autonomy within a meso-level marginalized group (Polletta 1999).  
These spaces generate social movement activity in two related ways.  First, with cultural 
autonomy marginalized groups can develop the resources such as organizations, 
leadership, and explicit cultural tools that allow them to challenge their status.  For 
instance, African-Americans' residential segregation allowed this meso-level social group 
to develop institutions such as the black church which then served as a source of cultural 
resources in the civil rights movement (Morris 1982; Morris & Staggenborg 2004).  
Second, structural changes allow people to act in free spaces in ways that conflict with 
cultural codes embedded in institutions (Rochon 1998).  In chapters 2 and 3, I explore the 
existence of free spaces for LGBT cultural development and activism and in chapter 6 I 
analyze the role of Pride parades as free spaces. 
 Johnston & Klandermans summarized the role of social movements in the process 
of cultural change:  
When established identities and social statuses no longer correspond to 
possibilities that are opened up by advances in knowledge and technology, 
there arise new movements that blend and meld the analytical distinctions 
between culture and movements, perhaps more so today than ever before. 
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(1995: 4) 
 
Cultural sociologists tend to treat cultural change as a natural process; social movement 
researchers show the role of individuals and groups in bringing about specific changes.  
This section is a review of the ways that social movements create and use culture 
internally to foster group cohesiveness among activists and externally to challenge 
existing cultural attitudes and codes. 
 Studies with an internal (to movement) focus mainly concern implicit culture in 
the world at the meso- or even micro- level used to build solidarity and motivate 
participation among activists (Johnston & Klandermans 1995; Taylor & Van Dyke 2004).  
The main mechanism for these functions is collective identity, or a shared sense of self.  
Social movements both rely on and construct collective identities among activists.  They 
rely on existing common identities, for example by race, gender, or social class, to define 
the constituency for movement activism and to motivate participation and commitment 
by politicizing these identities (Hunt & Benford 2004; Taylor & Whittier 1995).  Social 
movements further construct collective identities as individuals work together in pursuit 
of movement goals (Hunt & Benford 2004; Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield 1994; Melucci 
1989). 
Collective identity can work as an implicit subcultural element when individuals 
who do not know one another feel close by virtue of their identities as environmentalists, 
for example, or as feminists (Gamson 1998).  It can also be explicit when collective 
identities become labels for a group to be used by both insiders and outsiders (Bernstein 
2005).  Individuals who share in a collective identity can find personal fulfillment both 
through bonds with others and because the experience clarifies their personal identity 
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(Gamson 1992).  Collective identity benefits social movements through members' 
increased commitment and motivation (Gamson 1998; Hunt & Benford 2004). 
Organizations can also recruit new activists who share the same sense of self by 
promoting activist collective identities and these identities can sustain movements at 
times when the political climate is less receptive to movement activity (Staggenborg 
2001; Taylor 1989; Taylor & Whittier 1992).  Melucci (1989) went further to argue that 
the construction of collective identities is central to new social (identity-based) 
movements since participants are not defined by a shared structural location. 
 Collective identities are developed through interaction, shared emotions, and the 
creation of boundaries.  By bringing people together in a new way, social movements are 
a space for interpersonal interactions.  Individuals develop implicit and explicit cultural 
tools such as group specific norms that facilitate interaction.  They emphasize similarities 
and negotiate the explicit cultural representation of their group (Melucci 1989; Hunt & 
Benford 2004; Taylor & Whittier 1995).  Social movements are also sites for shared 
emotional experiences – both positive and negative - through which individuals bond 
with one another and sustain their commitment to the cause (Eyerman 2005; Hunt & 
Benford 2004; Jasper 2011).  In fact, Jasper (1998) argued that collective identity is 
primarily emotional as it is the feeling of being part of a group and close to others in that 
group (see also Blumer 1939; Melucci 1980). An important emotional aspect to collective 
identity is the sense that individuals are united in a common cause with a shared fate 
(Fantasia 1988; Hunt & Benford 2004).  Finally, participants in social movements create 
boundaries by defining proponents and allies to their causes and identifying opponents.  
Activists build collective identity by defining “us” as united by common interests and 
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experiences and highlighting the differences of “them” (Hunt & Benford 2004; Taylor & 
Whittier 1992). 
 Another way social movements use culture is through externally focused 
persuasion.  In their pursuit of social change, movement organizations produce explicit 
culture in the form of symbols, slogans, music, art, and collective action frames (Benford 
& Hunt 1992; Eyerman & Jamison 1995; Gamson 1995; Johnston & Klandermans 1995; 
Snow & Benford 1988; 1992; Williams 2004).  These explicit cultural tools are produced 
at the micro- to meso- level of movement organizations and promoted out to the general 
public.  Eyerman & Jamison, for example, showed how folk music of the 1960s by Bob 
Dylan, Joan Baez, Phil Ochs, and others  “functioned as another kind of social theory, 
translating the political radicalism that was expressed by relatively small coteries of 
critical intellectuals and political activists into a much different and far more accessible 
idiom” (1995: 464).  The protest songs of these folk artists communicated the implicit 
cultural values of racial equality and world peace and connected them to left antiwar and 
civil rights movement activity.  For these movements, folk music was an explicit cultural 
tool of persuasion that brought implicit cultural values first to the meso-level subculture 
of non-activist youth and hippies, then to wider macro-level society as they gained 
popularity.   
 The most studied cultural tool that social movements produce is collective action 
frames (Williams 2004).  Research on collective action frames far eclipses that of other 
cultural tools, to the extent that these can seem the only form of explicit culture with 
which social movements engage.  Frames are interpretive schema to articulate grievances 
and couple them with proposed solutions (Benford & Hunt 1992; McAdam 1996; Snow 
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& Benford 1988; 1992).  Like music, activists use collective action frames to try to 
persuade others to join their cause, by challenging implicit cultural values or by 
motivating individuals to act based on values that align with those of activists (Gamson 
1998; Snow et al. 1986).  Frames are used in activists' communications with the mass 
media, slogans and speeches at demonstrations, and even through the dramatic situation 
created in tactical action (Benford & Snow 2000; Gamson 1998; McAdam 1996). When 
successful, frames diffuse from one movement group to subsequent “spinoff” groups, 
then out to the wider culture through mass media (movement-led campaigns and media-
led coverage) (Gamson 1995; 1998; Meyer & Whittier 1994; Strang & Soule 1998)5.  For 
instance, civil rights activists articulated a master frame that identified legal/political 
equality as the means through which to achieve cultural equality (McAdam 1994; Morris 
1998; Snow & Benford 1992).  Activists who invoke the civil rights frame couple the 
problem of cultural inequality in the form of discrimination and disrespect with the 
solution of equal citizenship rights and state protection from overt discrimination.  Seeing 
the macro-level cultural resonance of this frame, feminists and LGBT activists have 
adopted this explicit cultural tool to articulate their movement strategy (Miceli 2005; 
Snow & Benford 1992).   
 The ultimate goal of changing implicit macro-level culture in the world is 
achieved either through a “bottom up” or “top down” model.  With the “bottom up” 
model, activists try to persuade individuals to change their cultural attitudes (culture in 
                                                 
5 This is not just a one way process, from movements to the public.  Research shows that citizens use 
frames developed by movements and come up with their own to debate matters of public concern 
(Gamson 1992; McFarland 2011). 
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the mind), then if enough people adopt new attitudes macro-level semiotic codes will 
change as well (Swidler 1995).  With the “top down” model, activists target macro-level 
codes; if these change, then individuals within a culture will act according to new social 
meanings (Swidler 1995).  In both models, explicit cultural tools produced at the micro- 
to meso-level of movement organizations are vehicles of persuasion either down to the 
individual-level of implicit cultural attitudes or up to the macro-level of society wide 
implicit cultural codes.  
 Equivalence framing and political correctness illustrate “bottom up” vs. “top 
down” models of cultural change.  Social movement groups use equivalence framing to 
promote one term over another, for example using the words “gay or lesbian” over 
“homosexual” (Druckman 2001; Druckman & Holmes 2004).  The “bottom up” model 
theorizes that the more gay-friendly term “gay or lesbian” challenges individual implicit 
cultural attitudes by emphasizing gays and lesbians as a valued minority group while 
“homosexual” emphasizes non-normative sexuality and reinforces attitudes that condemn 
this behavior.  By promoting “gay or lesbian”, social movement groups seek to change 
individual implicit cultural attitudes with an explicit cultural tool.  When enough people 
adopt the new term as a reflection of changed individual attitudes, this will aggregate to a 
more gay-friendly macro-level implicit cultural code that values gays and lesbians as a 
legitimate group in society.  Following the “top down” model, by contrast, the 
equivalence framing of “gay or lesbian” works to change culture by coding the term 
“homosexual” as culturally unacceptable at the macro-level.  Rather than seeking 
individual-level change of cultural attitudes, the theory of the “outside in” model is that 
by promoting terminology that implicitly treats gays and lesbians as a valued minority, 
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individuals will be persuaded to change their behavior to reflect a changed cultural code.  
This will, it is hoped, trickle down to change in actual individual attitudes. 
 The internal implicit collective identities that develop from movement activism 
and the production and external dissemination of explicit cultural tools, principally 
collective action frames, are important means through which social movements bring 
about cultural change.  Given the dominance of framing in social movement literature, it 
can seem as though the only way movements change culture is through the production 
and dissemination of these cultural tools (e.g. Earl 2004; Tarrow 1992).  Some scholars 
argue that social movements have their most lasting impact through these mechanisms of 
cultural change (Isaac 2008; Jasper 1997).  However, the research on which these insights 
are based concerns movement actions with legal/political equality as their primary goal.  
Though cultural change may be movements' most lasting impact, movement scholars pay 
little attention to direct efforts to effect this type of change.  Scholars therefore 
understand implicit collective identities and explicit collective action frames as ways that 
movements use culture to achieve legal/political change rather than significant cultural 
changes in their own right (Williams 2004).  Social movement research by and large has 
not considered the functions of implicit collective identities and explicit cultural tools in 
campaigns for direct cultural change.  Through my study of Pride parades I consider how 
participants use culture internally and externally in the pursuit of cultural equality. 
Mass Demonstrations and Cultural Change 
 Mass demonstrations – protest rallies and marches – are common tactics used by 
social movements to advocate for social change.  Micro- to meso- level social groups 
(movement organizations and supporters) employ these explicit cultural tools to 
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communicate implicit meanings that challenge either individual cultural attitudes or 
macro-level cultural codes.  As described above, the bulk of research on social movement 
tactics concerns those directed at the state in pursuit of political/legal change. The 
ultimate goal may be altered implicit cultural codes, but the state is treated as a mediator 
to change these codes.  After reviewing the ways that social movements create and use 
culture in pursuit of social change, this section addresses the cultural meanings and 
implications of mass demonstrations.   
 According to Tilly (1995; 2008), mass demonstrations are WUNC displays: 
collective enactments to demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.  By 
showing these qualities, social movements claim the necessary political power to have 
their demands heard.  Movement tactics are dramaturgical displays in which activists are 
protagonists and targets are antagonists in a struggle for power (Benford & Hunt 1992).  
In American political culture, the march on Washington is the epitome of a demonstration 
intended to claim political power by occupying space and to thereby compel legal change 
(Barber 2004; Ghaziani 2008).  Political and cultural environment is important such that 
movement organizations stage mass demonstrations when they perceive the political 
opportunity for this tactic to be successful but are not able to employ institutional means 
such as directly lobbying politicians (Carmin & Balser 2002; McAdam 1996).  In his 
study of four lesbian and gay marches on Washington, for instance, Ghaziani (2008) 
showed that each march was precipitated by changing political and cultural contexts that 
activists recognized as opportunities to present specific movement demands through mass 
demonstration. 
 Mass demonstrations affect culture externally through the explicit communication 
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of political power.  Internally, mass demonstrations are sites at which to build collective 
identity among participants by providing a place for interpersonal interaction, invoking 
shared emotional experiences, and constructing symbolic boundaries.  Mass 
demonstrations – as the name implies – bring many people together under a common 
purpose.  Individuals coordinate their actions to march together at a space, and any time 
individual work together they create shared implicit and explicit culture to facilitate 
interaction (McPhail & Wohlstein 1983).  They also negotiate the image they present of 
their group, thereby shaping their collective identity (Bernstein 1997; Ghaziani 2008).   
 Participants in mass demonstrations often experience the heightened emotions of 
collective effervescence as they chant slogans and march along public streets together 
(Jasper 1998).  Mass demonstrations are collective rituals to communicate power and, as 
some argue, to express emotions such as enthusiasm, pride, anger, fear, and sorrow 
through patterned collective behavior (Taylor & Whittier 1995).  Since Durkheim 
([1912]1995), theorists have noted the power of ritual to produce solidarity through 
shared emotions (Collins 1975; Hobsbawn 1959; Kemper 1981; Turner 1969).  By 
sharing emotions, even negative ones such as anger and fear, participants bond with one 
another and increase their commitment to movement action (Eyerman 2005; Jasper 
2011).  Moreover, individuals express pride in a shared identity through mass 
demonstration aimed at improving the social standing of a group to which they belong 
(Jasper 1997).  Thus protest both creates and reflects emotions and collective identities.  
Finally, mass demonstrations facilitate the creation and maintenance of collective identity 
by literally constructing boundaries between participants and bystanders (Taylor & 
Whitter 1992).  Participants assert their “we-ness” with slogans that carry an implicit 
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other, such as “Who's streets? Our streets!” and “We are the 99%”. 
 If we treat Pride parades as a mass demonstration like those most studied in social 
movement literature, then their symbolic meaning is that they are demonstrations of 
political power.  With over one million people at New York's 2010 parade, this would 
make it the largest political demonstration for any cause of the year.  But Pride parades 
generally are not treated as political demonstrations, for good reason.  They include 
festive parade elements such as floats and marching bands and do not make explicit 
claims for political change.  This leaves the researcher with the question of where to 
situate Pride parades within the repertoire of collective action.  A few researchers have 
considered tactics used by movements to target culture, rather than the state, and these 
may provide insight into understanding Pride parades. 
Cultural Protest 
 The social movement literature I have reviewed so far was developed from 
empirical research on state-directed tactics.  There are two problems with this.  First, 
focusing on state-directed tactics places the locus of power in the hands of the state.  
Researchers working within a contentious politics and/or political process/political 
opportunity model explicitly identify the state as the main power holder in modern 
democracies, but this model has been criticized for ignoring other sources of social power 
(Armstrong & Bernstein 2008; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Melucci 1985; Offe 
1985; Pichardo 1997; Tilly 1978; 1986; 1995; 2008).  The second, related problem is that 
even with attention to cultural change, focusing on state-directed tactics implies a model 
wherein cultural equality must be preceded by political/legal equality.  The theoretical 
insight of identity politics is that social movements can be based on the struggle for 
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cultural equality, not just structural equality.  Fraser's (1995; 2000) redistribution/ 
recognition distinction though is between cultural and structural inequality; political/legal 
equality is a means to achieve these but not the end goal.  The question in this dissertation 
is whether the explicit cultural tool of mass demonstration carries a different external 
implicit message and affects internal movement culture differently when its purpose is to 
directly challenge implicit culture at the macro-level. 
 A few researchers have studied movement tactics that directly challenge dominant 
culture.  With regard to their external messages, these studies suggest that such tactics 
may communicate richer symbolic meanings than state-targeted political protests.  In his 
study of the AIDS activist group ACT UP, Gamson (1989) detailed how it used symbolic 
inversions to engage cultural conflict.  The group's most prominent symbol was a pink 
triangle - a symbol used by Nazis to mark homosexuals - with the words 
“SILENCE=DEATH” written on it.  ACT UP reclaimed this symbol of powerlessness to 
mean action; instead of silently accepting death, they called for others to fight back.  
More recently, Rupp & Taylor (2003; Taylor, Rupp, & Gamson 2004) argued that drag 
performers challenge the gender binary through their performances, while Bernstein & 
De La Cruz (2008) showed how Hapa movement activists challenge cultural insistence 
that each person has one race by asserting multiracial identities.  Taylor et al. (2009) 
illustrated the cultural contestation in the same-sex marriages performed in February 
2004 when San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom defied state law and issued marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.  The authors explained the cultural challenge: 
Cultural rituals typically serve to affirm dominant relations of power. 
When used in the pursuit of change, however, cultural tactics imbue 
traditional symbols, identities, and practices with oppositional meaning 
and are often deployed in new ways that challenge and subvert the 
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dominant order (Taylor et al. 2004)…as sites of ritualized heterosexuality 
(Ingraham 2003), the weddings were an opportunity for same-sex couples 
to deploy identity publicly and strategically (Bernstein 1997) to gain 
visibility for their relationships, stake a claim to civil rights, contest 
discriminatory marriage laws, and challenge the institutionalization of 
heterosexuality. (Taylor et al. 2009: 876) 
 
The San Francisco brides and grooms staged public weddings that challenged the 
dominant, macro-level semiotic code linking marriage to heterosexuality.  While 
legal/political equality was a partial goal, it was neither the immediate nor dominant aim 
of this action.  The mayor and his clerks engaged in civil disobedience by defying the law 
and legally marrying same-sex couples, but those who married engaged in cultural 
disobedience by defying the implicit cultural standard that only heterosexual couples get 
married, and only their unions are publicly celebrated. 
 In each of these studies, activists did not simply adopt state-directed tactics like 
protest marches and direct them at cultural targets.  Like state-directed tactics, these 
culture-directed tactics are explicit cultural tools employed by a micro- or meso-level 
social group to   communicate implicit meanings that challenge social power.  The 
difference is that cultural equality is a direct goal and the state, through its role 
establishing legal/political equality, is only indirectly involved.  With each of the studies 
reviewed, the culture-directed tactics carry rich symbolic meaning beyond the simple 
communication of political power of state-directed demonstrations.  The tactics 
themselves are creative ways to challenge culture through enacting new meanings.  They 
challenge macro-level implicit meanings directly, implying an “outside in” model of the 
effect of culture on individual behavior.  In this dissertation I consider the ways that Pride 
parades direct their external message towards macro-level culture. 
 Evidence from these studies about the internal community building effects of 
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culture-directed tactics are mixed on their difference from state-directed tactics.  Taylor et 
al. (2009) noted that participants in San Francisco same-sex marriages, like participants 
in political mass demonstrations, experienced collective effervescence through which 
they bonded with other participants.  Rupp & Taylor (2003), however, found that drag 
performances expanded the scope of those who participated in or observed cultural 
protest.  As entertainment, these drag performances appealed to broad audiences while 
still engaging in cultural critique.  More research is needed to tie internal cultural effects 
with the external message and direction of protest along with the wider social conditions 
against which participants protest.   
 This research points to the promise of studying movement actions directed at 
targets other than the state, even when that target is the intangible dominant culture. 
However, more research is needed to match the tactics activists use to their particular 
social contexts.  This dissertation is an attempt to meet this need through a study of 
LGBT Pride parades.  I describe and analyze \ the external cultural message of Pride 
parades and their internal cultural work, then link these two sides to LGBT people's 
social/political status in American society. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 My examination of LGBT Pride parades starts with a description and analysis of 
the first Pride events held in New York City and Los Angeles in 1970.  The marches were 
held simultaneously to commemorate the one year anniversary of the Stonewall riots and 
to promote a new era of gay and lesbian visibility.  Though they differed in style – Los 
Angeles's event was more festive and parade-like than New York’s – the events had in 
common participants' open declaration and celebration of their gay identities.  The theme 
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of “gays marching as gays” was part of a broad change in gay and lesbian movement 
strategy to achieve cultural equality through direct challenges to both oppressive laws and 
macro-level cultural codes. 
 Next I fill in the forty year gap since the first Parades in 1970 and describe the 
current political and cultural climate for LGBT people in the U.S.  I describe changes in 
the political and cultural climate for LGBT people by reviewing key legal changes in 
state and federal sodomy laws, non-discrimination statutes, and same-sex relationship 
recognition, macro-level increases in the cultural visibility of LGBT people, and meso-
level development of culture within the LGBT population.  Next I compare the cultural 
landscape for LGBT people with that of two other identity groups, women and African 
Americans.  I argue that the primary cultural challenge for the LGBT community is 
cultural legitimacy as a group, which differs from women and African-Americans' 
challenge of cultural respect.  I tie the challenge for cultural legitimacy to the recent 
historical emergence of LGBT people as an identity group.  I also compare the LGBT 
community's cultural resources with those of women and African-Americans.  I show the 
unique challenge for LGBT people is to come together as a group to build collective 
identity other resources.  These challenges stem from the relative lack of “free spaces” in 
which to develop these resources.  In this chapter I set the stage for my study of 
contemporary LGBT Pride parades by defining those challenges and resources that are 
unique to the LGBT population and identifying those they have in common with other 
identity groups. 
 In the fourth chapter I trace the diffusion of Pride parades since 1970 and detail 
the methods of data collection and analysis for this study of contemporary parades.  
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Using data collected on all U.S. Pride parades, I summarize their current distribution by 
size and geography.  Next, I describe my study of contemporary U.S. Pride parades using 
field observations, crowd data, and participant interviews.  I systematically selected six 
parades to cover a range of variables include size, geographic region, demographics, and 
cultural climate towards LGBT people.  During the summer and fall of 2010 I observed 
each parade, took detailed fieldnotes, talked informally with marchers and spectators, and 
recruited participants for semi-structured phone interviews.  I conducted 50 of these 
interviews from the fall of 2010 to spring 2011, transcribed them, and analyzed them 
using the qualitative software MAXQDA.  I compared parades on two dichotomous 
variables: number of participants (small/medium vs. large) and cultural climate (gay-
friendly vs. non gay-friendly).  Finally, I analyzed photographs of spectators at each 
parade in order to roughly estimate the makeup of crowds by race/ethnicity, gender, and 
gender presentation.  I discuss methodological issues I encountered in this qualitative 
study of one-day events. 
 In the following two chapters I present data collected at six Pride parades.  The 
first chapter focuses on externally-oriented dimensions of Pride parades.  I argue that 
these parades attempt to change culture by contesting a dominant cultural code that 
regards homosexuality as a source of shame.  At Pride parades participants flip the 
cultural code on its head through visibility, celebration, and support of LGBT people.  I 
link this to the varying cultural climates in which parades are held by showing that 
participants in non gay-friendly climates emphasize support while those in gay-friendly 
climates emphasize celebration. 
 The second data chapter presents the internally-focused dimensions of Pride 
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parades.  I argue that LGBT people face cultural, structural, and demographic barriers to 
coming together to develop collective identity and that Pride parades are a site for this 
development.  I show that Pride parades facilitate the collective identity formation and 
maintenance by bring LGBT people physically together, fostering shared emotions, and 
constructing boundaries.  I also analyze the trade-offs of collective identity development 
at Pride as those with more non-normative gender or sexual displays are sometimes 
marginalized in order be more welcoming to straight ally participants and to present a 
more palatable image of the community to the mainstream. In contrast to externally-
oriented dimensions, internal dimensions vary in less patterned ways by parade size, 
cultural climate, and participants' sexual identities. 
 To conclude this dissertation, I summarize the ways Pride parades are thoroughly 
cultural protest tactics.  Operating within the cultural arena, Pride parades are explicit 
cultural tools used to challenge macro-level cultural codes.  I then discuss the ways my 
study can be used as a framework to research other cultural protest tactics.  This 
framework integrates cultural sociology with social movement theory and research.  
Finally, I suggest future areas of research on cultural protest in other social movements 
and on the links between political and cultural sides to identity-based social movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
PRIDE BEGINNINGS 
 
 
The first march was very much in keeping with how I saw myself 
politically. Something new and unique to my experience, the way I saw 
myself politically. It was unique because this was the first time in my life 
that I marched for myself. I marched for my freedom, I wasn’t marching 
as an advocate for someone else’s freedom, civil rights for instance, that 
was uniquely different. That I saw that my identity as a gay man was 
worthy of political formulation, worthy of a march in up an avenue in 
America in 1970 so that was unique and I saw progression in terms of my 
own development, in terms of how I saw human rights and the rights of 
people, so that was uniquely different. 
 
- Stephen F. Dansky, marched in New York City Pride, 1970 
 
 
 The first Pride events were held on June 28, 1970 simultaneously in New York 
City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, and drew roughly 5,000 marchers and an equal number 
of spectators1.  In terms of sheer size, these were the largest public gatherings of gays and 
lesbians in human history.  That alone makes the events historically significant, but I 
argue that even more than size these were significant adaptations of social movement 
tactics.  Coming out of the 1960s/70s protest cycle, Pride participants “took to the streets” 
in a familiar way for a new cause: gay and lesbian cultural equality. This new and bold 
action signaled a change in the strategy of gay and lesbian activists, from the more 
                                                 
1   While Chicago’s event continues as one of the nation’s largest parades today, I focus on the marches in 
NYC and LA because they were significantly bigger (~3,500 in NYC, ~1,200 in LA compared to ~200 
in Chicago). 
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modest and accommodating tactics of the homophile phase to the unapologetic strategies 
of gay liberation and gay identity phases of LGBT activism. 
 In the last chapter I argued that Pride parades complicate the role of culture in 
social movement theory because, rather than the state, they target macro-level implicit 
cultural codes.  In this chapter I examine the origins of Pride events to show their point of 
departure from state-directed mass demonstrations.  I explain what was, in Stephen 
Dansky's words, “uniquely different” about the 1970 Pride events in New York City and 
Los Angeles as compared to both earlier gay and lesbian activism and tactics used by 
other movements.  I connect these Pride events both to social movement literature on 
tactic diffusion and to the development of gay and lesbian activism in the last forty years. 
With his concept of modularity, Tarrow (1998) formalized the notion that the 
modern repertoire of contention contains tactics that can be used for many situations, 
purposes, and towards different targets.  In the language of cultural sociology, the modern 
tactical repertoire is is a cultural toolkit from which activists draw to make contentious 
claims (Swidler 1986).  A tactic such as a protest march or sit-in communicated culturally 
intelligible meanings that are modular, or adaptable to activists' specific purposes.  
Diffusion of social movement tactics are theorized to occur in a cycle in which a new 
tactic is slowly adopted by a few, then diffusion increases rapidly as many groups adopt 
the tactic, and finally the process tapers because all (or most) possible groups have 
adopted the tactic (Oliver & Meyers 2003; Soule 2004). Within this model, scholars 
identify the mechanisms by which tactics diffuse, showing that social movement groups 
hear about new tactics directly via social networks (either through formal organizational 
or informal social communication) and indirectly through media accounts (Andrews & 
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Biggs 2006; Oliver & Meyers 2003; Soule 1997, 2004).  When diffusion is through 
indirect channels, shared collective identity is important so that those potential adopters 
that are more culturally and structurally similar are more likely to use the tactic (Conell & 
Cohn 1995; Soule 1997).  
Protests are not held regularly across time but in cycles (Tarrow 1998).  A cycle of 
protest (or contention) is a period of heightened conflict across a social system in which 
movements for many causes take collective action and there is diffusion of new tactical 
forms, identities, and frames (McAdam 1995; Snow & Benford 1992; Tarrow 1998).  
Movements do not exist as discrete units but as part of “movement families” that respond 
to similar political opportunities and jointly create and share resources such as tactics, 
identities, and frames (Koopmans 2004; McAdam 1995; Meyer & Whittier 1994;  Tarrow 
1998).   
Scholars identify a protest cycle during the 1960s and 1970s when contentious 
actions surged for movements on the political left including those for civil rights, women, 
farm workers, and gays and lesbians (McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997; Tarrow 1998).  
These movements had in common the idea that an oppressed group – their difference 
marked by race, ethnicity, gender, etc. - could challenge their cultural inequality through 
collective action (Morris 1999).  They also had in common the use of disruptive mass 
demonstrations such as marches, rallies, boycotts, and sit-ins (Morris 1999).  Activists in 
previous social movements had employed many of these tactics, but in the 60s/70s protest 
cycle they were used heavily and adapted by activists working for a host of causes.  Mass 
numbers of people with little social power, such as African-Americans, students, and 
women, used nonviolent tactics to claim social power by disrupting the normal order of 
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society (McAdam 1983).  Through sit-ins at segregated lunch counters and marches for 
equality along New York's 5th Ave. and in Washington, DC, activists demanded attention 
to their grievances by refusing to go along with their cultural and legal inequality. 
Movements that emerged later in the protest cycle drew from the innovative tactics used 
by activists in earlier movements (McAdam 1983; 1995; Morris 1999). 
 Many gays and lesbians participated in movements of the 60s/70s protest cycle, 
including civil rights, women's, and the New Left (Adam 1995; Valocchi 2001).  
Lesbians, in particular, were a strong segment of the women's movement though they 
were subject to homophobia from straight feminists (Adam 1995).  In addition to direct 
participation, gay and lesbian activists drew inspiration and motivation from the 
successes of the civil rights, women's, and other movements of the 1960s and their use of 
visible disruptive tactics (Adam 1995; Bernstein 2002; D'Emilio 1998).  Thus, the tactical 
innovations of other movements in the 60s/70s protest cycle were important influences 
for the Pride marches of 1970.  My task in this chapter is to show what was new about 
these events.  I argue that they were more than extensions of a familiar tactic to a new 
cause, but significantly modified the protest march tactic.  These first Pride events gave 
birth to the Pride phenomena that today reaches over on hundred U.S. cities and as many 
locations abroad. 
 To construct this narrative, I use published research on the gay and lesbian 
movement, contemporary news reports and editorials from the gay periodical the 
Advocate, and first person accounts from ten participants in early Pride events.  The 
Advocate was founded in 1967 and by 1970 had the largest circulation of all gay 
periodicals.  Unlike other gay periodicals of the time, it established a news focus rather 
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than mixing news and fiction (Streitmatter 1993).  While it was published in Los Angeles 
the paper maintained a national focus, signaled by its name change from the Los Angeles 
Advocate to simply the Advocate in the spring of 1970 (Streitmatter 1993).  Though not a 
perfect source, the Advocate was the most wide-ranging, news-oriented, and largest 
circulating gay periodical of the time.  The main source of new information in this 
chapter is through first person accounts with Pride participants.  I interviewed five men 
and one woman who marched in New York’s first march, one man and one woman from 
LA, one man who marched in New York’s second march and organized Philadelphia’s 
first march in 1972, and I include a first person account from another woman who 
marched in Los Angeles’s first parade and organized subsequent events.  I refer to Pride 
participants by name throughout the chapter, and provide brief biographical sketches of 
each in Appendix A. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical background to today’s Pride 
parades by showing how they came about, how they were organized, and what the 
experience was for participants.  I explain how the marches in New York and Los 
Angeles were different than any actions taken by gay activists before.  My historical 
overview sheds light on the meaning of the events in 1970 and places them in historical 
context.  In a nutshell, I find that what was truly new about the first Pride events was that 
it was the first large-scale action in which gay men and lesbians publicly showed 
themselves as gay and lesbian, declaring it worthy of celebration and respect. 
Setting the Stage for Stonewall  
 
 By June 1969, cultural and structural elements were present for a gay cultural 
uprising.  There was a profound disconnect between gays' structural position and their 
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cultural and legal treatment.  Structurally, the Industrial Revolution allowed people for 
the first time in history to organize their lives around sexual and romantic preferences.  
The Industrial Revolution introduced wage work so that an individual could 
economically sustain herself apart from her family.  It brought people to cities for 
industrial jobs where they were able to congregate based on personal affinity.  This made 
it possible for a person, whatever his sexual orientation, to meet and form a relationship 
with someone based on preference and still survive financially (Adam 1985; 1995; 
D'Emilio  1983; 1998)2.  Chauncey (1994) documented a thriving gay male culture in 
New York City with neighborhood enclaves, publicized social events, and commercial 
establishments from 1890 to 1940.  Other historians told the stories of predominantly gay 
male cultures in San Francisco, Portland (OR), Atlanta, and Boston (Boag 2003; Boyd 
2003; Chenault 2008; The History Project 1998).  World War II sped up this process in 
the U.S. Massive numbers of men and women were mobilized for the war effort, drawing 
them together in cities and in the service.  This structural change meant that previously 
isolated gay men and women could meet each other and create community.  They 
established gay bars in port cities like San Francisco, New York, and Seattle and 
networks of gay soldiers and industrial workers (Bérubé 1990, D'Emilio 1998).  At the 
same time, the military paid more attention to homosexuality than any time in the past, 
screening recruits for perceived homosexual tendencies and dishonorably discharging 
service women and men if they were discovered to be gay (Bérubé 1990) 
                                                 
2 This does not mean that gays and lesbians were free from inequality based on other factors such as race, 
gender, and class. Nor were they free from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.  It means 
only that it was possible for some gays and lesbians to organize their lives around their sexuality. 
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 In the 1950s, gays began to organize for social change just as the federal and state 
governments increased policing of homosexual behavior.  State-led anti-vice campaigns 
resulted in large increases in the number of sodomy arrests across the country, and while 
these laws technically could be applied to hetersexual acts, these campaigns targeted gay 
men's sexual behavior (Eskridge 2008).  McCarthy era congressional investigations 
named gay and lesbian service members and federal employees as threats to national 
security (D'Emilio 1998).  With this state pressure gay men and lesbians were 
increasingly at risk of arrest, losing their jobs, and cultural disregard.  The first gay and 
lesbian activist organizations were founded in the midst of this legal and cultural 
repression.  Harry Hay created the Mattachine Society for (mostly) gay men in Los 
Angeles and Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon founded the Daughters of Bilitis for lesbians in 
San Francisco (Adam 1995; D'Emilio 1998).  Both groups had modest goals3: to provide 
social support to gays outside the bar scene and to educate professionals in the medical 
and psychological communities about gays and lesbians.  They thought that if straight 
professionals tempered their rhetoric about gays' inherent sickness, then the mainstream 
would not see them as a threat to morality and social order.  Scholars describe the 
homophile movement as “accommodationist” because they did not challenge mainstream 
negative policies and perceptions head on, but rather attempted to forge a safe 
compromise in which they could live unmolested. (Adam 1995; D'Emilio 1998; 
Rimmerman 2002) 
 During the 1960s, many gays and lesbians were active in civil rights, women's, 
                                                 
3 Hay created the Mattachine Society originated with more radical aims, but more moderate activists took 
the group over within two years. 
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and students movements.  As noted above, they gained both inspiration and practical 
training in mobilization, movement organization, and protest tactics from these 
experiences.  By 1969 they had many resources with which to challenge their cultural 
inequality.  But while many gays and lesbians had the ability to support themselves 
economically, commercial spaces in which to socialize, and cultural resources with which 
to assert their social power, they faced intense harassment from police and cultural 
disregard.  Many lived happy and productive lives but were maligned by mainstream 
society as criminals, sinners, and mentally ill (Carter 2004; Ghaziani 2008; Herrell 1996).  
Though organizations had actively worked for social change for nearly twenty years, in 
1969 gays and lesbians had no legal protections so could be (and often were) fired from 
their jobs and denied housing for being gay.  Laws made homosexual sex illegal in most 
states and some ordinances made it effectively illegal to congregate in bars (Carter 2004; 
Eskridge 2008).  Since owners operating a gay bar could not get a liquor license, their 
bars were frequently raided by police for liquor law violations (Carter 2004; Eskridge 
2008).  In New York City, the Mafia operated many gay bars (Carter 2004; Duberman 
1993).  After twenty years of homophile activism and during a time of broad social 
change and more radical activism, urban gays had activist know-how and socialization.  
They were economically and socially able to fight back against a larger cultural and legal 
system that repressed them.   
The Meaning and Significance of Stonewall  
 On June 27, 1969, police raided a gay bar called the Stonewall Inn.  The official 
reason was that it was serving alcohol without a license; the catch was that the New York 
alcohol commission would not grant licenses to bars that served gays (Carter 2004; 
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Duberman 1993).  Police raids were common on places where gays congregated – mostly 
bars and cruising areas – and were supported by laws that treated any gathering of gay 
people as sites of indecency (Adam 1995; Armstrong 2002; Armstrong & Crage 2006; 
Carter 2004; Eskridge 2008).  Rather than scattering to avoid arrest when police raided 
the Stonewall Inn, patrons fought back.  They managed to turn the tables on police by 
barricading them inside the bar.  As police reinforcements arrived, so did other gays and 
lesbians in the area and the raid became a full-blown riot.  Riots continued for three 
nights straight, ceasing during the daytime for everyone to regroup and starting again as 
night fell. (Carter 2004; Duberman 1993; Lietsch 1969) 
As Armstrong & Crage (2006) showed, the Stonewall riots became known as a 
significant turning point in the gay rights movement through interpretive work of 
contemporary gay leaders.  The event was not the first time that gay patrons fought back 
against a police raid, but because of existing activist infrastructure including relationships 
with mainstream media outlets and established gay periodicals, community leaders were 
able to get the word out early that the riots signified something big.  In this chapter 
through analysis of articles from the Advocate and first person accounts from 1970 Pride 
participants in New York City (NYC) and Los Angeles (LA), I demonstrate how 
community members interpreted the Stonewall riots. 
 Advocate portrayals of police officers reveal a perception of them as 
representatives of broader cultural disregard, not merely as isolated bad actors.  Writers 
described broad cultural struggle between gays and mainstream culture.  When reporting 
or editorializing on specific police incidents they frequently switched between naming 
the police and general macro-level culture as perpetrators of what they regarded as anti-
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gay oppression.  In an article discussing the aftermath of Stonewall, for example, the 
writer says that gays at the time had solidarity because, “[they] share a feeling of 
persecution arising from injustices dealt out to them and their gay friends by the straight 
establishment” (Jackson 1969: 11).  In this view, which was dominant among Advocate 
articles, the institutional power of the police was that of straight, mainstream society, and 
this society actively oppressed gays. 
 Writers distinguished gays' social struggle from that of racial/ethnic minority 
groups, principally African-Americans.  They felt that gays occupied a different cultural 
space because they were not recognized as a minority group but as damaged people who 
could be fixed.  Berbrier (2002) argued that the success of the civil rights movement 
changed the American cultural landscape so that a group could benefit by being 
recognized as a minority.  He documented the efforts of three groups – deaf, gay, and 
white supremacist activists – to establish themselves as culturally legitimate minorities in 
order to establish a basis for their political recognition claims (Berbier 2002).  Advocate 
writers descriptions of the Stonewall riots fit this model of claims-making.  One reporter 
wrote that the police did not respect gay rioters enough to fight brutally (like they did 
against African-Americans in civil rights protests) because they viewed gays as “sick” 
(Leitsch 1969).  In another piece, after discussing police harassment the author broadened 
the discussion to explain the difference between mainstream views of African-Americans 
and gays: 
Straight people do not regard homosexuals as a minority group like 
Negroes. The straights had moral conflicts and guilty feelings about their 
treatment of the Negro minority, but they have no such qualms when it 
comes to gays. Most Christian churches and the conservative straights 
regard them as disgusting and abominably wicked, while the liberals 
regard them as mentally ill. The Negroes had many friends in white 
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society. The number of straights who understand homosexuals and our 
plight are few – very few (Jackson 1969: 11). 
 
Jackson described a challenge that is mainly cultural, not political. By contrasting their 
struggle with that of African-Americans, Advocate writers emphasized that it was driven 
by ignorance and prejudice about what it means to be gay.  African-Americans faced 
extreme prejudice from the white majority, but for these community leaders the important 
point was that they were never told not to be black.  Advocate saw gays' cultural 
challenge as being recognized as whole individuals that could not and did not want to 
change their sexuality.  
 Advocate writers clearly interpreted the Stonewall riots as a turning point in gays’ 
approach to their place in the world.  Armstrong & Crage (2006) noted that community 
leaders advanced this interpretation from the beginning.  Advocate articles and first 
person accounts add richness to this argument by showing how they placed Stonewall as 
a turning point not just for activists within the social movement field, but for all gays and 
lesbians4.  The first mention of Stonewall in the Advocate was in September 1969 with 
two articles side by side. The first, “Police raid on N.Y. Club Sets Off First Gay Riot” 
(Leitsch 1969), was a detailed accounting of events.  The second, “N.Y. Gays: Will the 
Spark Die?” (Lige & Jack 1969a) analyzed reactions and follow up strategies.  Both 
articles emphasized Stonewall as an event that shifted gays’ stance from the homophile 
movement’s narrow and accommodationist goals to a broader, defiant challenge of gays’ 
cultural marginalization.   
Writers detailed how the gay rioters stood up for themselves as gays, using camp 
                                                 
4  Armstrong (2002) made the point that the gay identity movement ushered at this time expanded the 
field of gay social movement activism to include all who identified as gay, not just activists. 
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humor and sexual taunts to disarm police and shouting “Gay Power” and “We Want 
Freedom Now”.  In one instance, a writer reported that as police were trying to arrest one 
rioter, “A high shrill voice called out ‘Save our sister!’ and there was a general pause, 
during which the ‘butch’-looking ‘numbers’ looked distracted” (Lietsch 1969: 11).  In 
this report and subsequent articles, writers emphasized the bravery of more feminine gay 
men and drag queens who were marginalized both by mainstream and gay society.  As 
one writer pointed out, “those usually put down as ‘sissies’ or ‘swishes’ showed the most 
courage and sense during the action. Their bravery and daring saved many people from 
being hurt, and their sense of humor and ‘camp’ helped keep the crowds from getting 
nasty or too violent” (Lietsch 1969: 11).  In the homophile movement that characterized 
gay activism until the late ‘60s, activists promoted the most “respectable” image of gays 
they could – highlighting those gay men and women who followed cultural norms of 
gender presentation and were thus least threatening to this cultural order (Adam 1995; 
D'Emilio 1998; Rimmerman 2008).  By emphasizing the actions of those who most 
deviated from social norms and thus were most marginalized, writers signaled that the 
spark of Stonewall was to stand up for gays’ difference from mainstream culture.  By 
doing this, Stonewall rioters fought back  as gays in that they did not compromise the 
expressions of identity. 
Writers connected the celebration of less “respectable” gays and lesbians to 
greater pride for all in the community.  As a result of the actions at Stonewall, the poet 
Allen Ginsburg is quoted as saying “They no longer have that wounded look” (Lige & 
Jack 1969a: 3).  Writers coupled this new pride in gay identity with a motivation to act 
for social change (Jackson 1969; Kepner 1970; Lige & Jack 1969a; 1969b; Wells 1969).  
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Nikos Diaman, who participated in New York City march, also described a new optimism 
among gays in New York: 
I was joyous about the change and attitudes on the street. The people that I 
met in [New York] when I first came back had a lot of guilt. But then men 
that I was meeting after the Stonewall, they started the liberation word, 
that’s more optimistic and freer about sexuality. 
 
For Diaman, Stonewall sparked a personal change among gay men he met; for Tommi 
Mecca, the personal change resulted in a more militant attitude toward mainstream 
society:  
I think it was that spirit, that spirit of rebelliousness, of defiance because 
you know, you’ve got to remember that in the early 70’s we had 
everything against us, nobody like queers, nobody except a few fringe 
Quakers and Unitarians. Basically, religious groups thought we were the 
devil, the same with government, just about everybody so what I saw in 
NY that first time I went to the Pride march, I saw the spirit of defiance, 
the spirit of fuck you, we don't care how you think about us, we don't care 
you want to lock us up in jail or some psych ward, you are wrong and we 
are right.  
 
Both men described a changed attitude toward a hostile culture - the refusal to accept the 
message that gays and lesbians are mentally ill, sinners, or criminals and adoption of a 
view that being gay is a valid human difference that deserves cultural acceptance. 
Along with this new motivation to challenge mainstream cultural codes, 
community leaders were concerned with using the new spark to focus on internal unity of 
the gay and lesbian community.  These two foci, external and internal, went together as 
activist groups in NYC planned both political rallies and social gatherings immediately 
after the riots (Carter 2004; Lige & Jack 1969a; 1969b).  Many participants I interviewed 
attended these events.  Nikos Diaman traced his involvement in the Gay Liberation Front 
(GLF), an activist group that played a major part in the first march, to attending a dance 
sponsored by the group.  Martha Shelley reported organizing smaller protest events, 
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activities for which she was mentioned in the Advocate (Lige & Jack 1969b).  On the 
west coast, the Advocate reported that the Western Homophile Conference of 1969 
centered on concerns of unity and change (“Western Regional” 1969). 
Preparing to March 
At Stonewall, gays of all types – women and men, drag queens, youths living on 
the streets, and adults with white collar jobs - fought back against harassment that they 
saw as personally directed at them and motivated by disapproval for who they were.  
They fought back as gays, with drag queens and feminine men at the front making 
sexually suggestive comments in response to police harassment and using camp humor to 
defuse tension.  They showed that gays had power without compromising themselves, in 
stark contrast to the stance of the homophile movement.   
Stonewall was essentially reactive; gays fought back when attacked.  In the 
months after the attack community leaders debated what to do next.  There was a spark in 
the community, a desire for more action, and many were concerned that this spark did not 
breed militancy.  A commemorative march on the anniversary of Stonewall was first 
proposed at the Eastern Regional Conference of Homophile Organizations (ERCHO) in 
November 1969 (Carter 2004).  Since 1965, ERCHO had sponsored Annual Reminders 
on July 4th at Independence Hall in Philadelphia that were intended to bring attention to 
gay rights (Bernstein 2002; Carter 2004)  Participants followed a strict dress code of 
jackets and ties for men and dresses for women and silently held signs declaring, “15 
MILLION HOMOSEXUAL AMERICANS ASK FOR EQUALITY, OPPORTUNITY, 
DIGNITY” (Carter 2004; Rainbow History Project 2011).  At the 1969 conference, Craig 
Rodwell, who had conceived of the Annual Reminders, offered a resolution to change this 
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event: 
That the Annual Reminder, in order to be more relevant, reach a greater 
number of people, and encompass the ideas and ideals of the larger 
struggle in which we are engaged – that of our fundamental human rights 
– be moved in time and location. 
 
We propose that a demonstration be held annually on the last Saturday in 
June in New York City to commemorate the 1969 spontaneous 
demonstrations on Christopher Street and this demonstration be called 
CHRISTOPHER STREET LIBERATION DAY.  No dress or age 
regulations shall be made for this demonstration.   
 
We also propose that we contact Homophile organizations throughout the 
country and suggest that they hold parallel demonstrations on that day.  
We propose a nationwide show of support. (Carter 2004: 230) 
 
The resolution was adopted, and planning began for the first Pride march on June 28, 
1970.  
 It is unclear exactly when planning started in Los Angeles but there were three 
main leaders: Morris Kight, head of GLF, Troy Perry, who had founded the Metropolitan 
Community Church (MCC) in 1968 to serve gays and lesbians, and Bob Humphries.  
These three activists applied for a parade permit that included “decorated floats, 
marching bands, riders on horseback, and possibly a small elephant” (“Permit Hassle” 
1970: 1).  The application was met with resistance by the police commission, who wanted 
organizers to take out a bond for $1.5 million in the event that there was violent backlash 
to their parade and properties were damaged.  Comments made by commissioners, 
reported by the Advocate, revealed that their view of gays and lesbians was exactly that 
which the parade meant to challenge.  Police Chief Davis was quoted saying, “we would 
be ill-advised to discommode the people to have a burglars’ or robbers’ parade or a 
homosexuals’ parade” (“Permit Hassle” 1970: 1), and others similarly questioned the 
worth of a gay parade. Commissioners did not see gays and lesbians as a legitimate group 
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to hold a parade.   
Despite the police commission’s refusal, organizers succeeded in getting a permit 
after filing suit against the commission.  In his ruling, Judge Schauer compared gays’ 
right to demonstrate as equal to that of other minority groups, saying  
Whether it is a group of Negroes demonstrating in Jackson, Miss., for civil 
rights, or a group of homosexuals demonstrating for equal rights in 
Hollywood, wherever people are attempting to demonstrate peacefully to 
petition their government for redress of grievances, it is the duty of the 
police that are paid by the taxpayer – including the demonstrators – to 
protect them from intervention by hoodlums, and not attempt to keep them 
from exercising their constitutional rights (“Permit Hassle” 1970: 6). 
 
The judge granted the permit on the basis that any group is allowed to demonstrate for 
their rights and receive police protection, equating gays and lesbians with African-
American civil rights demonstrators.  He ruled that commissioners’ opinion of the group 
did not matter for their constitutional right to demonstrate.  Thus, the judge upheld gays 
and lesbians' legal/political equality under the law to hold a demonstration. 
 There was no similar hassle in New York as a coalition of groups there planned 
their march.  NYC activists had better relationships with city officials, at least good 
enough to receive a permit (Armstrong & Crage 2006).  Accounts from participants and 
the Advocate show a difference in make-up of the planning committees in each city.  In 
New York, activist groups explicitly working for political and cultural change from New 
York, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, and other major cities had been conferencing 
together and planning the Annual Reminders in Philadelphia since 1963 under the name 
East Coast Homophile Organizations (ECHO, later called ERCHO) (D'Emilio 1998).  As 
the name suggests, the coalition was comprised of groups that had been working mainly 
with the pre-Stonewall homophile strategy of narrow goals and accommodationist tactics.  
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They were joined by newer groups with the more outspoken and uncompromising 
liberation approach such as the GLF.  Tommi Mecca, who planned Philadelphia’s first 
Pride march in 1972 and participated in NYC’s in 1971, described the tension between 
older homophile and newer liberation groups:  
There was always friction there between us and the homophile people 
because the homophile people weren’t as sold on this idea of coming out 
of the closet and really being out there and using your real name and all of 
this stuff and we were...I think they [homophile activists] saw the writing 
on the wall, saw that we were the future and that was really smart on their 
part because we were, we were very much a part of the present and the 
future.   
 
Though different in strategy, nearly all groups involved in planning NYC Pride were 
social movement organizations with the primary goal of social change through political 
and cultural contestation (“N.Y. Groups Set Big Liberation Day March” 1970). 
 LA's march was organized more by strong community leaders who were 
prominent both for activism and social activities than by representatives from activist 
groups.  One participant I talked to, Ruth Weiss, moved from New York to Los Angeles 
in May of 1970 and was familiar with both committees.  Her impression was that LA’s 
committee was much more hierarchical, with a few individuals setting policies and 
delegating work.  Pat Rocco corroborated this impression. Along with Kight, Perry, and 
Humphries, he identified himself as a main organizer of the parade.  While Kight was 
prominent as an activist and founder of LA’s GLF chapter, Perry and Humphries were 
both ministers in addition to their activism and Rocco was prominent for his filmmaking 
and performance.  According to Del Whan, who was active with the militant group GLF, 
Kight believed that in order to be successful the parade must include a broad community 
coalition.  Thus those who planned LA’s parade represented more than the activist 
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segment of the gay and lesbian community, while NYC’s planning committee came 
wholly from it.  NYC’s march was organized by a coalition of group representatives and 
LA’s by four strong leaders. 
 Advocate writers and Pride participants envisioned the first march in many ways.  
Central to all was the idea of celebrating the Stonewall riots and carrying on the new 
spirit of open, bold, and defiant declaration of sexuality.  Organizer Morris Kight in Los 
Angeles was quoted in the Advocate describing the planned event as “a love-in…entirely 
peaceful and non-violent…which is the essence of love” (“Permit Hassle” 1970: 6).  The 
official title of the event was “Christopher Street-West: A Freedom Revival in Lavender,” 
which speaks more of a celebratory event than a defiant protest.  The newspaper also 
described NYC’s planned event as a “freedom march”, referring perhaps to Freedom 
Rides of the civil rights movement or to the expected feeling of liberation marchers 
would experience by marching openly on city streets.  In contrast with the Annual 
Reminders, there was no dress code and everyone who wished was to be included.  Many 
participants who had been active in other movements such as civil rights and the 
women’s movement said they initially saw the event much like other protest marches at 
the time, but it was unique because it was for gays and lesbians rather than another group. 
The Big Gay March 
On Sunday afternoon at 2pm, June 29, about 3,000 people marched in 75° 
weather through Manhattan (“Thousands March” 1970; Tucker 1970).  Spanning over 
three miles, this first Pride march was longer than the 2010 parade by half a mile and 
went from Christopher Street in the heart of the gay neighborhood and the location of the 
now boarded up Stonewall Inn up 5th Ave. to Sheep’s Meadow in Central Park.  In Los 
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Angeles, 1,200 marchers stepped off at 7pm to parade down Hollywood Blvd in front of 
a crowd four to five thousand (estimates vary widely, some claiming up to 15,000 
spectators) (“1200 Parade in Hollywood” 1970; Houston 1970; “Thousands March” 
1970).   
Marchers were not sure what to expect because this was a new event.  Police 
harassment was frequent and supported by laws that made it difficult for gays and 
lesbians to congregate without fear.  Losing one’s job for being gay was a constant threat, 
heightened by a highly publicized 1969 incident in which San Francisco activist Gale 
Whittington was fired from his job at States Steamship Company after appearing with his 
lover in the gay periodical the Berkeley Barb (Armstrong 2002; Carter 2004).  LA Pride's 
permit was hard to come by and the difficulty in obtaining it evidences the degree of 
cultural resistance (“1200 Parade in Hollywood” 1970; “Permit Hassle” 1970).  Pat 
Rocco and Ruth Weiss, in LA, and Martha Shelley in NYC described talking to many 
gays and lesbians who were afraid to march for fear of repercussions with their jobs and 
families.  Nikos Diaman, in New York, said he was, “a little bit apprehensive because I 
didn't know what would happen. If there would be violence directed towards us, etc.” 
Stephen F. Dansky, also in NYC, reflected more strongly on his fear that day: 
In 1970 when we first march, we were illegal sexually, hospitalized mental 
illness as part of a diagnosis that was given by the American Psychiatric 
Association in the diagnostic manual which also is used for diagnoses. We 
could have been arrested for so called sodomy…. So when the first march 
occurred, we were not legitimate. We were legitimate for ourselves, but 
not legitimate for the world…The fear that I had on that very first march, I 
had no way of knowing whether we would make it, whether we would be 
attacked. There was a lot of violent protest against us. And we were 
victims of violence as we continue to be, but even more so in that era. 
 
These fears of violence and other repercussions went beyond the actions of the state; they 
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were fears of treatment by mainstream society.  The state was part of it, with the chance 
of arrest, but the bigger part was fear that the police would not or could not protect gay 
and lesbian marchers from economic or physical violence.  Fortunately, the fears were 
unwarranted as marchers in both New York and LA stepped off to mostly supportive 
crowds.  There were no reported incidents of violence or arrests. 
 The two Pride events were different.  Both mixed elements of traditional protest 
marches and celebratory parades, but NYC was closer to a protest march and LA closer to 
a parade.   In New York participants marched in formal and informal groups and held 
signs identifying their organizations.  The parade elements included, as described by the 
Advocate, 
Colorful pennants of purple, red, green, and yellow…Day-Glo signs 
reading “Gay Pride” were present everywhere. Banners and picket signs, 
mounted on cardboard tubes rather than on wooden slats, in order to 
conform to New York practice, proclaimed cities of origin and were 
carried proudly. 
 
Attire of the marchers ranged from flamboyant costumes, with laces, 
burnooses, and capes, to torn shirts and jeans, with a sprinkling of suits.  A 
few drags came in complete makeup and walked the entire three miles in 
high heels.  
(Tucker 1970: 5) 
 
While the NYC Pride march featured these festive parade elements, they did not include 
others like floats, music, or other entertainment.  Instead marchers chanted slogans like 
“2, 4, 6, 8, Gay is just as good as straight!” and held signs to “smash imperialism”.   
 NYC marcher Perry Brass attended planning sessions and reported that organizers 
were concerned to keep the march from becoming a carnivalesque parade, thinking that 
would take away from the seriousness of the event.  He described the discussions at 
planning meetings: 
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But there were other people who thought well if we do this, suppose the 
bars want to take it over and want to have floats and go-go boys. And we 
said, Martha [Shelley] and Bob and other people said no, this has got to be 
a political march, we have got to bring politics into this, it is going to be 
most of all a conscious raising event, which is what was so important to us 
at that period. ...And so we wanted this march to be a consciousness 
raising event, we didn't want it to be splashy, we didn’t want floats, we 
didn’t want disco music, we didn’t want any of that kind of stuff, we 
wanted banners, if there was going to be music, we were going to provide 
it, none of the amplified pop crap, we would have whistles and drums of 
our own. This was going to be just the idealism of young people of that 
period. 
 
For Brass and others, festive elements like amplified music and dancers would take away 
from the contentious message of the Pride march and thus make it less effective.  But 
while they eschewed these elements in favor of features common to protest marches like 
chants and banners, their event still centered on contesting the cultural place of gays and 
lesbians in society.  Their chants and signs of “Gay is Good” and “Lesbians are Lovable” 
spoke to cultural respect rather than legal equality.  Martha Shelley, another marcher that 
I interviewed, described the cultural challenge: 
The most important thing was to be out in public, to say that we were not 
going to take it anymore, to say that we were not going to let the police 
beat us up and cower in the closet. And a lot of people could get behind 
that, people who didn't have a political view...That it was gay people being 
out in public and refusing to cower in fear and refusing to buy the idea that 
we were inferior, mentally disordered, sinners, that we were as happy with 
ourselves or would be as happy with ourselves if we weren’t so beaten up 
by people as anybody else. That was something that any gay person could 
get behind. 
 
By marching on public streets and declaring their sexuality, marchers did not just say that 
“gay is just as good as straight”, they demonstrated it as well.   
 Another element to the more protest march atmosphere was the groups involved.  
The Advocate reported that representatives from over 25 formal groups marched, many 
from NYC but others from nearby cities such as Philadelphia, Newark, DE, Washington, 
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DC, and New Brunswick, NJ (Tucker 1970).  Like those who planned the parade, all 
groups listed are social movement organizations formed explicitly to enact political or 
cultural change. 
 In Los Angeles, by contrast, “Over 1000 homosexuals and their friends staged, not 
just a protest march, but a full-blown parade down world-famous Hollywood Boulevard” 
(“1200 Parade in Hollywood” 1970: 1). The Advocate piece continued its description: 
Flags and banners floated in the chill sunlight of late afternoon; a bright 
red sound truck blared martial music; drummers strutted; a horse pranced; 
clowns cavorted; 'vice cops' chased screaming 'fairies' with paper wings; 
the Metropolitan Community Church choir sang 'Onward Christian 
Soldiers'; a bronzed and muscular male model flaunted a 7 ½ foot live 
python...Sensational Hollywood had never seen anything like it. (“1200 
Parade in Hollywood” 1970: 1) 
 
The Advocate reported that there were five floats, one with a confrontational display of a 
gay man “nailed” to a cross and another with an equally provocative large jar of vasoline.   
 While many of these elements may seem to reduce the event to a frivolous 
spectacle – indeed, NYC organizers chose to exclude them for that reason – I argue that 
they declared, as NYC marchers did when they chanted, that “Gay is as good as straight”.  
By parading down a prominent street, participants were communicating that the fun and 
creative parts of their lives were worthy of celebration instead of shame.  According to 
Pat Rocco, who helped organized the parade, 
The first parade was not much a threatening parade as it was, just being 
there and doing it was enough...The first parade was just, “We're here, 
we're queer, get over it”. We didn't have a theme or that, we were just, let's 
do it and see what happens. And it did to happen and it happened in a big 
way. 
 
By Rocco's account there was not much planning about what to include or exclude from 
the parade.  While NYC organizers debated the inclusion of amplified music or 
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entertainment from bars, I have not found evidence of such a debate in the planning stage 
in Los Angeles.   
There were some though that did not think these elements were positive after the 
parade happened.  Ruth Weiss, a participant that I interviewed, was disappointed that the 
more sensational images, like the jar of vasoline, were the ones that the media picked up, 
but she blamed the media rather than the participants.  To her, the media chose to focus 
on those images that would be most offensive to mainstream readers, rather than giving 
an accurate representation of the parade as a whole.  The Advocate printed a letter from a 
dissenter to the parade, in which he or she argued 
By showing us off as a group of silly freaks, those queens sure lowered 
our public image to the level public opinion has had it set for years. How 
can we make demands for equality, based on our rights as normal citizens, 
when our public image is constantly destroyed by flamboyancy and poor 
taste? (“Readers Knock, Praise” 1970) 
 
This writer went further than Weiss by placing blame on gays and lesbians for their poor 
public image.  Other writers, though, defended the parade, saying that rights are not based 
on one's conformity and that it was those most marginalized – drag queens and 
effeminate gay men – who fought hardest during the Stonewall riots (“Readers Knock, 
Praise” 1970; “N.Y. Figure: 5000” 1970; “Remember, the ‘Queens’ Had the Balls!” 
1970).  One writer asked,  “Why do gays have to be blackmailed to suppress their own in 
catering to public prejudice?” and “Why reject our own, identify with our oppressors, 
discriminate against queens just because their life-styles are not our bag?” (“Remember, 
the ‘Queens’ Had the Balls!” 1970:18).  For these writers, Pride was about challenging 
negative cultural attitudes even at the expense of more narrow political goals. 
 One reason for the more parade-like atmosphere in Los Angeles may be that a 
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wider array of individuals and groups were involved in the event.  Rocco said the first 
parade was about making visible and showing the diversity of the gay community.  This 
diversity is reflected in the groups involved.  Social movement organizations such as 
GLF and Daughters of Bilitis marched alongside the public health group Stamp Out 
Syphilis, topless contestants riding in convertibles for the Advocate's Groovy Guy 
contest, the Grand Duchess (a drag queen) from San Francisco, and a contingent from 
Orange County marching with the banner, “Homosexuals for Ronald Reagan” (1200 
Parade in Hollywood 1970).  As discussed earlier, organizers in Los Angeles sought to 
include a broad coalition of community groups from the beginning which included social 
movement activists, public health groups, bars, and drag performers. 
 LA marchers also showed the diversity of the gay and lesbian community by 
presenting themselves in ways that defied stereotypes.  The Advocate reported two 
contingents and the reactions they received.  The first was a man who “drew delighted 
whoops all along the parade route” as he marched with two Alaskan Huskies and a sign 
that said “Not All of Us Walk Poodles” (1200 Parade in Hollywood 1970: 6).  Another 
was a gay motorcycle group decked out in leather and riding Harley-Davidsons that 
“tended to shock straight spectators into silence”.  The Advocate continued with a 
conversation among spectators: 
“Don't tell me they're part of it,” a girl said in a small voice. 
 
“They couldn't be,” her slender young male escort muttered, “They 
couldn't be.”  
 
(“1200 Parade in Hollywood” 1970: 6) 
 
While many participants did present themselves stereotypically, others such as these two 
contingents tried to challenge stereotypes by showing that not all in the gay community 
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conform to them.  What ties these together is that gay men and lesbians paraded through 
streets in celebration of their sexuality, however it manifested, and in defiance of a 
mainstream culture that condemned them as immoral, criminal, or mentally ill. 
Themes of the NYC and LA Pride Events 
 Through first person accounts with participants and reports from the Advocate, I 
isolated four themes to the first Pride events in New York and Los Angeles.  Just as 
rioters at Stonewall fought back without compromising their gay identities, the 
overarching theme of the first Pride march was gays marching as gays – not for a specific 
cause, not for another group, but declaring that their gay identity was legitimate and their 
stigmatization was to be publicly challenged. Instead of promoting the least objectionable 
image possible, as they had done at Annual Reminders, gays and lesbians were 
unapologetic in their divergence from mainstream norms of sexuality and gender 
expression.  Ruth Weiss, who marched in the LA parade in 1970 and in NYC's Pride 
march in subsequent years, directly referenced this contrast with Annual Reminders: 
We were not like the homophile movement. We were out there and we 
were in your face. “We're here, we're queer, get used to it. If you don't like 
it get out of our way.” Part of the impetus was a counterpoint to the 4th of 
July marches by Mattachine which had a dress code. We were just going 
to get out there in whatever you wanted to wear and very festive and tie-
dyed. 
 
To Ruth, the dress code of ties, suit coats, and dresses served to mask participants’ true 
selves in order to make homosexuality less of a challenge to mainstream culture.  Annual 
Reminders sought to present gays and lesbians as no different from straight people 
whereas Pride events were meant to highlight difference and bring visibility to the gay 
community.  As Ruth said, Pride participants could wear what they wanted, meaning they 
were free to present their true gay selves.   
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 Scholars of LGBT activism mark the Stonewall riots as a turning point in the 
movement (Adam 1995; Armstrong 2002; D'Emilio 1998; Rimmerman 2008).  
Movement strategy switched from an interest group model in which activists sought 
narrow goals and emphasized gays' and lesbians' similarity to the heterosexual 
mainstream to an identity politics model seeking recognition of difference and inclusion.  
This more holistic model put the focus on ordinary people's gay identity, making each 
person's declaration of his or her homosexuality an act to further movement goals.  The 
Pride events in New York and Los Angeles were collective actions to challenge macro-
level cultural norms through participants' declaration and celebration o gay identity.  
Whereas Annual Reminders were collective actions that embodied the homophile 
movement's interest group strategy by presenting gays and lesbians as non-threatening, 
different in only one small aspect, gays and lesbians collectively showed difference that 
challenged macro-level culture at Pride events.    
 Though the look of the Pride events in New York and Los Angeles differed, they 
had in common the open display of gays and lesbians without regard to making the image 
palatable to mainstream society.  In New York, that took the form of a protest march with 
festive elements to celebrate gay identity; in Los Angeles participants put on a parade to 
make this identity visible.  Many participants that I interviewed understood Pride in 
relation to their activism with movements for civil rights and women.  In the quote that 
opens this chapter, Steven F. Dansky said the connection with other movements made 
Pride special because it was the first time as an activist that he marched for his own 
identity and not that of someone else.  He likened Pride to consciousness-raising events 
of the women's movement, saying that like those Pride was intended to raise awareness of 
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both participants and the public of the importance and legitimacy of an identity that is 
culturally maligned.   
 Another participant, Perry Brass, summed up the march more simply, saying, “We 
saw the march as being something that has never happened before. In the fact that it was 
going to be overtly, unshamlessly, unapologetically gay” - that is, without concessions to 
macro-level cultural pressure to hide markers of sexual difference.  Most NYC organizers 
and marchers had strong activist backgrounds and marched with social movement groups, 
so their “unapologetically gay” event took the familiar form of a protest march with 
banners, signs, and chants.  The participants in Los Angeles came from a broader base of 
the gay community – drag performers, church members, public health advocates, and 
social movement activists – and they put on a parade to showcase all these facets of their 
community. 
 Many aspects of the Pride events challenged mainstream culture.  In Los Angeles 
in particular, contingents such as the Groovy Guy contest and the float with an oversized 
jar of vasoline were both overt celebrations of gay sexuality that contrasted sharply with 
homophile activists’ strategy to get along by minimizing the importance of gays’ and 
lesbians' sexual desires.  NYC participants took a less theatrical but not less contentious 
approach by marching with signs and slogans to collectively declare their gay identity 
and assert their cultural worth.  Perry Brass, the New York participant who described the 
march as “unapologetically gay”, explained this was culturally contentious: 
There's an aspect to our march which also had a confrontational aspect to 
it. The fact that we were showing people in broad daylight that we existed, 
and this was something that never happened. My favorite quote from that 
period, a wonderful man named Jerry Hoose, he was shouting as we were 
walking up 6th avenue, “We're not in a dark bar anymore, we're out of the 
shadows and in the sunlight.” That’s what Jerry said and this was the 
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hallmark of the march, this was in broad daylight, we're not hiding 
anymore. 
 
Before Stonewall, gays and lesbians – both as activists and in their everyday lives – by 
and large tried to get along by accommodating themselves to a hostile culture. It was not 
safe to publicly display their sexuality so they were open with each other only in a few 
limited spaces.  One of the most prevalent spaces was bars, which were less than ideal 
because they were run by the Mafia in New York and frequently raided by police.  The 
only way that most people could be gay, if at all, was to hide their sexuality in 
mainstream society and confine that part of their identity to dark bars.  Pride flipped this 
on its head by bringing gays and lesbians “out of the shadows and into the sunlight”.  It 
was not a political challenge because, as the Los Angeles judge affirmed in granting the 
permit for that parade, gays and lesbians had the constitutional right to assemble.  It was 
instead a challenge to the macro-level cultural code prescribing how gays and lesbians 
were supposed to act. 
 I argue that the overarching theme of Pride events was gays and lesbians marching 
as themselves and this was a cultural challenge.  A second theme was that marchers and 
Advocate writers were clear that Pride was something unique that had never been done 
before.  Armstrong & Crage (2006) showed that participants in the Stonewall riots self-
consciously interpreted the event as an important turning point in gay activism, and from 
my research this theme continued with the first Pride events in New York and Los 
Angeles.  By their size alone these events were significant as the biggest gatherings of 
open gays and lesbians in history.  The Advocate signaled the importance of Pride by 
devoting the first six pages of its July 22, 1970 to coverage of Pride events, including a 
full page of pictures.  Coverage continued in subsequent issues as the periodical 
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published letters to the editor analyzing the events' impact and debating future steps for 
the movement. 
 Participants interpreted Pride as more than a novel achievement, but as a new 
concept entirely.  Many marchers that I interviewed had been active with other social 
movements so that the form of the events, in New York in particular, was not new to their 
experience.  What was new was that the Pride events were centered on gay identity and 
not on another identity or cause.  According to NYC  participant Paul Guzzardo,  
It was very exciting because it was a gay one. You know, lots of gay guys 
and women that were marching together and that was what made it so 
exciting. And after being oppressed for so many years, this was just so 
liberating, I couldn't believe it. To walk down the street and say, “This is 
who we are.”  Just really great.  
 
Guzzardo's quote reinforces the overarching theme of gays marching as gays, but he also 
makes the point that this planned collective visibility was new to his and others' 
experience.   
 Another theme was the strong emotional experience participants had in the march.  
Jasper (2011) noted that protest marches often evoke a range of emotions from anger to 
elation and this side of social movement experience is often overlooked by researchers.  
Advocate writers and interviewees described fellow participants as “elated” and 
“jubilant” because they were able to march openly with many others for the first time 
(“1200 Parade in Hollywood” 1970; Tucker 1970).  One participant compared the “high” 
he felt to those brought on by drugs or alcohol. The Advocate described the upbeat mood: 
Activities conducted by the various organizations during the week and the 
obvious success of the event itself had combined to give protesters what 
most described as a “real feeling of self-liberation.” Before, during, and 
after the march Gays freely demonstrated affection by holding hands, 
embracing, and kissing.  (Tucker 1970: 5) 
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The Advocate attributed participants' excitement to both pride in putting on a successful 
event and the liberation of being able to publicly display their sexuality (“1200 Parade in 
Hollywood” 1970; Tucker 1970).  LA participants Pat Rocco and Del Whan echoed these 
sentiments, saying they felt elated and noted that others both marching and in the crowd 
showed their excitement by cheering, smiling, and clapping.  Rocco said that he and 
others were in “seventh heaven... We walked down the street so proudly and often so 
tearingly, just so amazed of the whole concept of that first parade ever. Our attitude and 
elation were boundless.”  The atmosphere of Pride events was thus matched with the 
collective effervescence common to mass demonstrations (Jasper 2011).  What made it 
different from other parades or marches was the reasons given for the emotions, 
highlighting the significance of the events as a cultural challenge that fit with gays and 
lesbians experiences. 
 Participants talked about their excitement at seeing so many people marching for 
gays and the thrill they felt from openly showing affection for same-sex partners along 
with many couples.  NYC marcher Nikos Diaman, said that participating with others 
helped assuage his fears of backlash.  Martha Shelley, also from NYC, said that the 
upbeat atmosphere and collection of people helped participants take the bold step to 
march openly.  Once marching, participants emotions heightened through their collective 
experience.  Perry Brass described how he felt comparing the experience to other protest 
marches in which he'd participated: 
So my feeling was, oh this will just be another protest march like the anti-
war protest march but then when I saw the thousands of gays and lesbians 
just out there and the energy we had with each other and it was a contact 
high, what you call a contact high, just touching each other, being with 
each other, everyone just smiling and laughing, and hugging and kissing 
and people who were my friends. At that point GLF probably had 100 
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active members and every single one of them was someone who meant 
something to me. By the time we got to Central Park, I was in this state of 
huge [unclear], I was just so happy.  
 
For Brass the heightened emotions included the closeness he felt to other marchers.  At 
this time gay community leaders were beginning to emphasize an individual's coming out 
as gay or lesbian as necessary for both personal liberation/integrity and for movement 
success (Armstrong 2002).  In a heteronormative culture, an individual is assumed 
heterosexual until proven otherwise (Rich 1980, Sedgwick 1990, Warner 1993).  On a 
personal level, coming out means an individual will avoid near daily obfuscations about 
her or his social life and relationship status.  On a collective level, when many individuals 
come out gays and lesbians can become a culturally recognized group and sexual 
orientation a valid group identity.  Recognition means cultural power as a minority group 
and may lead to political power as a voting block or a protected status in discrimination 
laws (Berbrier 2002; Fraser 1995).  Moreover, this shared emotional experience serves to 
solidify a group’s collective identity (Eyerman 2005; Hunt & Benford 2004; Jasper 1998; 
2011).  As described by participants, the 1970 Pride events were a collective coming out; 
the first time in history that a large number of gays and lesbians expressed their sexuality 
openly in public.  All participants were out prior to marching, but the experience of being 
out with many others resulted in what LA marcher Del Whan called “euphoria and pride”.  
In true Durkheimian fashion, the collective effervescence that participants felt served to 
bond group members to one another (Durkheim 1912[1995]).   
 Both Pride events were organized by a large coalition of community leaders and 
groups.  In New York most participating groups had social activist goals, while in Los 
Angeles individuals and groups represented many facets of the gay community including 
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activists, performers, and public health advocates.  In New York and Los Angeles 
community leaders interpreted the Stonewall riots as important to all members of the gay 
community and planned the commemorative Pride events as community-wide 
celebrations (see also Armstrong & Crage 2006).  NYC organizers drew on the existing 
ECHO coalition to organize their Pride march (Carter 2004).  With weaker city-wide 
coalitions and fewer social movement organizations, strong community leaders organized 
the LA Pride parade and used their existing social networks to mobilize participants (see 
also Armstrong & Crage 2006).  According to LA organizer Pat Rocco, the success of 
Pride showed the effectiveness of community leaders' social networks for future 
organizing.  After the first Pride parade, “If people got an idea that we needed to do 
something we would be the ones, the core group, we would be the ones to make the calls. 
We would make the decision and from there on it would happen”.  Though others such as 
Ruth Weiss were critical of the hierarchical nature of this organizational model 
(particularly for marginalizing women), Rocco believed that it led to effective 
mobilization. 
 The coalitions of groups and individuals that organized and marched in the 1970 
Pride events was one way that these events brought together a diverse spectrum of the 
gay community.  The final theme of these events was inclusion, or as Armstrong (2002) 
characterized it, “unity in diversity”.  Organizers of the Los Angeles event gathered a 
greater diversity of groups and individuals than those in New York, but both had in 
common the attempt to represent a wide swath of the gay and lesbian community.  
Participants also saw Pride as events to show the diversity of individual expressions 
within the gay community.  In Los Angeles, participants such as the Grand Duchess of 
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San Francisco (a drag queen) and shirtless contestants in the Advocate's Groovy Guy 
competition portrayed themselves in stereotypical ways despite the cultural negativity 
toward them.  Others like the gay motorcycle group defied stereotypes to show that gays 
and lesbians vary as much as straight people.  Part of the overarching “gays as marching 
as gays” theme is that by not conforming to one dress image, participants chose how to 
represent themselves and displayed their diversity.   
 Pride events were also diverse by uniting gay men and lesbians and including 
people of color.  The racism and sexism prevalent in mainstream American society has 
reflected in gay communities both in the form of overt prejudice and structural inequality 
(Armstrong 2002; Duberman 1993).  With greater social capital, white gay men pre-
Stonewall were the main  patrons at gay bars and social movement organizational leaders 
(Valocchi 1999).  This perpetuated as gay bars catered to white men and SMOs focused 
on their concerns such as police harassment and employment discrimination.  For both 
economic and social reasons, lesbian bars have never flourished so police harassment was 
not a major issue.  Instead, lesbians' concerns of wage inequality compared to men and 
uncertain parental rights were often routed in gender inequality and compounded by their 
lack of access to male privilege through opposite-sex partners (Adam 1995). Many 
lesbians were active in the women's groups but were discriminated against for their 
sexuality.  NOW President Betty Friedan famously (but perhaps apocryphally) called 
lesbians a “lavender menace” that if welcomed in the organization threatened to make the 
whole group appear to be a “man-hating” “bunch of dykes” (qtd. in Jay 1999: 137).  
 All three women that I interviewed – Martha Shelley, Ruth Weiss, and Del Whan 
– mentioned feeling marginalized by activists in both the women's and gay movements 
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but said that there was better inclusion of women at all levels of planning and 
participation at Pride than any other movement action.  Shelley reported that the planning 
committee decided to have one woman and one man speak following the Pride march and 
she was the female representative. Male marchers also noted that men and women 
worked more collaboratively on the two Pride events than they had in the past.  Still, 
Pride organization and participation was dominated by men; it was not an easy fix to 
gender problems.  Additionally, self-identified bisexuals and transgender people were not 
included in the first events.  The concepts of bisexuality and changing gender identity 
were still early in formulation so there simply were not many people who identified as 
such in 1970 (Valentine 2007).  Participants and Advocate writers did note greater 
freedom for non-normative gender expression and prominent inclusion of drag queens in 
both events. 
 I have not been able to get as much information about racial/ethnic diversity 
within the gay community and at Pride events.  This is most likely due to the 
marginalization of people of color that then affects their inclusion even in writing history.  
Structural inequality and overt discrimination were barriers to participation in the gay 
community for people of color, but the few examples I drew from marchers were 
positive.  For NYC marcher Roberto Camp, inclusion and diversity were the main themes 
of Pride.  He described a “very close brotherly, sisterly kind of interaction” among gay 
men and lesbians from many ethnic backgrounds.  He cited the participation of Puerto 
Ricans and African-Americans in the march (he himself is Mexican-American) as 
evidence of inclusion.  Other interviewees said that while participants supported racial 
and ethnic diversity, there were strong society-wide divides between white people and 
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people of color. 
Conclusion 
 A common empirical debate among social movement scholars is whether a 
particular tactic is truly new or an adaptation of an older form.  Usually the answer lies 
somewhere in between.  In this chapter I have described what was new about the 1970 
Pride events in New York and Los Angeles: namely, they were the first mass 
demonstrations in which gays and lesbians marched as themselves and for themselves 
without compromise.  I argue that marchers in organizers were influenced both by the 
disruptive tactics they had seen and participated in with other social movements of the 
1960s/70s protest cycle and by the modest, accomodationist stance of the 1950s/60s 
homophile movement.  
Drawing from these influences, organizers and marchers created a cultural protest 
tactic that was qualitatively different from the politically focused marches of their 
predecessors.  Pride events were not traditional state-directed protest marches with 
narrow goals.  They were bigger in size. They drew in a wider group of people, not just 
seasoned activists.  They drew an audience.  They were celebratory and elicited joyous 
emotions.  They featured broad cultural statements rather than narrow political goals.  
Most importantly, in the cultural context of mainstream society, the very fact that gays 
collectively marched down public streets in broad daylight and showed themselves to be 
gay inverted the macro-level cultural code of invisibility. 
Likewise, in contrast to earlier homophile activism, Pride events were bolder and 
less concerned with public image.  Before the 1970 Pride marches gay and lesbian 
activists marched yearly for civil rights in Philadelphia, calling the events Annual 
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Reminders.  Organizers enforced a strict dress code meant to further the homophile era’s 
strategy of presenting gays and lesbians as respectable citizens who differed from the 
mainstream in only one aspect.  Pride events invited all to participate in whichever 
clothes and through whichever theatrical displays they chose.  Through overt sexuality 
and non-normative gender displays, the LA parade in particular featured contingents that 
played on, rather than reduced, mainstream negative stereotypes of gays and lesbians.  
These elements proved to be controversial within the gay and lesbian community, but 
most supported the celebration of all aspects of gay identity.  Pride events ushered in a 
new era of gay and lesbian activism in which the open declaration and celebration of gay 
identity played a central role (Armstrong 2002). 
 Current literature on social movements does not have a place for the events I have 
described because researchers have not studied cultural contestation to the extent that 
they have studied contestation in the political realm.  In 1970 members of the gay 
community created a new social movement tactic  - an explicit cultural tool - that 
combined political protest, cultural critique, and community celebration.  The result was a 
powerful cultural challenge and a unifying emotional experience.  The Pride events in 
New York and Los Angeles were different from one another but both exhibited central 
themes of gays marching as gays, a new event, collective effervescence, and inclusion for 
all in the gay community.   
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STATE OF GAY AMERICA 
 
Forty years have passed since the first Pride events in Los Angeles, New York, and 
Chicago.  Those three cities still host Pride parades, and they are joined by over one 
hundred more Pride marches and parades across the country and over 100 internationally 
(GayCityUsa 2011).  The spread of Pride parades has been accompanied by 
improvements in the legal status of LGBT people, their cultural visibility, and the 
development of LGBT meso-level culture, including the addition of bisexual and 
transgender individuals to the gay and lesbian community.  Despite these gains the LGBT 
community, like other marginalized groups, still faces cultural opposition to full equality 
but has cultural resources with which they challenge this opposition.  I argue that due to 
their recent historical emergence and current demographics, the cultural opposition and 
resources of the LGBT population differ in key ways from those of other marginalized 
groups, particularly the two most studied, African-Americans and women.  These 
differences outline a cultural struggle for equality centered on establishing the legitimacy 
of LGBT people as an identity group. 
Defining the LGBT Community – Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
 The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender population is generally referred to by 
the initialism LGBT, but a little explanation is needed about the components of this 
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moniker.  Lesbian and gay are preferred terms for women and men, respectively, who 
identify their primary romantic and sexual attractions as oriented to the same sex.  In the 
time period addressed in the previous chapter, bisexual and transgender were not yet 
common forms of identification, thus I refer there only to the “lesbian and gay 
community” (Adam 1995; Armstrong 2002). Bisexuals are partly but not exclusively 
attracted to the same sex.  Bisexuals may form romantic and sexual relationships 
individuals of either sex and interpret their attraction to both sexes as an important part of 
their personal identities.  In the late 1980s, bisexuals began to be regularly included in 
lesbian and gay politics and community, a changed signaled most clearly with their 
official inclusion in the March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay, and Bi Equal Rights and 
Liberation in 1993 (Armstrong 2002; Ghaziani 2008). 
Lesbians, gays, and bisexuals deviate from the implicit macro-level norm of 
heterosexuality by virtue of their sexual orientation.  Transgender people, by contrast, 
deviate from this norm according to their gender identity – their psychological sense of 
gender.  Those who identify as transgender feel that their biological sex is incongruous 
with their social gender.  They communicate their preferred social gender through gender 
presentation – clothing, voice, mannerisms, and so on.  Many transgender individuals will 
also undergo medical and surgical procedures to alter their biological sex characteristics.  
These procedures range from transgender men (biologically female) taking testosterone 
to lower their voices and change muscle and fat distribution to transgender women 
(biologically male) surgically altering their penises into vaginas.  Not all individuals who 
identify as transgender alter their physical bodies, nor do all identify completely with one 
gender.  The important point is that while identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual concerns 
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one’s sexual orientation, identifying as transgender is about one’s gender identity. 
 Though transgender as defined above has only recently been regularly included in 
culturally and politically as a category in the LGBT collective formation, gender identity 
and sexual orientation have long been entwined and often confused for one another 
(Adam 1995; Chauncey 1994; Freud 1962; Minton 1987; Valocchi 1999).  In the first 
theoretical work on modern homosexuality, the German lawyer Karl Ulrichs, who 
identified as gay, wrote that gay men are biological males who have a female spirit.  
Likewise, he understood lesbians as biologically female with male spirits (Adam 1995; 
Levay 1997).  The idea of congruence between the object of one’s affections and one’s 
masculinity or femininity has persisted both from within the LGBT community and 
outside.  In urban gay subcultures before WWII, particularly among those who were 
working-class 
most men were labeled [homosexual or queer] only if they displayed a 
much broader inversion of their ascribed gender status by assuming the 
sexual and other cultural roles ascribed to women. The abnormality (or 
“queerness”) of the “fairy,” that is, was defined as much by his “woman-
like” character or “effeminacy” as his solicitation of male sexual partners. 
(Chauncey 1994: 13) 
 
Conversely, men with masculine gender expressions would be considered “normal” 
instead of “queer” despite their sexual behavior with other men (Chauncey 1985; 1994; 
Valocchi 1999).  From a social constructionist perspective, gender identity and sexual 
orientation are intertwined because heterosexuality is a constitutive element in the 
construction of gender (Connell 1992; Lorber 1994; Rich 1980).  Thus by virtue of their 
same-sex attraction, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals break gender norms. 
 Drag – men dressing as women for performance – has a long history in the gay 
community and is another way that sexual orientation and gender identity are intertwined.  
72 
 
While dressed in drag, performers conventionally use feminine names and pronouns 
(Bunzi 2000; Rupp & Taylor 2003).  Their performances can be a form of gender critique 
as they assert both their male bodies and feminine expressions (Rupp & Taylor 2003).  
Drag queens mix the concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity because of their 
strong connection to the gay community and most drag queen's self-identification as gay 
men.  Due to persistent cultural beliefs that women are not sexual beings, outside 
formulations rarely addressed lesbian sexuality.  Within lesbian community, though, there 
is a tradition of butch/femme dichotomy, where relationships included one masculine 
(butch) woman and one feminine (femme) partner (D'Emilio 1998; Gibson & Meem 
2002; Kennedy 1993).  While transgender as a separate category is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, therefore, gender transgression in the form of drag and non-normative 
gender expression has long been part of gay and lesbian communities. 
In some ways it is a triumph of LGBT cultural activism that the concepts of 
sexual orientation and gender identity have been decoupled to the extent that a same-sex 
couple is not predicated on the pseudo-heterosexuality of a masculine and a feminine 
partner (Valentine 2000).  Transgender individuals have suffered though as they face 
greater explicit discrimination and violence and implicit scorn, disrespect, and ignorance.  
Lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, while somewhat more insulated from charges of gender 
transgression, are also then policed for normative gender presentations both by fellow 
LGBs and by dominant culture (Loftin 2007). 
A final identity term often used in the LGBT community is “queer”.  The term has 
a history as a derogatory slur aimed at gay men in particular, but has been reclaimed by 
some as a positive identification.  It is an umbrella term to describe all in the LGBT 
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community and sometimes is used to include other sexual affinity groups such as BDSM 
or to include straight allies (Gamson 1995).  The term includes non-normative gender 
identity as well as sexual orientation and thus is preferred by some who want to indicate 
difference without being specific or by those who break dominant norms of both gender 
and sexuality (e.g a transgender woman who identifies as lesbian).  It is also used as a 
cultural critique of the rigidity of gender and sexual categories, in effect a label used to 
eschew labels (Gamson 1995; Stein & Plummer 1994). As a political term, proponents of 
queer politics advocate more radical challenges to institutional order than those pursued 
through mainstream LGBT identity politics.  In particular they critique the push for 
legalized same-sex marriage as a strategy to assimilate LGBT people into 
heteronormative society when instead they believe queer people should run from 
marriage as a fundamentally oppressive institution (Warner 1999).  For clarity, I use the 
term “queer” to indicate gender and sexual difference and the term “gay” when speaking 
only about sexuality.  I use the initialism LGBT to refer to the community of people who 
identify outside the norm by virtue of their gender identity or sexual orientation. 
Changes in Legal and Cultural Status of LGBT Community, 1970-2010 
It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a complete account of the 
LGBT community's ups and downs during the forty year history of Pride parades.  In this 
section I briefly cover major changes in federal and state laws, cultural visibility, and 
LGBT subculture. 
Legal Change 
 In 1970 LGBT people were at risk for criminal prosecution for their sexual 
behavior, enjoyed no legal protections against public or private discrimination, and had 
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no recognition of their same-sex relationships at any level of government.  All states save 
Illinois had statutes criminalizing sodomy.  These statutes varied and prohibited a range 
of non-procreative sexual acts between consenting adults.  While many technically 
applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sex, in practice gays and lesbians were 
arrested far more than straight people (Eskridge 2008).  From 1970 to 2003, most states 
repealed these laws but the final thirteen were struck down by the Supreme Court in the 
Lawrence vs. Texas (Eskridge 2008).  This decision reversed an earlier 1986 decision in 
Bowers vs. Hardwick that had affirmed the constitutionality of sodomy laws.  The 
Lawrence vs. Texas case was viewed as a major victory by LGBT activists and 
community leaders since they had increasingly interpreted these laws as official 
government sanctions against not just homosexual behavior but against LGBT identity 
(Bernstein 2002; Eskridge 2008). 
 Gains have also been made to include sexual orientation and gender identity as 
protected classes in anti-discrimination laws.  In 1970 not one city, county, or state 
protected LGBT people from discrimination – either in the public or private sector - 
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000).  
The first such laws were enacted in 1972 in East Lansing and Ann Arbor, MI, followed 
by liberal university town such as Berkley, CA and Boulder, CO and major cities with 
large, organized gay populations like Detroit, San Francisco, and Washington, DC 
(Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000; Eskridge 1999).  These early laws were passed in 
relatively gay-friendly cities with little organized resistance (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 
2000).  From the late-70s on LGBT activists have battled against conservative Christian 
activists wishing to preserve their right to refuse service and employment in the private 
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sector to those they view as sinners and against libertarian groups who view 
nondiscrimination laws as government overreach (Green 2000).   
Despite this opposition, laws have been passed to protect people from public and 
private discrimination based on both sexual orientation and gender identity in sixteen 
states and the District of Columbia (NGLTF 2012).  Five states have laws preventing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation but not gender identity, thus making it illegal 
to fire someone for being gay, lesbian, or bisexual but legal to fire someone for being 
transgender (NGLTF 2012).  However, transgender people may be protected from 
discrimination through a more recent interpretation of Title VII, which prohibits sex 
discrimination.  In three recent cases, federal judges have ruled that firing someone for 
being transgender constitutes sex discrimination – in other words, is legally the same as 
firing someone for being a man – and is thus illegal according to Title VII of the 1965 
Civil Rights Act (Glenn vs. Brumby et al. 2011; Schroer vs. Billington 2007; Smith vs. 
City of Salem 2004).  These are positive signs for transgender people, but this legal 
interpretation of Title VII is not yet fully settled in the courts.  Additionally, Executive 
Order 13087, signed by President Clinton in 1998, prohibits discrimination based on 
sexual orientation of federal civilian employees (OPM n.d.).  Despite legislative gains, 
there exists no federal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation in the 
private sector, nor is there legislation in a majority of states to explicitly prohibit 
discrimination against LGBT people.  This leaves 56% of Americans without explicit 
legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity 
(NGLTF 2011). 
 Evidence of discrimination against LGBT people shows the cultural inequality of 
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this population.  In review of workplace discrimination studies since the mid-1990s, 
Badgett et al. (2007) found that at least 15% and as many as 43% of LGBT people report 
experiencing some form of employment discrimination. Moreover, based data from the 
nationally representative 2008 General Social Survey, Sears & Mallory (2011) found that 
9.2% of those who were out as lesbian, gay, or bisexual to their employers reported losing 
a job due to discrimination.  Transgender people fare even worse.  In separate surveys, 
between 67% and 78% of transgender individuals reported some form of discrimination 
based on their gender identity.  In one survey 47% of transgender respondents said they 
were discriminated in hiring, promotion, or retention (Sears & Mallory 2011).  For those 
working towards legal equality, this evidence of discrimination points to the need to add 
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes in non-discrimination laws.  I 
argue that beyond this legal/political issue, the fact that so many people will mistreat 
LGBT employees by harassing, denying promotions, and even firing them points to the 
cultural inequality of LGBT people. 
 The final major area of legal change for LGBT people is recognition of same-sex 
relationships1.   Legal recognition in the form of marriage, civil unions, or domestic 
partnerships not only did not exist in 1970 but was virtually unthinkable for most gays 
and straights alike.  Until the early 1990s, individual couples made scattered attempts to 
have their relationships legally recognized but LGBT activists did not make a concerted 
effort to change relationship recognition laws (Chauncey 2005).  Same-sex marriage 
                                                 
1 Hate crimes legislation, adoption policy, LGBTs in the military, legal gender identification (the ability 
to change ones legal gender), and insurance coverage for gender transition-related care are also 
significant LGBT rights issues, but I chose to focus only on three areas. 
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exploded as a national issue when conservative activists mainly from the Christian Right 
took up the cause (Chauncey 2005; Fetner 2008).  In 1993 the Hawaii Supreme Court 
ruled in 1993 that the state's law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was presumed 
unconstitutional and sent the case to lower courts to decide what, if any, compelling 
interest the state had to deny marriage to same-sex couples.  This case was then dropped 
when the state amended its constitution to give the legislature the power to define 
marriage – which it did, defining it as one woman and one man. Conservative activists 
responded to the perceived threat of legalized same-sex marriage by promoting the 
Defense of Marriage Act in the U.S. Congress.  Signed into law in 1996, this act prohibits 
federal recognition of same-sex marriages and exempts states from recognizing those 
performed where it is legal.   
 The issue heated up to a new level in 1999 when the Vermont Supreme Court that 
denying same-sex couples the benefits and protections afforded to opposite-sex couples 
violated its state's constitution.  Conservative activists then worked to pass state 
constitutional amendments through legislation and popular referenda and restricting 
marriage and often other forms of relationship recognition, such as civil unions or 
domestic partnerships2, to heterosexual couples.  Since Alaska passed the first such 
amendment in 1999, 29 states total have amended their constitutions to limit marriage to 
heterosexual couples.  Meanwhile, since 2004 eight states and the District of Columbia 
                                                 
2 Civil unions and domestic partnerships are new forms created specifically to extend benefits and 
protections to same-sex couples without extending marriage itself.  Civil unions tend to offer all legal 
benefits of marriage while domestic partnerships can be more limited. Civil unions are generally 
reserved for same-sex couples (as a legal alternative to marriage), while some some state and local 
governments that offer domestic partnerships do so both to same-sex and opposite-sex partners. 
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have changed their laws either through legislation or court order to grant marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.  An additional 13 states grant civil unions or domestic 
partnerships to same-sex partners which offer most of the benefits and protections of 
marriage. 
 Legally things are much better for the LGBT population as a whole in 2010 than 
they were in 1970.  As a result of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence vs. 
Texas there is nowhere in the country where one can be prosecuted for consensual 
homosexual (or heterosexual) sex.  Americans are protected from discrimination in public 
and private employment based on their sexual orientation in 21 states.  Laws in sixteen 
states explicitly protect them from discrimination based on their gender identity.  
However, without a federal non-discrimination statute, citizens in 29 states - 56% of the 
population – are vulnerable to such discrimination (NGTLF 2011)3.  Evidence shows this 
discrimination does occur and is most acute for those who are transgender.   
 Finally, same-sex couples can be legally recognized through marriage, civil 
unions, or domestic partnerships in nineteen states and the District of Columbia.  In 
eleven of these states fewer legal benefits and protections are afforded to married same-
sex couples than to opposite-sex couples because these states do not recognized same-sex 
marriage.  Though same-sex couples from any state can legally marry in eight states, 
DOMA provisions mean that their unions are not recognized either in their home state or 
by the federal government for taxes, immigration, social security benefits, and a host of 
                                                 
3 From a legal standpoint non-discrimination laws protect both those who identify as LGBT and those 
who are perceived as LGBT.  Moreover, though actual instances are exceedingly rare, these laws also 
protect citizens from discrimination based on their heterosexuality or gender normativity.  Thus, non-
discrimination laws protect all citizens regardless of their sexual and gender identification. 
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other benefits and protections.  In sum, though all Americans are now protected from 
prosecution of consensual sex acts, citizens of 29 states are still subject to employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and have no legal 
recognition for their same-sex partnerships.  The legal status of LGBT people has 
improved since 1970 but mainly for those in certain states. 
Implicit Cultural Attitudes 
 Americans have changed their cultural attitudes about homosexuality since 1970.  
The General Social Survey (GSS) has asked respondents for their opinions on the 
morality of sex between two people of the same sex since 1973.  As shown in Figure 2.1, 
their attitudes have changed from overwhelming disapproval to an even split between 
total disapproval and total acceptance. 
Figure 3.1. Morality of Homosexual Behavior, 1973-2010, General Social Survey 
 
 
The first time the GSS asked respondents their opinions on the morality of homosexual 
behavior, 72.5% said that it was “always wrong” while only 11.2% said it was “not 
wrong at all”.  These numbers were fairly steady for twenty years.  Between 1991 and 
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1993, the percentage of those who said homosexual behavior was “always wrong” 
dropped 11 points, from 77.4% to 66.1%.  There was a corresponding increase of seven 
points in those saying that this behavior was “not wrong at all”, with figures going from 
14.9% in 1991 to 21.9% in 1993.  Subsequent years showed a continued shift toward 
increased moral acceptance for homosexual behavior until the proportions of those 
believing each extreme converged in 2010.  In that year, 45.7% of respondents said that 
this behavior is “always wrong” and 42.7% said it is “not wrong at all”.  Throughout this 
time the percentage of those choosing middle options - “sometimes wrong” or “almost 
always wrong” - has remained relatively steady at 10-15%. (Smith et al. 2011) 
 These data are supported by analyses of polling trends on acceptance of 
homosexuality by Yang (1997), Schafer & Shaw (2009), and Anderson & Fetner (2008).  
Moral acceptability and tolerance are distinct concepts; morality is what one personally 
regards as right or wrong while tolerance is one's willingness to peacefully coexist with 
someone that one does not necessarily agree with.  One may tolerate LGBT people 
without believing that their sexual behavior is morally acceptable.  In addition to fewer 
Americans saying that homosexuality is morally wrong, over the last four decades more 
are showing tolerance towards having gay or lesbian neighbors and teachers (Yang 1997; 
Schafer & Shaw 2009).  As shown in Figure 2.2, Americans' tolerance towards having 
gay college teachers has increased since 1973 even more than their belief in the moral 
acceptability of homosexual behavior. 
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Figure 3.2. Tolerance Toward Gay College Teachers, 1973-2010, General Social Survey 
 
 
 
As a proxy for tolerance towards gays and lesbians, I used the GSS item asking 
respondents whether an openly gay man should be allowed to teach in college.  The 
percentage of GSS respondents who said he should be allowed rose from 50.1% in 1973 
to 85.4% in 2010, a total of 35.3 percentage points.  By comparison, those who said that 
homosexual behavior is always wrong decreased by 26.8 percentage points.  Whereas the 
moral acceptability of homosexuality remained fairly constant from 1973 to 1991 and 
then steadily dropped until 2010, tolerance for gay college teachers steadily increased 
during the entire 37 year time span.  There was also strong association between 
respondents' beliefs of the moral acceptability of homosexuality and their tolerance for 
gay college teachers. Chi-square tests showed statistically significant correlation each 
year measured and gamma values ranged from -0.83 to -0.70.  There was no trend in the 
strength of association between the two variables, as measured by gamma values.  Thus, 
while both belief in the moral acceptability of homosexual behavior and tolerance for gay 
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people has increased substantially since 1973, the relationship between these two cultural 
attitudes have not changed.  A person who believed homosexual behavior was wrong in 
2010 was no more likely to tolerate gay people in positions of influence than a person 
with this belief in 1973. 
 Unfortunately there is little information on cultural attitudes towards bisexual and 
transgender people.  In a nationally represented survey sponsored by the LGBT rights 
advocacy group Human Rights Campaign (2011), a plurality of respondents (36%) 
indicated cool, unfavorable feelings towards transgender people.  Roughly equal numbers 
indicated warm and indifferent feelings (26% and 28%, respectively), while the 
remaining tenth of respondents did not rate their feelings towards transgender individuals.  
More survey respondents (35%) had warm feelings toward bisexuals.  By contrast, 40% 
of respondents indicated warm, favorable feelings towards gays and lesbians and 25% 
had cool, unfavorable feelings towards them.  As with legal protections and evidence of 
discrimination, this poll suggests that cultural attitudes are similarly less favorable 
towards transgender people than toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 
 Overall these data show considerable improvement in Americans cultural attitudes 
regarding homosexuality.  Despite this improvement, nearly one half of Americans still 
believe that homosexual behavior is always wrong.  LGBT people continue to face 
negative implicit cultural attitudes from a great number of individuals.   
Cultural Visibility  
 Gays and lesbians in 1970 had very little visibility and bisexuals and transgender 
individuals had basically none.  Due to intense social stigma and oppressive laws, many 
found it dangerous to openly declare their sexuality.  There were few images of gays and 
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lesbians in popular or political culture, and those they did see were negative (Ghaziani 
2008; Gross 2001).  Since then the cultural visibility of LGBT people has increased, both 
in terms of their visibility as individuals and in public images. 
 Data do not exist to quantify how many more people openly identified as LGBT 
in 2010 than in 1970.  Since Kinsey’s (1948; 1953) reports on sexual behavior, social 
science researchers have shown that as many as 25% of people acknowledge at least 
some same-sex attraction (Dickson, Paul, & Herbison 2003; Gates 2011; Savin-Williams 
& Ream 2007).  With only about 3.8% of Americans openly identifying as LGBT, this 
leaves many who have same-sex attraction but do not identify as gay or bisexual.  
Without data over time, these measures cannot determine changes in the rates of those 
with same-sex attraction who openly identify as gay or bisexual.  The one measure that 
can serve as a proxy for LGBT visibility as individuals is the percentage of survey 
respondents who say they know someone who is LGBT.  In just eight years during the 
1990s, the percentage of those who said in polls that they had a gay friend or 
acquaintance rose from 22% in 1992 to 56% in 2000 (Brewer 2008).  Knowing someone 
who is gay correlates strongly with one’s attitudes towards homosexuality, and this 
increase may partially explain the greater acceptance of homosexuality evidenced in polls 
(Becker & Scheufele 2011; Brewer 2008).  As with other public opinion research, data do 
not address visibility of bisexuals or transgender people.  
 A second indication of LGBT visibility is their presence and representation in the 
media. The AIDS crisis in the 1980s brought national attention to the gay community but 
a good deal was negatively focused on the health risks of gay sexuality and even gays and 
lesbians as dangerous individuals (Gross 2001).  During the 1990s, there was an upswing 
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in gay and lesbian visibility in popular culture (Gross 2001; Walters 2001).  The most 
notable examples are Ellen Degeneres's public coming out (both as a character on her 
television show and in real life), Olympic diver Greg Louganis, and the popular 
television show Will & Grace which featured two gay main characters.  In the first 
decade of the 21st century gay visibility in popular culture increased even more.  
According to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), during the 
2009-2010 television season 3% of all scripted series, broadcast network regular 
characters were LGBT.  This is the highest number of LGBT characters (17 total) since 
the group began researching LGBT representation in 1996 (GLAAD 2010).  These and 
other media showed gays and lesbians as responsible, productive members of society 
who are irreducible to a set of stereotypes but also undeniably, openly, and proudly gay.   
 Images were not entirely positive nor did they represent the diversity of the LGBT 
community.  In the absence of other types of visibility, prominent gay and lesbian 
celebrities can give the impression that LGBT people are more affluent than the general 
public.  Media images of gays and lesbians are overwhelmingly white, which also 
obscures the diversity of the LGBT community (GLAAD 2010).  Though there were two 
transgender characters on primetime broadcast networks during the 2007-2008 season, 
there were none during the 2009-2010 season (GLAAD 2010)  Finally, while these 
images normalized LGB people, some criticize them for doing this, likening it to the 
accommodationist strategy of the pre-Stonewall homophile movement.  They argue that 
representations suggest that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals could only be accepted if they 
present normative gender expressions, work white collar jobs, and pursue conventional 
relationships, and transgender people could not be accepted at all (Avila-Saavedra 2009; 
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Shugart 2003).  This runs counter to the message of the first Pride parades, when gays 
and lesbians were visible as themselves, be that as drag queens in full make-up and high 
heels or young hippies in bell bottoms.  
 A major change in macro-level explicit culture since 1970 is that gays and 
lesbians themselves have entered this culture, sometimes even on their own terms.  In 
1970, fewer LGBT people openly acknowledged their sexuality for fear of cultural, 
economic, and legal consequences.  In the eight years for which we have data, 1992 to 
2000 the percentage of Americans who said they had a friend or acquaintance who is gay 
by 33 points.  In terms of media representation, before the 1980s LGBT people appeared 
rarely and were portrayed negatively.  During the 1980s the AIDS crisis hit the gay 
community and they became more visible but again not in a positive light.  From the 
1990s on, things have turned around as a few prominent gay and lesbian celebrities put a 
face to the community and television and movies include gay characters in a variety of 
ways.  Though not wholly positive, this visibility represents a definite change in 
American culture. 
LGBT Culture 
 The final area of change is within the meso-level LGBT community.  One theme 
of the 1970 Pride events was bringing gays and lesbians together.  At the time there were 
divisions by both gender and race, few LGBT periodicals for communication within the 
community, and a dearth of spaces for LGBT people to gather.  The AIDS crisis in the 
1980s was a catalyst for community building across gender divisions as lesbians, who 
were largely unaffected, cared for the countless gay men who suffered from the disease.  
To fight the disease gays and lesbians established public health service and outreach 
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organizations.  As AIDS was labeled a “gay cancer” in macro-level culture and help from 
outside was slow to materialize, the gay community came together to support one another 
through a traumatic period in its history. (Armstrong 2002; Gross 2001; Shilts 1987) 
 The demographics of the LGBT population has always been a challenge to 
developing LGBT culture.  Like racial and ethnic minority groups, LGBT people 
represent a fraction of the total population, but one major difference is the LGBT 
population's relative lack of residential clusters.  
 LGBT people comprise only a small percentage of the population.  According to 
the best estimates available, 3.8% of the U.S. population identifies as LGBT (Gates 
2011), one percentage point less than the Asian-American population. While there 
certainly are a few well-known LGBT neighborhoods, such as the Castro in San 
Francisco and West Hollywood near Los Angeles, the population density of LGBT people 
in these neighborhoods is less than that of Asian-Americans in the Sunset District of San 
Francisco, for instance, or African-Americans in the Crenshaw neighborhood of Los 
Angeles.  Using five year estimates from the American Community Survey (2005-2009), 
I review the geographic distribution of the LGBT population in the U.S.  To put this 
population in perspective, I compare its distribution to that of African-Americans in the 
U.S. using 2010 Census data.  
 In the absence of census reporting of individual LGBT identity, this population is 
measured by household type.  Those same-sex couples who report their domestic 
relationship as either “spouses” or “unmarried partners” are counted as same-sex couple 
households.  The census recodes all such households and reports them as unmarried 
same-sex partners.  Straight couples are measured similarly but reported as either married 
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couples or unmarried opposite-sex partners.  This measure is imperfect because it 
determines only counts of those who live together as partners, thus leaving out single 
LGBT people and those who identify as bisexual or transgender but have opposite-sex 
partners.  Those in unpartnered households are single with or without children and may 
identify as straight or LGBT. 
 I analyzed the populations of 32,803 zip codes – every zip code in the U.S. 
reporting at least one household.  Of these 118,000,000 households nationwide, there 
were 4,038,584 households with same-sex couples, comprising 0.8% of all households.  
Roughly half of all zip codes (15,764) have populations of fewer than 1,000 households 
and 17 of these report at least 10% of households with same-sex couples – all but one 
include only one same-sex couple households but with low overall populations such that 
the percentage is skewed.  In addition to their skewed numbers, I omit zip codes with 
fewer than 1,000 households because the purpose of this section is to describe population 
density as a cultural resource for marginalized people, making the presence of ten or 
fewer same-sex couple households insignificant. Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of 
same-sex households by total household population for the remaining 17,039 zip codes 
with populations over 1,000 households. For comparison, Figure 2.4 shows the 
proportion of African-American individuals by total population for these same zip codes. 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of Same-Sex Couple Households by Zip Code Population 
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Figure 3.4. Distribution of African-Americans by Zip Code Population 
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There is not a great deal of variation in LGBT population density by zip code.  Same-sex 
couple households range from 0 to 14.7% of households in the 17,033 zip codes with 
populations over 1,000 households.  By contrast, the percentage of African-Americans 
ranges from 0 to 98.1% of the populations of these zip codes.  The population density of 
LGBT people in zip codes with the highest percentage comes nowhere close to that of 
African-Americans in well-populated zip codes.  There are only three zip codes with over 
1,000 households in which more than 10% of households are comprised of same-sex 
couples. These zip codes are well-known LGBT enclaves: the Castro district of San 
Francisco, Provincetown, MA, and Palm Springs, CA.  While these enclaves may be sites 
for LGBT community building, they are the exception rather than the rule for LGBT 
population distribution. 
 On the whole LGBT people have very low residential segregation as compared to 
racial and ethnic minority groups such as African Americans.  The standard deviation for 
the percentage of same-sex couple households in zip codes over 1,000 households is 0.45 
percentage points, compared to 17.28 percentage points for African-Americans.  The vast 
majority of same-sex couples have few LGBT neighbors.  In fact, 56% of same-sex 
couples live in zip codes with fewer then 100 other gay couples. By comparison only 
1.4% of African-Americans live in zip codes with fewer than 200 other African-
Americans.  LGBT people are more geographically isolated from one another and thus do 
not have the same ability to turn the demographic resource of residential clustering into a 
cultural resource by building collective identity through sharing space. 
 Breaking down same-sex couples by gender show different patterns for lesbian 
versus gay male couples. Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of gay male and lesbian couple 
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households by number of households for zip codes with over 1,000 households. 
 
Figure 3.5. Distribution of Gay vs. Lesbian Couples by Zip Code Population 
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As shown in Figure 2.5, there are fewer zip codes with high concentrations of lesbians 
couples than with many gay male couples. The two zip codes that stand out as having a 
high percentage of lesbian couples – 02657 (Provincetown, MA) and 01060 
(Northampton, MA) – have low overall populations.  Zip code 01060 in Northampton, 
Massachusetts includes 4,617 households, 183 of which are headed by lesbian couples.  
There are 14 zip codes that have more total households and higher percentages of gay 
male couple households.  While there are actually 52,202 more lesbian couples 
households than gay male couples households, the latter are more likely to live among 
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other gay men.  Moreover, in many areas lesbian couples outnumber gay male couples or 
vice versa.  Of those zip codes with over 1,000 households, 18% have twice as many 
lesbian couples as gay male couples and 5% have twice as many gay male couples.  As I 
discuss below, this has implications for the ability of LGBT women and men to form 
collective identity across gender lines. 
 Census data do not break same-sex couples down by race/ethnicity or income.  
Like gender, sexual orientation is distributed throughout the population such that there is 
the same racial/ethnic and class diversity among lesbians and gays as the population as a 
whole4 (Gates 2010; Gates, Lau, & Sears 2006).  The same barriers to racial/ethnic 
integration that exist in the broad population – residential segregation, separate cultural 
traditions, and overt and covert racism – exist among LGBT people.  Gay communities 
have a history racism and sexism and major activist organizations have been 
overwhelmingly run by white men (Armstrong 2002; Duberman 1993).  LGBT people 
experience divides in social class because most spaces for socializing are commercial and 
located in cities, creating a barrier for the participation of LGBT people with lower 
incomes.  As I discuss further below, gender, racial/ethnic, and class divides are cultural 
barriers to building LGBT community. 
 LGBT people have used periodicals and the internet to communicate with one 
another across physical distances and have created social spaces to come together.  LGBT 
periodicals have proliferated since the 1970s.  These periodicals played an important role 
                                                 
4 According to the 2008 GSS, bisexuals are slightly more likely to be non-white, and data are too scarce 
to estimate the racial/ethnic distribution of transgender people.  LGBT people are negatively impacted 
by economic policies that favor heterosexual married couples but otherwise do not vary from the 
general population by class. 
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in drawing the LGBT community together both for mutual support and political 
mobilization, but their circulation was low and concentrated in major cities (Streitmatter 
1995).  LGBT newspapers and magazines now proliferate along with myriad websites, 
blogs, and email lists that disseminate all manner of news and information to connect 
LGBT individuals.  Social media such as Facebook and Twitter expanded this even more 
as people are able to share information about local events and issues with their social 
networks. 
 The growth in LGBT advocacy organizations, film festivals, and sports leagues 
has allowed for more ways for LGBT people to connect and socialize.  As LGBT rights 
have grown as a political issue, social movement organizations working to further the 
legal/political status of LGBT people have established all over the country.  LGBT people 
and their straight allies work together to try to pass non-discrimination laws and to fight 
restrictions on relationship recognition.  Since gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are all in 
the same boat when it comes to legal/political equality, they work together across gender 
divisions.  However, gender identity is not consistently included in laws addressing 
equality by sexual orientation, so political activism can also be a source of division 
between LGB and transgender people. 
 LGBT film festivals and sports leagues are two types of social events that bring 
LGBT people together across gender and race divisions.  There are over 50 LGBT film 
festivals held in the U.S. (Pritchard 2012).  The majority of these cater to all LGBT-
identified people but some are more specialized, such as the New England Transgender 
Film Festival in Provincetown, MA, the Queer Women of Color Film Festival in San 
Francisco, and the Fears for Queers LGBT Horror Film Festival in Austin, TX.  Film 
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festivals bring people together physically for a shared experience centered on LGBT 
identity while constructing a narrative about this identity through the films shown 
(Gamson 1996). Likewise, a number of gay and lesbian sports leagues across the country 
bring LGBT identified women and men together. Some leagues separate women and men 
while others field integrated teams.  With commercial bars still main sites for LGBT 
socialization, gay and lesbian sports leagues are important spaces for LGBT women and 
men to socialize regularly outside bars. 
 All in all the United States was a kinder place for LGBT people in 2010 than it 
was in 1970.  They are no longer criminalized for intimacy between partners through 
sodomy laws.  In over one third of states they are protected from public and private 
discrimination and have their relationships with others of the same-sex recognized 
through marriage, civil unions, or more restricted domestic partnerships.  However this 
leaves LGBT Americans in 60% of states vulnerable to discrimination and without legal 
benefits or protections afforded to heterosexual couples.  Without federal recognition of 
same-sex relationships, even legally married couples are subject to higher taxes, denied 
social security partner benefits, and, may even see one spouse deported if she is not an 
American citizen, risk deportation when visas expire. 
 LGBT people have made cultural gains in terms of individual level implicit 
attitudes, macro-level visibility, and meso-level development of LGBT community.  
Implicit individual attitudes (culture in the mind) have become more tolerant towards 
homosexuality, though there is still a ways to go.  Though the percentage of Americans 
who believe homosexual behavior is “always wrong” dropped 27 points between 1972 
and 2010, nearly half of Americans (46.7%) continue to say that homosexuality violates 
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their moral code.  Though information is scarce, bisexuals and transgender individuals 
lag behind in cultural acceptance as measured by individual attitudes.  The growing 
acceptance of LGBT people is helped by the fact that more have come out to family, 
friends, and acquaintances (Brewer 2008).  Gays and lesbians are also visible in explicit 
macro-level culture through prominent gay celebrities and gay characters in television 
and movies.  This visibility has raised questions and criticisms of the “mainstreaming” of 
LGBT people most representations are of white, affluent, gender normative gays and 
lesbians in conventional relationships (or without sex lives at all), thereby obscuring the 
racial/ethnic, socioeconomic, and sexual diversity of the LGBT community.  Finally, 
LGBT people have developed meso-level community and collective identity through a 
proliferation of online and print LGBT periodicals, virtual communities, and social 
spaces that draw together LGBT individuals across gender and racial/ethnic divisions. 
How the LGBT Community is Different than Other Groups 
 I argued in the introductory chapter that attention to state-targeted tactics 
dominates social movements research and that insights into the role of culture in social 
movements derive from empirical research on these tactics.  Social movement theory 
from contentious politics to new social movements postulates that movements direct their 
collective actions at the source of social power.  In the politics of recognition, movements 
seek legal/political equality through the state as a way to achieve cultural equality.  
According to the contentious politics approach to social movements, they do so because 
the state is the locus of social power (McCarthy, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).  Approaches such 
as multi-institutional politics and new social movements hold that social power in 
Western industrialized countries extends beyond the state to non-governmental 
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institutions and macro-level culture.  The question for researchers is then where to locate 
the source of social power that perpetuates a group's cultural inequality.   
 According to this research mass demonstrations are explicit cultural tools used by 
a meso- or micro- level social group to communicate political power.  Internally, mass 
demonstrations foster the development of collective identity among participants by 
bringing individuals physically, facilitating shared emotions, and establishing boundaries 
between participants and outsiders.  Not all tactics target the state, and research on those 
directed at macro-level dominant culture show they convey rich symbolic messages that 
challenge macro-level implicit meanings.  These messages are specific to the meanings 
challenged, as when the AIDS activist group contested shame and silence about 
homosexuality by reappropriating a macro-level symbol of gay oppression, the pink 
triangle, as a meso-level symbol of gay power (Gamson 1989).  In order to understand 
the use of culture as an external challenge to macro-level dominant culture, the researcher 
must also understand the qualitative nature of a group's cultural inequality. 
 In the previous section I showed the ways LGBT people in the U.S. have made 
gains toward cultural inequality over the past 40 years but continue to face challenges in 
areas of legal protection, implicit cultural attitudes of fellow citizens, and cultural 
visibility.  In order to understand the role of Pride parades in the struggle for LGBT 
cultural equality, then, there are two questions about the nature of their inequality: 1) 
What is the source of social power that perpetuates LGBT cultural inequality? and 2) 
What is the qualitative nature of LGBT cultural inequality?  Recognizing the role of 
meso-level culture in the formation of collective identity as an internal movement 
resource, I add a third question: 3) What cultural resources do LGBT people have with 
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which to collectively challenge their inequality?  In this section I analyze LGBT cultural 
inequality to offer answers these three questions.  To highlight what is distinct about 
LGBT cultural inequality, I compare the cultural challenges and resources of LGBT 
people to those of two other groups, African-Americans and women, that have 
collectively challenge their cultural inequality during the 20th century5. 
Source of Social Power, or, Why the State Has Less Control Over LGBT Cultural 
Equality 
 In the introductory chapter I argued that the ability of the state to effect each type 
of equality depends on the extent and manner in which it controls the mechanisms of 
inequality.  The state can have direct control over cultural equality via the symbolic 
power of citizenship, indirect control via official recognition and regulation of citizens' 
treatment of one another in the private sector, and have no control via macro-level 
implicit cultural codes and individual implicit attitudes.  I argue that the state exercises 
less control over LGBT cultural equality and I attribute that to the group's recent 
historical emergence. 
 The first mechanism of inequality is legal/political in the form of state guarantees 
of civil rights and equal participation in government.  The state directly controls 
legal/political equality and this has cultural effects.  The right to vote in a democratic 
                                                 
5 A couple disclaimers. First, making comparisons between social groups is tricky business loaded with 
political landmines.  I offer up these comparisons in order to claim that LGBT cultural inequality is 
qualitatively distinct from that of African-Americans and women, not to claim a hierarchy of 
oppression.  Second, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully answer my three questions about 
LGBT cultural inequality; instead my focus is to justify my claim that LGBT people's cultural 
challenges are distinct from those of other groups. 
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state, for instance, is a cultural symbol that conveys a measure of equality to all who 
posses it.  By this measure the state is not a source of social power to perpetuate 
inequality of LGBT people as it has been for African-Americans and women.  Both 
groups were denied suffrage when the country was founded and only won it through 
sustained action.  African-American men were technically granted voting rights by the 
14th and 15th amendments but many were denied the ability to exercise that right through 
poll taxes and other means.  Collective action of the civil rights movements resulted in 
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to guarantee African-Americans' right to vote.  
Likewise, women were denied suffrage until passage of the 19th amendment after 
sustained and coordinated collective action.  By another measure, the state has denied 
gays and lesbians formal legal/political equality by inhibiting their right to free assembly.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, from the anti-vice campaigns of the 1950s through 
the time of the Stonewall riots, laws often treated gatherings of gay people as illegal sites 
of indecency (Adam 1995; Armstrong 2002; Armstrong & Crage 2006; Carter 2004; 
Eskridge 2008). 
 A second mechanism of inequality is unequal treatment under the law.  All three 
groups have suffered unequal treatment either through explicit laws through the 
differential application of laws.  Examples include Jim Crow laws which legally enforced 
separation between Southern blacks and whites and laws denying women the ability to 
own their own property.  Laws are differentially applied in instances like racial profiling 
in criminal justice and sexual assault/intimate partner abuse prosecution.  LGBT 
advocates argue that the lack of legal recognition for same-sex marriage, with all 
attendant benefits and protections, constitute unequal laws for LGBT people (Hull 2006; 
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McFarland 2011).  Sodomy laws were instances of differential application of laws since 
though many did not specify homosexual sex specifically, they were disproportionately 
used to prosecute gay men.  Through these first two mechanisms, the state has direct 
control to ensure legal/political equality and indirect control over cultural inequality in 
the sense of cultural effects of legal policies. 
 The state plays a final indirect role in cultural equality through a third mechanism: 
guaranteeing equal treatment of all in the private sector.  All three groups have 
experienced discrimination in employment and public accommodations and have worked 
to pass non-discrimination statutes to protect against it.  Titles II and VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act protect against discrimination by race, color, religion, sex, and national 
origin.  While Title VII has successfully been used to protect against employment 
discrimination of transgender people, sexual orientation remains an unprotected class in 
federal law covering private sector employment. 
 Through each of these mechanisms, the state has deployed its power in a different 
manner towards LGBT people than towards African-Americans and women.  The state 
has interacted with African-Americans and women as culturally distinct groups subject to 
differential direct and indirect legal/political treatment.  Towards LGBT people, by 
contrast, state power has undermined cultural group status either through their formal 
absence in the law or through informal application of the law to criminalize sexual 
behavior.  Through sodomy laws, the state effectively outlawed a fundamental aspect of 
gay identity, applying its power to undermine rather than reinforce cultural recognition as 
a distinct identity group.  I argue that this makes the state, if not less a source of power, 
than a qualitatively different source of power that underpins LGBT cultural inequality.  
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 LGBT people have only recently emerged as a distinct cultural group.  To be 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender in the modern sense is to define one's sexual 
orientation or gender identity as a primary and relatively fixed feature of one's personal 
identity and to be able to live one's life according to this identity (Adam 1985; 1995).  As 
discussed in chapter 1, while same-sex desire and behavior have been documented at 
every time and place that social scientists are able to measure, only through wage labor 
and urbanization brought on by Industrial Revolution have individuals with same-sex 
desire been able to form lasting relationships with others of their own gender to the 
exclusion of opposite-sex pairing.  Likewise, though many cultures have had 
institutionalized means for people to live socially as a gender that does not correspond to 
their biological sex these cultural forms are distinct from how transgender as understood 
in the modern West (Towle & Morgan 2002).  The Western form typically defines 
transgender people as those whose biological sex is incongruous with his or her internal 
sense of gender, necessitating a social transition from one gender to another. Like with 
the emergence of modern homosexuality, the Industrial Revolution, through urbanization 
and wage labor, enabled those who feel transgender to live independently of social 
control from tight-knit families and communities, allowing for greater freedom to live 
according to one's internal sense of self. 
 African-Americans and women, by contrast, have existed as distinct cultural 
groups through the nation's history (and for women, much much before).  Since its 
founding federal laws have treated Americans differently according to their race and sex.  
In fact laws enforcing slavery played a role in the cultural construction of African-
Americans as a group (Omi & Winant 1986).  Legal recognition of LGBT people, either 
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positively or negatively, is much more recent.  Sodomy laws existed since the nation's 
founding, but they outlawed sexual acts rather than a group of people.  It was not until 
after WWII that these laws were used to target gay people (Eskridge 2008).  Likewise 
until the “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy of the U.S. military was enacted in 1994, the 
institution's code of conduct prohibited homosexual acts but not gay identity.  It was not 
until the first non-discrimination ordinances were passed in 1973 that a local, state, or 
federal law treated LGBT people as a distinct class rather than as individuals committing 
deviant acts. 
 I argue that the role of the state as a source of power over LGBT cultural equality 
is a key difference between this group and African Americans and women.  While 
legal/political inequality has served to solidify the latter groups' statuses as separate, 
marginalized cultural groups, when state power has been directed at LGBT people it has 
most often denied their status as an identity group.  Compared to African-Americans and 
women, the state has a different role, for a shorter amount of time, in perpetuating LGBT 
inequality.  LGBT people did not begin to seek state recognition until Stonewall and the 
first Pride parades ushered in the gay identity movement (Armstrong 2002).  Prior to 
Stonewall, state policies like sodomy laws and restrictions on commercial gay spaces 
encouraged gays and lesbians to remain “in the closet”, not publicly identifying as gay.  
This served to perpetuate LGBT cultural invisibility, so that gays and lesbians were 
invisible both to one another and in the macro-level dominant culture.   
 By contrast, state policies towards African-Americans and women served to create 
and reinforce visible cultural distinction. Through identity politics, LGBT activists post 
Stonewall have actually pursued visibility as a culturally defined minority group 
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deserving of state recognition and protection from discrimination (Berbrier 2002; 
Gamson 1995).  Moreover, they choose to emphasize a collective identity as a distinct 
meso-level cultural group in some political campaigns while downplaying distinction in 
others (Bernstein 1997).  This makes the nature of LGBT cultural inequality qualitatively 
distinct from that of other minority groups, as I argue below, while it also changes the 
relationship of state power over LGBT cultural equality.  In the U.S. the state is 
comparatively silent regarding LGBT people, and in their short history as a social group 
what few policies applied to LGBT people served to reinforce cultural invisibility.  For 
LGBT activists, this means that macro-level culture may serve as an important target for 
social movement action. 
 The Nature of LGBT Cultural Inequality 
 Social movement activists use explicit cultural tools – collective action frames, 
music, theatrical displays, and mass demonstrations - to persuade and challenge macro-
level culture.  These tools apply cultural meanings in a new way, whether through 
symbolic inversion in the case of ACT UP (Gamson 1989) or appropriating symbols for a 
new purpose in the case of public same-sex weddings (Taylor et al. 2009).  To make sense 
of Pride as an explicit cultural tool, it is important to understand the macro-level implicit 
cultural meanings associated with LGBT people.  I argue that these cultural meanings 
deny the legitimacy of LGBT people as a cultural group and that this contrasts with 
meanings associated with African-Americans and women.  These groups struggle for 
cultural respect, which is qualitatively different than the LGBT struggle for cultural 
legitimacy. 
 Many scholars have noted that in the post-Stonewall era of the LGBT social 
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movement activists have pursued an identity politics strategy in which they liken gay 
identity to ethnic identity (Epstein 1987; Gamson 1995). Berbrier (2002) added to this 
insight by claiming that activists rhetorically framed the LGBT community as a minority 
group rather than as a group of social deviants.  He argued that culturally “minority” is a 
different categorical status than “deviant” and that this status carries higher cultural value 
since African-Americans achieved greater legal/political and cultural equality.  They did 
this during the civil rights movement by demanding equality while also asserting group 
difference.  I argue that the higher cultural value of minority status is the recognition of 
group identity as a legitimate, and therefore culturally allowed, category of being.  For 
the category “woman” to be culturally legitimate, therefore, means that women are not 
socially sanctioned to change their identity and cease to be women.   
 Berbrier's (2002) study concerned the ways activists' rhetoric positioned their 
groups in the culturally legitimate category “minority” by distancing themselves from the 
illegitimate “deviant” category.  My focus is on how macro-level American culture 
positions LGBT people, and I argue that historically this positioning has been as a group 
of deviant individuals rather than a minority group. Moreover, minority status conveys 
cultural legitimacy while deviance does not.  Minority status designates group difference 
that, while often coupled with cultural disrespect, is held as legitimate and undeniable6.  
Deviance, by contrast, is not a culturally legitimate group status because it conveys an 
individual's failure to meet social norms and is not held as the basis for shared culture.  In 
                                                 
6 Culturally legitimate minority status may or may not include recognition that the identity in question is 
a matter of individual choice.  One does not choose one's racial signifiers, for example, but one does 
choose religion.  Both race and religion are culturally legitimate forms of group identity difference.   
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other words, a deviant individual is socially sanctioned to remove the source of their 
deviance – for LGBT people, this to stop behaving and identifying as queer – and this 
social sanction constitutes cultural illegitimacy.   
 Historically LGBT people have been marked as culturally deviant in three ways: 
as sinners, criminals, and mentally ill (Carter 2004; Ghaziani 2008; Herrell 1996).  Two 
of these ways, as criminals and mentally ill, have all but disappeared since gains made by 
LGBT activists removed their institutional support.  Legal change, particularly the 
elimination of sodomy laws, diminished the cultural strength of the charge that LGBT 
people are criminals.  Similarly the medical community no longer designates 
homosexuality as mentally illness and treats attempts to change patients' sexual 
orientation as unethical (APA 2011).  Gender Identity Disorder, however is still an 
official, but controversial, diagnosis applied to transgender individuals who experience 
psychological distress due to the mismatch between their biological sex and gender 
identity (APA 1994).  The strongest remaining way LGBT people are marked as deviant 
is based on the belief that homosexual behavior is immoral.  While this belief is less 
popular than in 1970, it is still held by half of all Americans.  The rhetoric used in debates 
over LGBT legal/political rights illustrates this construction. 
 Opposition to LGBT legal/political rights has come primarily from the Christian 
right (Fetner 2008; Green 2000; Herman 1996).  Since its inception, the Christian right 
has made cultural claims based on their belief that homosexuality and gender 
nonconformity are sins that will cause social harm if not kept in check by legal and 
cultural sanctions.  Studies of debates over LGBT rights have consistently found that 
concerns for traditional morality undergird arguments to oppose expansion of these rights 
104 
 
(Hull 2006; McFarland 2011; Price, Nir, & Capella 2005; Tadlock, Gordon, & Popp 
2007).  One prevalent argument used to oppose same-sex marriage, for instance, is that 
heterosexual marriage is good for society and same-sex marriage threatens the institution 
(McFarland 2011).  By labeling these unions as threats, this argument denies their 
cultural right to exist as legitimate and respected social relationships. 
The explicit cultural frame that homosexuality is immoral is a belief held 
implicitly by 46.7% of Americans, making it far from a fringe position.  Even arguments 
not directly referencing morality play on the belief that sexuality is a choice, and thus 
deviant rather than an immutable feature of one's identity7.  For instance, the argument 
that non-discrimination laws or relationship recognition for same-sex couples constitute 
“special rights” denies that being LGBT is a legitimate identity that is worthy of state 
protection.  Those using this argument may even justify their claim by contrasting the 
illegitimacy of gays' “lifestyle choice” with the legitimacy of African-Americans' claims 
for equal rights (Herman 1996). 
 My argument is that the cultural opposition to LGBT equality is qualitatively 
different than cultural opposition to other groups, such as African-Americans and women.  
Debates over LGBT legal rights illustrate that the macro-level cultural code constructs 
homosexuality and gender transgression as deviant and therefore an individual property 
that can and should be changed.  By contrast, cultural opposition to legal/political 
equality for African-Americans and women has been grounded in their cultural 
                                                 
7 Religion is also a choice, but perhaps due to America's cultural history valuing religious choice as an 
individual right, this choice has not led to culturally illegitimate or deviant status for religious 
minorities. 
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inequality.  Rather than denying their existence as a cultural group, opponents of racial 
and gender equality take the reverse position by asserting human's natural difference 
(based on biology, divine order, or some combination of the two) by race, ethnicity, and 
gender (Frenier 1984).  Legal/political equality, they argue, would disrupt social order by 
going against natural cultural difference.  For instance, the separate sphere ideology was 
(and in some cases may still be) a popular cultural argument against women's 
legal/political equality (Kerber 1988).  According to this ideology, women and men 
inhabit separate yet equally important spheres of social life.  The public sphere, and thus 
legal/political equality, is the province of men and the state should not invite women into 
this sphere through the extension of legal/political rights.  Feminists argue that this 
ideology enforces not just women's cultural difference but their cultural inequality 
(Ferree 1990; Kerber 1988). My point is that the construction of women's cultural 
difference from men legitimizes their existence as a distinct cultural group in contrast to 
the ways that queerness is constructed. 
 In a nutshell, the cultural code that underpins LGBT people's continued inequality 
constructs them as deviant individuals and thus not a legitimate cultural group.  The 
cultural codes supporting African-Americans' and women's inequality, by contrast, 
construct them as legitimate minority groups that are nonetheless distinct and in some 
ways inferior to dominant white men. Both cultural codes have considerably weakened 
through a combination of structural change and sustained, coordinated collective action to 
challenge them, yet they remain important barriers to full legal/political and cultural 
equality.  Neither form of opposition is more conducive to social movement action, but 
activists will use different cultural meanings to challenge these distinct codes. In this 
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dissertation I am concerned with how Pride parade participants challenge the cultural 
code that constructs them as deviant and thus not a legitimate cultural group. 
 Once again I locate the roots of this distinction between LGBT people and 
African-Americans and women in their relatively recent historical emergence as a 
cultural group. Until the Industrial Revolution, homosexuality and gender transgression 
were structurally possible only as deviant acts (Adam 1995; D'Emilio 1998).  
Homosexual behavior was culturally confined at the macro-level to relatively isolated 
acts outside the family structure.  There was no meso-level cultural group of individuals 
who defined their primary attractions and identities as queer.  Without such a group there 
was no cultural challenge to the morality model which defined acts of homosexuality and 
gender transgression as sinful.  It was not until the Industrial Revolution brought about 
wage labor and urbanization that allowed men, and later women, to organize their lives 
around their queer desires. 
 Macro-level culture is meant for stability and thus resists change.  Cultural change 
happens through conflict between a group's structural possibilities and their cultural 
position.  I contend that in 2010 there was cultural lag between LGBT people's structural 
ability to be a cultural minority group and their continued macro-level cultural 
construction as deviant individuals.  Evidence of increased cultural visibility and 
decreased proportion of Americans who believe homosexuality is morally wrong indicate 
this macro-level construction is changing.  However, the persistence of cultural attitudes 
treating queerness as deviance and cultural arguments against LGBT equality speak to the 
continued strength of macro-level construction of LGBT people as deviant individuals.  
African-Americans and women likewise continue to challenge macro-level constructions 
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of them as culturally different and inferior to white men, but this challenge is one of the 
cultural worth and place of them as minority groups rather than as deviant individuals. 
 LGBT people's recent historical emergence as a collective identity group means 
that their cultural challenge is distinct from than that of other identity groups, specifically 
African-Americans and women.  While these groups struggle for cultural respect, LGBT 
people struggle for cultural legitimacy.   
Cultural Resources with Which LGBT Challenge Inequality 
 In order to mount either a legal/political or cultural challenge to one's unequal 
status a marginalized group draws from the resources in their meso-level culture. The 
stronger the culture in terms of collective identity, the better individuals in a similar 
structural and cultural position may band together as a group to challenge their inequality.  
Demographic and cultural isolation worked both to construct and reinforce African-
Americans' cultural inequality but also allowed for the development of cultural resources 
for the civil rights movement.  Because they were segregated in poor neighborhoods 
African-Americans developed social institutions, primarily the black church, and 
community leaders (Morris 1984).  African-Americans developed collective identity  
through years of shared physical space with one another as well as marginalized 
structural/cultural status.  Demographic and culturally isolated neighborhoods became 
“free spaces” in which African-Americans developed cultural resources to challenge their 
cultural inequality (Polletta 1999; Polletta & Jasper 2001).  Likewise, cultural institutions 
such as community centers and feminist bookstores were important to sustaining the 
women's movement  in times of decreased collective action (Taylor 1989).  Just as LGBT 
people face unique cultural opposition centered on the struggle for legitimacy as an 
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identity group, there are distinct demographic, structural, and cultural barriers to 
developing cultural resources, primarily collective identity, with which to challenge 
macro-level cultural codes.   
 Structural.  All LGBT people face the same structural challenge: sexual 
orientation and gender identity are not a heritable characteristics in the same sense that 
race and ethnicity are and thus no one is born into LGBT community89.  Racial/ethnic 
minority children adopted into white families may have a similar experience such that 
interracial adoption can be a controversial issue.  However, they are a very small 
proportion of the population and may turn to established racial/ethnic minority 
communities for culture and community.  Women, too, are not born into gender-specific 
enclaves, but as 50% of the population they grow up in families with other women and 
have no trouble encountering other women in their daily lives.  All LGBT people, by 
contrast, must seek out community when they come out as teens and adults.  This process 
is hampered by demographic and cultural factors. 
 Demographic.  LGBT people comprise a small and geographically disperse 
segment of the population.  Put simply, there are few places in the U.S. where the LGBT 
population reaches the critical mass needed to support cultural institutions. Even in these 
places, like the Castro district of San Francisco, LGBT people live among a significant 
heterosexual population which may inhibit the extent to which these neighborhoods can 
act as free spaces.  A trip to the Castro, with its nearly omnipresent rainbow flags 
                                                 
8 While there is evidence of a genetic component to sexual orientation and gender identity, the link is 
complex and not fully understood.    
9  A very small number of LGBT people may actually be born to LGBT parents, but even they will most 
likely have an extended family dominated by straight members. 
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certainly weakens this assertion, but the uniqueness of this neighborhood points to the 
broader point that very few LGBT people live in places like the Castro.  I noted above 
that a full half (56%) of same-sex couples live in zip codes with fewer then 100 other gay 
couples. By comparison, only 1.4% of African-Americans live in zip codes where they 
are similarly isolated.  LGBT people therefore need to create free spaces while 
geographically dispersed throughout the larger population, and many LGBT individuals 
must travel in order to interact with others.   
 A further demographic challenge is the different residential patterns of gay men 
compared to lesbians.  Lesbian couples outnumber gay male couples overall, but more 
gay male couples live in zip codes with relatively high LGBT populations.  Thus, 
lesbians face an even greater challenge than gay men to the physical proximity that 
allows for the development of collective identity.  These residential patterns also serve as 
a barrier to gay men and lesbians interacting and sharing collective identity.  Lesbian 
couples outnumber gay male couples two to one in 18% of zip codes that have over 1,000 
couples and the reverse is true in 5% of these zip codes. This geography may exacerbate 
the cultural tendency among LGBT people to separate by gender both to socialize and to 
organize for social change.   
 LGBT people have established spaces in which to build community and collective 
identity.  Before 1970 these consisted of bars, clubs, and movement organizations located 
almost exclusively in a few neighborhood enclaves in major cities.  Since 1970 LGBT 
spaces, while still concentrated in urban areas, have proliferated throughout the country.  
In addition to commercial and social movement spaces, I identified LGBT periodicals 
and online communication, film festivals, and sports leagues as ways that LGBT people 
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come together.  In the previous chapter I also I identified the first Pride events as places 
where gays and lesbians built collective identity and united across both gender and 
racial/ethnic lines.  The growth of each of these spaces represents an improvement in 
LGBT people's ability to form collective identity despite their demographic separation.  
However, one further type of barrier to this formation is cultural. 
 Cultural.  The first step for each LGBT person to meet, form community with, 
and collectively identify with other LGBT people is to personally come out and identify 
as LGBT.  Though LGBT people have become much more culturally visible over the past 
40 years, macro-level culture is still heteronormative, meaning that everyone is presumed 
straight and gender-normative until proven otherwise.  Added to that, the cultural 
construction of queer sexuality and gender as deviance rather than minority status exerts 
cultural pressure against individual public identification as LGBT.  While this has 
lessened since 1970, it is still very much present and constitutes a cultural barrier against 
forming LGBT community.  Moreover, this is a cultural barrier that African-Americans 
and women do not face and thus further illustrates the cultural distinctiveness of the 
LGBT struggle for equality. 
 The legal/political and cultural inequality of African-Americans and women 
separate them structurally and culturally from white men as minority groups.  African-
Americans in particular, some argue, are separated culturally as a way to reinforce their 
lower socioeconomic status (Gans 2005).  Their cultural challenge is thus to politicize 
their externally defined collective identity and turn it into an internal resource.  LGBT 
people, too, must define their identity as politically meaningful.  They also face the 
cultural challenge, though, of defining their identity as collective – that is, as an identity 
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feature held in common by many individuals.  While the nature of African-Americans' 
and women's inequality lends itself to this collective identification, since queer sexuality 
and gender is constructed as deviance their inequality is a barrier to collective 
identification.  
 A second cultural barrier to forming LGBT collective identity is to unite across 
gender, racial/ethnic, and class lines.  As I noted above, LGBT women and men have not 
historically shared the same political concerns or social spaces.   Likewise, racism and 
class divisions have hindered community building that is inclusive of this diversity.  
Some social spaces like inclusive film festivals and sports leagues do bring LGBT 
women and men together but others like bars and clubs cater only to one gender.  
Activists in the women's movement have faced similar cultural barriers to unite across 
racial/ethnic and class lines.  With both race and class privilege, affluent and middle class 
white women have dominated feminist social movement organizations and feminist 
theory.  Second wave white feminists in particular were criticized for ignoring the 
concerns of women of color and poor women and setting up a false choice between 
loyalty to one's race or class and loyalty to one's gender.  This is an area, then, in which 
LGBT people experience a cultural barrier similar to that of another group.  
 The LGBT population faces structural, demographic, and cultural barriers the 
LGBT to developing collective identity and thus the cultural resources that allow for/aid 
collective action.  While they share cultural barriers such as uniting across racial/ethnic 
and class lines with the women's movement, most of their barriers are unique to this 
community.  In order to develop meso-level cultural resources such as shared symbols, 
ideology, and leaders, LGBT people must first come out publicly with their identity, 
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physically find other LGBT people, and develop relationships outside previous 
residential or family based social networks. 
Conclusion 
 LGBT people lived in a more culturally and legally equal world in 2010 than 
when the first Pride events were staged in 1970.  In forty years their legal/political 
struggle went from fighting criminalization of their sexual acts to pushing the state to 
recognize their relationships and protect them from discrimination.  Activists in many 
states have succeeded, but Americans are still vulnerable to legal discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity federally and in a majority of states.  Similarly, 
same-sex relationships are not legally recognized in most places in the U.S.  Evidence of 
employment discrimination and the benefits of legal relationship recognition point to the 
need for these types of laws.  Culturally, LGBT people are more visible both in their 
micro-level social circles and in the macro-level mass media. The proportion of 
Americans with negative implicit cultural attitudes towards LGBT people decreased, but 
nearly one half continue to believe that homosexual behavior is morally wrong.  LGBT 
people also have more cultural resources with which to challenge inequality than they did 
in 1970.  Though they are demographically dispersed throughout the U.S., they come 
together in political and social spaces and form collective identity. 
  Social movements research about how identity-based movements work has 
developed by studying, among others, the civil rights and women's liberation movements.  
These movements use culture both in the form of explicit tools to challenge macro-level 
codes that underpin inequality and as implicit meso-level collective identity to mobilize 
and sustain movement activity.  The majority of this work has addressed movement 
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campaigns aimed at achieving legal/political equality and corresponding state-directed 
tactics.  Research on movements and tactics with cultural goals and targets suggests 
richer use of symbolic meanings.  To understand the role of Pride parades in the struggle 
for LGBT cultural equality, I explored three questions about the nature of their inequality 
through comparison to African-Americans and women: 1) What is the source of social 
power that perpetuates LGBT cultural inequality? 2) What is the qualitative nature of 
LGBT cultural inequality? and 3) What cultural resources do LGBT people have with 
which to collectively challenge their inequality?   
 In this chapter I argued that while state power has perpetuated LGBT cultural 
inequality, it has done so by undermining rather than reinforcing their status as an identity 
group.  Given their relatively recent historical emergence as a social group, the state has 
played a different role, for a shorter amount of time, in perpetuating LGBT inequality 
than it has for African-Americans' and women's inequality.  Likewise, the nature of 
LGBT cultural inequality centers on the construction of queer sexuality and gender as 
deviance and not as a feature of a minority group.  This leads to a struggle for cultural 
legitimacy that is qualitatively different from that encountered by women and African-
Americans as they stand up for cultural equality.  Finally, LGBT face unique structural, 
demographic, and cultural barriers to building meso-level culture in the form of collective 
identities.  These barriers mean that LGBT people to not find “free spaces” within 
externally defined geographic or cultural marginalization and instead must create them.   
 With this descriptive and analytical background on LGBT inequality, in the 
following chapters I consider how one tactic, Pride parades, challenge literature on 
movement tactics and uses of culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
  
STUDYING CONTEMPORARY PRIDE PARADES 
 
Pride Parades Since 1970 
 Participants declared the inaugural Pride events in New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles on June 27, 1970 a resounding success, and word quickly spread to gay and 
lesbian advocates across the country.  The following year, these cities held even bigger 
events.  New York's event remained more of a march and drew, according to the 
Advocate, up to 20,000 people, while the event in Los Angeles “had more the aspect of a 
Shriner's parade – complete with clowns, outlandish costumes, and a deft baton twirler – 
than of a civil rights march” (“Thousands Turn Out”: 1).  Chicago's event went from a 
relatively small march drawing two hundred in 1970 to a grander parade with 1,200 
participants in 1971 (“Thousands Turn Out” 1971).  They were joined by marches in 
Boston and Atlanta and a rally and “gay-in”1 in San Jose, CA (“Thousands Turn Out” 
1971; “cyclops” 1971).  In 1972 Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Francisco hosted Pride 
parades as well (“Christopher Street Parade” 1972; Jenkins 2011; Stein 2004).  The 
parade in San Francisco was notable because though it was known even then as a gay 
mecca, community leaders were skeptical of the utility of Pride for their city in 1970 and 
                                                 
1 “Gay-ins” were much like Pride marches without collective locomotion.  Individuals occupied public 
space, such as parks, and openly displayed their gay identity.  They were inspired by “be-ins” and  
“love-ins” common  to 1960s hippie and counterculture and the sit-ins of the civil rights movement. 
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1971.  Originally gay and lesbian leaders viewed Pride as too confrontational given the 
relatively good relationship the community had with city officials, but by 1972 it had 
proven a successful event so they organized a parade of their own (Armstrong & Crage 
2006). 
 Since these early marches, the number of Pride parades in the U.S. grew to 1102 
as of 2009.  Pride parades are also held in over thirty countries around the world, many in 
Europe but also in unlikely places like Asunción, Paraguay and Bengaluru, India.  Figures 
4.1-4.5 show the diffusion of Pride parades across the U.S. since 19703
                                                 
2 Data were collected by the author using information provided by Pride organizers.  An additional 62 
cities host Pride festivals, which are held on public or private grounds and open to the public.  Three 
amusement parks – Disneyworld in Orlando, FL, Knott's Berry Farm in Buena Park, CA, and 
Dollywood in Pigeon Forge, TN – also host Pride events.  However, I include only Pride events with 
collective locomotion in my analysis.  
3 Figures only include those parades still in existence. 
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Figure 4.1. U.S. LGBT Pride Parades, 1970 (N=3) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. U.S. LGBT Pride Parades, 1990 (N=48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. U.S. LGBT Pride Parades, 1980 (N=21) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. U.S. LGBT Pride Parades, 2000 (N=66) 
Figure 4.5. U.S. LGBT Pride Parades, 2009 (N=110) 
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As illustrated in the figures, Pride parades were never isolated to a particular area of the 
country.  While they cluster in major population centers, they are not clustered by 
political or cultural dimensions. By 1980 half the parades were held in either the South or 
the Midwest, both in major cities like Houston and in smaller places such as Des Moines, 
IA.  Table 4.1 shows the current geographic distribution of Pride parades. 
Table 4.1: Parades by Region of Country 
Region N % 
Total 
Population 
States Without 
a Parade 
States in Region 
Northeast 23 20.9% 53.7 million CT, DE, NH 
CT, DE, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, 
RI,VT 
South 30 27.3% 99.2 million AR, MS 
AL, AR, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, 
MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV 
Midwest 19 17.3% 59.8 million SD 
IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, 
OH, SD, WI 
West 38 34.6% 66.3 million WY 
AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, 
OR, UT, WA, WY 
Total 110 100%    
 
Parades are now held in 43 states and the District of Columbia.  Those states without a 
parade host Pride festivals – one or two day events with booths and entertainment that do 
not include a collective locomotion component.  Proportionally, there are a few more 
parades in the West and Northeast compared to the Midwest and South.  In addition to 
their geographical distribution, Pride parades are held in both small and large cities.  
Figure 4.6 shows the emergence of Pride parades that are still in existence by year and the 
population of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in which they are located.    
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Figure 4.6. Growth of LGBT Pride Parades by MSA Size (N=110*) 
 
* First year of 18 parades unknown, coded as 2009. 
 
 
   After the first parades were founded in the 1970s in large metropolitan areas, there 
was a steady growth of parades in all sizes of MSA.  It is true that Pride parades are held 
in urban centers, but common perception is that they happen only in major cities with 
vibrant gay neighborhoods like New York and San Francisco.  Though I found that all 
MSAs with over 2 million people (save Detroit) hosted Pride parades, these accounted for 
only one third of all parades.  Since 1976, parades have been founded in roughly equal 
proportions across MSA population categories.  The biggest growth has been in the 
smallest and largest population categories, each accounting for 30% of new parades. 
Most recently, from 2001 to 2009, half of all parades (48%) have been founded in the 
smallest MSAs, those with populations below 500,000.  Moreover, of the 20 parades with 
unknown starting years, one half are held in MSAs with fewer than 500,000 residents.  
Despite common perception, then, Pride parades are not a strictly metropolitan 
phenomenon.  
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 Finally, pride parades also vary greatly in their size, measured by the number of 
participants and spectators.  Size estimates were provided by parade organizers for 2008 
events.  Parade size ranged from 50 people in Pasco, Washington to over one million in 
New York City.  Table 4.2 shows the breakdown of parades by size and the median 
population of the MSAs in which parades are held.  Size categories were determined by 
taking quartiles of the size estimates given by parade organizers, thus they are in roughly 
equal groups. 
Table 4.2: Parade Size by Population in Hosting MSA N=110 
Size of Parade N % 
Median 
Population 
Very Small, 0-1,300 16 272,271 
Small, 1,301-4,000 15 524,665 
Medium, 4,001-20,000 17 1,134,280 
Large, 20,001-90,000 14 2,738,615 
Very Large, 90,000+ 13 3,715,353 
Size Unknown 35 820,725 
Total 110 1,075,530 
 
Size of parade correlates with the population of the area in which they are held.  Of those 
parades with less than 1,300 participants, twelve are held in MSAs with fewer than 
500,000 people and four in MSAs with fewer than one million.  Likewise, eleven of the 
largest parades (drawing over 90,000 participants) are held in large population MSAs 
(over two million people) and two are in MSAs with one to two million residents.  
Parades in middle size categories show similar correlation between size and the 
population of their MSA.   
 To further test the influences on parade size, I ran a serious of linear regressions. 
In the first model, I regressed MSA population on parade size. I added year the parade 
was founded to the second model and ran a likelihood ratio test to determine if this 
addition significantly changed the explanatory power of the model.  Finally, I added 
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remaining independent variables – geographic region, % white and % same-sex couples 
in MSA, median income in MSA, and statewide same-sex marriage recognition – and ran 
a likelihood ratio test.  I included the percentage of white residents as a measure of 
racial/ethnic diversity, and the percentage of same-sex couples as a proxy for LGBT 
population.  Though Pride parades are not strictly for LGBT people, a higher LGBT 
population may indicate a greater constituency for Pride events.  Same-sex marriage is a 
highly charged political and social issue and its legal status is one indicator of local 
acceptance of LGBT people.  Table 4.3 summarizes the results. 
Table 4.3. Regression of Independent Variables on Parade Size, N=75 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
MSA Population 0.020** 0.015** 0.017** 
Year Founded  -6463** -5552** 
Geographic Region°    
   South   5866 
   Midwest   29647 
   West   19466 
% White   389 
% Same-sex couples   186665 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Recognition°° 
   
  No law   35742 
  State law prohibits   64615 
  Constitution prohibits   47665 
R2 0.24 0.41 0.44 
Likelihood Ratio Test  17.73** 4.46 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
° Northeast is reference category 
°° Legal same-sex marriage is reference category 
 
 
 In all models, MSA population was highly correlated with number of participants 
in an area's Pride parade.  Alone, in model 1, MSA population accounted for 24% of the 
variation in parade size.  The year a parade was founded was also strongly correlated with 
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parade size such that the earlier the parade was founded, the larger its current size.  A 
likelihood ratio test between models 1 and 2 indicated that the addition of founding year 
increased the explanatory power of the model. This was also evidenced by the increase in 
R2 value by seventeen points.  The addition of remaining independent variables did not 
increase model 3's explanatory power over model 2 and none of the added variables 
significantly affected parade size.  
 From this information, then parade size increases along with size of the 
population in its hosting MSA and with the length it has been in existence.  While there is 
considerable variation in parade size and year of founding such that there do exist small 
parades founded early in the history of the phenomena, regression analysis showed that 
early founding is a predictor of large size.  Moreover, though there are substantive 
reasons that region, diversity, LGBT population, and acceptance of queer sexuality and 
gender would affect the number of people that attend Pride parades in a given region, 
these reasons are not supported by regression analysis.  In subsequent chapters I 
interrogate whether these factors influence the meanings that participants attribute to the 
events. 
 In sum, Pride parades have expanded far beyond what original participants 
dreamed.  They are held in most states and in cities of all sizes.  While the largest parades 
in New York, San Francisco, and other major cities draw the most attention, the majority 
of parades are held in smaller cities like Birmingham, AL and Las Cruces, NM.   
Methods 
 My study of contemporary Pride parades in the U.S. consists of observations at 
six parades during the summer of 2010, semi-structured interviews with fifty participants, 
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and content analysis of the racial and gender make-up of crowds using digital 
photographs.  In this section I detail site selection, data collection, and analysis, then 
discuss the methodological challenges I encountered. 
Selection of Cases 
 What little research has been conducted on Pride parades has focused on the 
largest of these events that draw tens and hundreds of thousands or participants (e.g. 
Browne 1997; Kates & Belk 2001; Herrell 1992; Johnston 2005).  While these parades 
draw the most media attention and thus create the popular image of what Pride parades 
are, they represent only a fraction of the 110 parades that were held in the U.S. in 2010.  
In order to get a fuller picture of Pride, I systematically selected six parade sites 
according to number of participants, geography, and demographics of their host cities.  
Using the data set that I constructed of all LGBT Pride events in the U.S., I separated 
parades into quintiles by size and selected one event from each group.  I added the parade 
in New York City as my sixth research site because it is both the largest Pride event in the 
country and it carries symbolic importance as the site of the Stonewall riot.   
 To choose between parades in the same quintile, I considered region of the 
country, demographics, and measures of gay-friendliness.  Though not statistically 
representative, my goal was to construct a sample of parades that represents the diversity 
of these events.  Geographically, I chose parade sites in each of four Census regions and 
from separate divisions within these regions. Since there are nine Census divisions and I 
was only able to attend six parades, I did not attend a parade in the East North Central, 
West South Central, or East South Central divisions.  Demographically, I matched parade 
data with census data by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which parades were 
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held. I used the percentage of white population as a representation of racial and ethnic 
diversity and chose parades in cities with high, middle, and low diversity.  I also looked 
for variation by the median income in each city. I used measures of individual-level 
cultural attitudes and relationship recognition statutes to represent gay-friendliness.  Data 
on cultural attitudes come from the 2010 GSS and are separated by Census division.  A 
second proxy for gay-friendliness is the presence state laws recognizing same-sex 
relationships. Passage of these laws requires both public support and muted opposition.  
Such laws represent steps toward legal equality, which may then make the cultural 
climate more friendly to LGBT people. Finally, as a practical matter I chose parades with 
different dates.     Table 4.4 lists the parade sites I chose with their size and information 
on geography, demography, and gay-friendliness. 
 
Table 4.4. Parade Sites 
Site Date 2010 Size 2010 Region % White 
Median 
Income 
% Homosexuality  
is not wrong at all 
Relationship 
Recognition 
Fargo/ Morehead, ND August 15 350 W North Central 92.3 $24,290 45.3 None 
Burlington, VT July 25 1,500 New England 93.6 $26,897 75.1 Legal Marriage 
Salt Lake City, UT June 6 20,000 Mountain 77.8 $25,492 40.9 None 
Atlanta, GA October 10 60,000 South Atlantic 54.9 $29,030 38.3 None 
San Diego, CA July 18 150,000 Pacific 51.6 $25,329 55.1 State Civil Union 
New York, NY June 27 1 million Middle Atlantic 51.3 $29,913 51.4 
Domestic 
Partnership* 
* As of 2010.  In 2011 New York State passed marriage equality and now issues marriage licenses to same-
sex couples. 
  
 The parades in my study represent a wide diversity on all variables and mirror the 
diversity of the population of Pride events.  Parades were distributed throughout the 
country such that the two closest parades, Burlington, VT and New York City, were 
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separated by 350 miles and vastly different in size.  The MSAs in which parades are 
located vary from 51.3% white population in New York City o 93.6% white population in 
Burlington, VT.  The make-up of non-white population is different as well.  African-
Americans are the largest minority group in Atlanta while in San Diego Latinos are the 
largest. These groups are both substantial proportions of the population in New York City.  
Parades vary by median income in their host MSA, though there is slightly less diversity 
in the parades chosen compared to all parades.  For the population of all MSAs that host 
parades, median annual income ranges from $16,000 to $39,000, but the range in my 
sample is from $24,000 to $30,000.  However, over half of all parades are in MSAs that 
have median incomes within this range. 
 Parades were located in the gay-friendly cultural climate of Burlington, VT where 
three quarters of residents believe homosexuality is not wrong at all and the state grants 
marriage licenses to gay couples, and in the non gay-friendly climates of Salt Lake City 
and Atlanta, with no legal relationship recognition for same-sex couples and majority 
disapproval of homosexuality.  Unfortunately these are not the most unfriendly regions; 
residents of East and West South Central regions (the Deep South, Texas, and Oklahoma), 
had even higher rates of disapproval.  Though there were fourteen parades in these 
regions, none fit the criteria needed on other variables. 
Field Observation 
 I attended each parade and made detailed observations of the entire event.  
Depending on the size, I arrived one to two hours before the scheduled start time and 
observed the preparations made by parade contingents and organizers and watched 
spectators interact as they gathered for the parade.  I spoke informally with both marchers 
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and spectators about their perceptions of the events.  During the parades, I walked back 
and forth along the route to watch the parade and observe spectators as various 
contingents passed by.  When there were protesters, I observed interactions between the 
two sides.  I paid particular attention to parade contingents that received especially 
positive reactions from spectators; there were none that received negative reactions.  I 
noted the signs participants carried, the shirts they wore, and the slogans they chanted.  I 
took detailed audio fieldnotes during events and summarized them with theoretical notes 
after events concluded.   
Participant Interviews 
 Participants are defined as those who attended Pride parades as either a marcher  
spectator, sponsor, or volunteer.  Research assistants conducted brief on-site structured 
interviews with participants asking about their experience with Pride parades and 
demographics.  The main purpose of these interviews was to solicit contact information 
for semi-structured interviews via phone.  Research assistants began soliciting interviews 
one to two hours before each parade started and continued until crowds dispersed after 
each parade.  They were dispersed through the crowds at each parade such that I placed 
one or two in parade line-up areas to approach marchers and others at various points 
along the parade route.  Once parades started, those interviewing marchers moved to 
other areas and continued to solicit interviews and contact information from spectators.   
 Research assistants sampled participants by quota according to perceived gender, 
age, and race/ethnicity.  I set a 50/50 gender quota for each parade, and research 
assistants strove for diversity by gender presentation, approaching some participants who 
presented themselves normatively and others who did not.  By age, I achieved variation 
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with a quota of two-thirds perceived under 40 and one-third over 40.  All respondents 
were over age 18.  I set race/ethnicity quotas relative to the non-white population in each 
hosting MSA.  In Atlanta, San Diego, and New York research assistants approached 
participants they perceived to be non-white for one third to one half of all interviews, 
while at the remaining parades they followed an informal quota by approaching non-
white individuals according to their relative presence in the crowds.  Finally, I instructed 
research assistants to approach participants that were diverse in terms of their 
stereotypically “flamboyant” behavior and the formal and informal groups with which 
they socialized.  This is a nonprobability sample in that respondents were chosen by 
walking through the crowd and soliciting brief information, and as such results cannot be 
generalized to the population of Pride parade-goers.  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with Pride participants via phone between 
one and six months after the event.  In the case of two parade sites, Burlington and Fargo, 
participants were also recruited via local email lists since the initial sample was 
comparatively small.  All participants attended Pride parades in one of the six cities in 
2010 as either a marcher, spectator, volunteer, or sponsor.  Given initial quota sampling, 
participants were diverse in terms of gender, sexual identity and role in the parade. Table 
4.5 summarizes these characteristics of interview respondents. 
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Table 4.5: Characteristics of Interview Respondents, N=50 
 
Variable N (%) 
City  
   Fargo, ND 10 (20%) 
   Burlington, VT 6 (12%) 
   Salt Lake City, UT 11 (22%) 
   Atlanta, GA 6 (12%) 
   San Diego, CA 8 (16%) 
   New York, NY 9 (18%) 
Gender  
   Woman 23 (46%) 
   Man 27 (54%) 
LGBT identity  
   Lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual 
32 (64%) 
   Transgender or drag* 4 (8%) 
   Straight 14 (28%) 
Role in parade  
   Marcher 14 (28%) 
   Spectator 30 (60%) 
   Volunteer or Sponsor 6 (12%) 
*2 respondents identified as transgender women, 2 were gay men who dressed in drag 
 
Semi-structured interviews lasted between 12 and 40 minutes in which 
participants described their experiences at their respective Pride events and their 
perceptions of Pride parades in general.  I asked interview respondents to compare Pride 
parades to other mass demonstrations like political marches and St. Patrick’s Day parades 
in order to place Pride in the spectrum of collective public displays. The interviews 
sought participants' understandings of the purpose and meaning of Pride parades and their 
evaluations of their respective events.  I asked them about the local climate for LGBT 
people and the role of Pride parade in the community. Finally, I asked respondents for 
their impressions of the racial/ethnic, gender, and class diversity at their Pride parades. 
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Crowd Photographs 
I took between 6 and 20 photographs of spectators at various points in each parade, then 
content analyzed the diversity of crowds.  There were an average of 15 identifiable 
individuals in each photograph.  At larger parades, crowds were much more dense and 
while photographs captured many people, the faces and bodies of many were obscured.  
We analyzed only those spectators for whom there was a clear view to distinguish 
personal characteristics. A research assistant and I coded spectators for perceived 
race/ethnicity, gender, and gender presentation.  We developed specific coding rules 
together.  This was an asset to coding validity because we each brought our own cultural 
understandings to the task.  As I discuss in more detail below, I approach Pride parades as 
an LGBT-identified insider with personal knowledge of LGBT culture.  My research 
assistant identifies as straight and lacks this cultural knowledge.  By collaborating on 
coding rules we were able to use our personal perspectives to develop specific criteria.  
This was an asset particularly in coding for spectators' gender presentation. However, as 
we are both white and female we approached these categories from the same social 
location.     
 We determined perceived race/ethnicity based on skin color and facial features 
and perceived gender by individuals' physical characteristics such as body size, weight 
distribution, and visible secondary sex characteristics such as breasts or broad shoulders.  
Gender presentation was the most difficult category.  We relied on our shared 
understandings of social norms to code as individuals as gender normative or non-
normative.  Criteria for the normative category included long, styled hairs, skirts or 
dresses, and accessories such as purses or jewelry for women and short hair, baggy 
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clothing, and short- or long-sleeved (as opposed to sleeveless) shirts for men.  We coded 
women as gender non-normative if they had, among other things, short, masculine style 
hair, wore baggy shorts or athletic clothing, or lacked feminine accessories.   Signs of 
gender non-normativity for men included tight clothing and sleeveless shirts or going 
topless.      
 We each coded half of all pictures independently.  To assure coding validity, we 
also coded a subset of spectators and calculated inter-coder reliability, achieving Cohen's 
kappa scores of 0.72 for race/ethnicity, 0.84 for gender, and 0.53 for gender presentation 
(Cohen 1960).  The kappa score for gender presentation is lower than ideal, but may be 
regarded as falling within a moderate range for reliability (Landis & Koch 1977).   
Analysis 
 I transcribed semi-structured interviews and analyzed them to find common 
themes using MAXQDA qualitative software.  I started by sorting responses  by whether 
they addressed external or internal dimensions of Pride.  External dimensions were those 
that spoke to Pride as a public statement for those outside the LGBT meso-level group 
and internal were those that related to this community.  I grouped responses within the 
external dimension according to common themes such as the target of action and the 
means to achieve external goals.  Within the internal dimension I sorted responses further 
into three groups – physical space, emotional responses, and boundary work -  following 
literature on developing collective identity.  After isolating common themes from 
interviewer data, I compared these to my detailed observations to see if participants’ 
perceptions match my own. 
 In order to capture variation among parades, I divided parades according to two 
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characteristics: size and cultural climate towards LGBT people.  Parade size is indicative 
of local LGBT community's ability to mobilize its members and supporters and is thus a 
measure internal to parades.  I divided parades into small/medium and large size groups.  
The small/medium parades drew well under 50,000 people, traveled up to one mile, and 
included few floats, if any.  The large parades were grander affairs in all respects.   
 Cultural climate is external to parades and is the relevant context in which parades 
are held. I used the same two measures of gay-friendliness that factored in site selection 
to separate sites as gay-friendly and non-gay friendly.  All parades sites marked as gay 
friendly were located states with some type of relationship recognition for same-sex 
couples and in regions where over half of residents believed homosexuality was not 
morally wrong.  LGBT people in non gay-friendly sites lacked legal protections for their 
same-sex relationships and faced greater moral disapproval.   I use state and region of the 
country as cultural units for two reasons.  First, acceptance of homosexuality correlates 
positively with city size so that any city will be likely to have a more friendly 
environment toward LGBT people than a rural area; thus using the city as a cultural unit 
would yield little variation4  Second, data from brief structured interviews indicate that 
on average one third of participants at each parade traveled over 25 miles (outside city 
limits and in some case suburbs) to attend.  This means that a large portion of participants 
come from more rural environments so that the cultural climate faced by those at the 
parade extends beyond the city.   
 Finally, since sexual orientation is the main identity category relevant to LGBT 
Pride parades, I measure individual variation according to participants' stated identity. 
                                                 
4 Despite this distinction, niether of the three “non gay-friendly” cities recognize any form of same-sex 
relationship. 
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While participants used a variety of identity labels, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
transgender, queer, and straight, I collapsed these into LGBT and straight. Table 4.6 
shows parades grouped by number of participants in sample, participants' sexual identity, 
size and cultural climate. 
Table 4.6 Parade Sites by Category 
 
 N=50 Size Cultural Climate 
Site N # LGBT Category Size 
Miles in 
Parade 
Route 
Category 
Homosexuality 
is not wrong at 
all 
 Relationship 
Recognition 
Fargo/ 
Morehead, ND 10 7 
Small/ 
Med 350 0.2 
Non Gay-
Friendly 45.3% None 
Burlington, VT 6 4 Small/ Med 1,500 0.3 Gay-Friendly 75.1% Legal Marriage 
Salt Lake City, 
UT 11 7 
Small/ 
Med 20,000 1.0 
Non Gay-
Friendly 47.1% None 
Atlanta, GA 6 3  Large 60,000 1.8 Non Gay-Friendly 38.3% None 
San Diego, CA 8 6  Large 150,000 1.5 Gay-Friendly 55.1% State Civil Union 
New York, NY 9 9  Large 1 million 2.0 Gay-Friendly 51.4% Domestic Partnership 
 
 I ran cross-tabulations and chi-squared tests to show variation among by identity, 
size, and cultural climate. Given the qualitative nature of my data, I can only suggest 
preliminary differences among parades. 
Ethnography of the Ephemeral 
 My study is an “ethnography of the ephemeral” (Paulsen 2009, 509) because 
unlike traditional ethnographies that involve months and even years of observation in the 
field, each phenomenon that I researched lasted only five to ten hours. With this short 
time period, my major challenge was going beyond my first impressions to compose a 
thick description based on participants’ own meanings (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw 1995; 
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Geertz 1973).  
 Paulsen (2009) identifies three challenges to this type of ethnography: gaining 
entrée and establishing a position from which to observe; moving beyond the 
immediately available informants; and refining research questions in light of emerging 
insights.  To meet these challenges, I spent months preparing by talking with parade 
organizers in various cities, researching the history of each parade and its current cultural 
climate, and constructing my data set of all Pride events in the country.  I added to this 
my personal knowledge of and familiarity with these events through years of 
participation as both a marcher and spectator.  Before starting this project, I had attended 
Pride events in six cities across the country and one in Asunción, Paraguay while serving 
as a Peace Corps volunteer.  Combining this personal experience with professional 
preparation, I started data collection with a thorough knowledge of what to expect and 
what to look for in light of my research questions. 
Gaining entrée to parade sites was not an issue because they are open to the public 
and draw large and diverse crowds such that neither I nor my research assistants stood 
out.  I did not have contact with parade organizers or participants prior to the events.  
Given my experience with Pride parades and my membership in the LGBT community I 
approach Pride as an insider.  I dressed casually in polo shirts and shorts, typical of the 
more conservatively dressed parade participants.  A number of features of my personal 
appearance mark me as “family” to fellow LGBT people, such as my short, spiked hair, 
nose ring, and visible tattoos.  This observational position as an insider helped me as I 
was able to easily build rapport with participants and parade volunteers. In one instance 
in New York, a female volunteer in a very crowded area allowed me access to a table on 
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which to stand and observe the start of the parade, remarking that “there aren't many cute 
soft butch girls like you around!”.  While I blended in with my personal appearance and 
familiarity, I also set myself apart from Pride participants through my behavior.  Most 
participants staked out positions along the parade route with groups of friends and 
interacted with those in their immediate vicinity.  I limited my contact with any one 
person or group, instead walking along the parade route making observations and taking 
pictures.   
The next challenge was the flipside of the first: to avoid too close contact with 
those informants who were immediately available to ensure both diverse perspectives and 
as much as possible an unbiased perspective on the event.  To this end, I used formal and 
informal quotas and employed research assistants to gather contact information for phone 
interviews.  As described above, I established sampling guidelines to ensure a diverse 
group of interviewees.  By using research assistants, each with unique personal 
characteristics, I was able to reduce interviewer effects.  I recruited research assistants 
through contacts with local colleges such that most were undergraduate or graduate 
students.  The majority did not identify as LGBT but had some familiarity with Pride 
parades.  My first contact with respondents was after the events via phone or email. 
Finally, my professional preparation and personal experience also mitigated my 
limited ability to refine research questions in light of new insights.  Though I developed 
new questions and insights at each parade, my observational goals did not change 
substantially between them.  I interviewed participants while completing parade visits 
and for three months after these were finished.   Using what Paulsen calls the “swarm 
strategy” (2009, 521), I was also able to rely on the perspectives of my research assistants 
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to check my assumptions about the meanings of Upstate Pride. 
In the following two chapters I present the results of my research.  Chapter 
35addresses the external aspects of Pride parade by focusing how they contest the 
dominant cultural code that stigmatizes homosexuality.  Chapter 6 turns the focused 
inward on the ways that Pride parades build community and collective identity among 
LGBT people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
LGBT PRIDE PARADES AND PUBLIC PROTEST IN THE CULTURAL SPHERE 
 
 
“I’m of Irish descent. And I have much more pride in being gay than I do 
in being Irish because I think that everyone likes to be Irish on St. 
Patrick’s Day.  But you have to be pretty brave to be gay on Pride Day.”  
  
- Blake, a gay male spectator at the 2010 Pride parade in Burlington, VT 
 
 Blake described his city, Burlington, VT, as very supportive of LGBT people.  He 
said that gay couples can regularly be seen walking hand-in-hand in the city's main 
business district without backlash.  Despite the friendly climate, he viewed Pride1 as a 
contentious event.  His understanding of macro-level culture was that LGBT identity 
continued to carry negative implications in comparison to something like Irish identity.  
While tolerated in Burlington, he did not think that LGBT identity was viewed as 
desirable.  Blake's observation that “you have to be pretty brave to be gay on Pride Day” 
speaks to Pride parades as social movement tactics that contest macro-level culture that 
constructs queerness as undesirable deviance. 
 In the introductory chapter I argued that the dominant literature in social 
movement research concerns movement campaigns primarily aimed at legal/political 
change.  Though the ultimate goal of many identity-based movements is often cultural 
                                                          
1 Throughout this chapter and the next I follow participants' use of the singular “Pride” to refer to Pride 
parades as a unitary phenomenon. 
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equality, they pursue legal/political equality as a way to bring it about.  Theoretical work 
in multi-institutional politics (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008) and new social movements 
(Pichardo 1997) pointed to the importance of non-state institutions and macro-level 
culture as sources of power in society.  I argued that the ability of the state is limited in 
the extent to which it controls cultural equality and that this control is always indirect.  
Moreover, the role of the state as a source of power over cultural equality may vary for 
each marginalized group.  In chapter 3, I presented evidence that the state is not the main 
source of power underpinning LGBT inequality.  When studying the LGBT movement 
for cultural equality, then, it is important to look to the ways that groups challenge non-
state institutions and macro-level culture. 
 An important part of social movements is the tactics they use to enact change.  
With its main focus on campaigns for legal/political equality, most research concerns 
tactics that target the state.  Incorporating the language of cultural sociology, I described 
movement tactics as explicit level cultural tools developed at the micro- to meso-level2 of 
movement organizations and constituents. When directed at the state, these cultural tools 
communicate fairly simple meanings as demonstrations of political power that challenges 
institutionalized state power (Barber 2004; Benford & Hunt 1992; Tilly 1995; 2008).  
Demonstrators may employ other explicit cultural tools, such as collective action frames, 
as they stage tactics in order to challenge implicit individual cultural attitudes and gain 
                                                          
2 The designation of micro- or meso- level depends on the number of individuals engaged in a tactics.  
Smaller tactics put on by a group of activists who know one another are micro-level, while larger mass 
demonstrations that draw participants from a particular constituency or subculture (such as 
environmentalists or African-Americans) are meso-level. 
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followers. The immediate goal though is legal/political equality, through which activists 
ultimately seek cultural equality.   
 A small body of research has examined movement tactics directed at dominant 
culture rather than the state.  Rather than institutionalized state power, these tactics are 
explicit cultural tools that challenge macro-level implicit cultural codes.  These tactics, 
such as ACT UP's “SILENCE=DEATH” campaign (Gamson 1989) and California same-
sex couples' public weddings (Taylor et al. 2009) challenged cultural codes through 
symbolic inversion.  The meaning of each explicit cultural tool (tactic) was specific to the 
macro-level cultural code it challenged.  This research shows that in order to understand 
these cultural tactics, one must describe the nature of the cultural inequality expressed in 
implicit macro-level cultural codes.  In chapter 2, I described LGBT inequality as 
centered on a struggle for cultural legitimacy as a minority group.   
  In this chapter, I analyze LGBT Pride parades as explicit cultural codes.  I focus 
on the meanings of these events from the perspective of participants – those who marched 
in and watched parades in 2010.  I use semi-structured interviews with participants to 
describe what they said Pride parades meant and my own field observations for what they 
communicated through slogans, dress, and actions. 
Previous Research on Pride Parades 
 In chapter 2 I described the inaugural Pride events in New York City and Los 
Angeles.  The main theme of both events was gays and lesbians marching as themselves 
by publicly declaring gay identity to demand cultural equality.  Participants in each city 
communicated this in different ways.  NYC activists staged a march that incorporated 
festive parade elements. The Los Angeles event looked more like a full blown parade.  
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Despite this variation in form, the message of both events was the unashamed public 
declaration and celebration of gay identity.  In chapter 3 I reviewed how the LGBT 
community's legal and cultural status has changed since 1970 and in chapter 4 I traced the 
growth and diffusion of Pride parades throughout the country.  In this chapter I look at 
six Pride parades that were held in 2010 and considered the meanings of these explicit 
cultural tools. 
 The public declaration and celebration of gay identity remains the stated purpose 
of LGBT Pride parades (InterPride 2009).  Research into these events has most often 
described them as sites of resistance to heteronormative macro-level culture through the 
public display of queerness (Brickell 2000; Browne 2007; Johnston 2005; Kates & Belk 
2001).  From her study of two Pride parades in the UK, Browne (2007) concluded that 
Pride was a “party with politics” in which participants challenged heterosexual norms 
through performances of queer sexuality and gender.  Similarly, Kates & Belk (2001) 
found that Toronto Pride participants celebrated their queerness by consuming goods to 
mark their identity such as rainbow flags.  These studies contest the popular critiques of 
Pride parades that their party atmosphere and commercialism erode the serious message 
they purport to convey (Chasin 2000; Savage 2003).  Instead, they show that through 
partying and commercialism Pride participants actually resist heteronormative culture. 
 These studies support my treatment of Pride parades as serious social movement 
events.  However, they have three main weaknesses in relation to my research questions.  
First, nearly all of this research is based outside the U.S. in countries where the laws and, 
most likely, macro-level culture are more friendly toward LGBT people. Second, 
virtually all research on Pride parades is based on parades that draw over 100,000 
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thousand people3.  Parades of this size are a small minority of those held in the U.S.; 88% 
of U.S. Pride parades draw fewer people.  I include six parades of widely varying sizes in 
my study, from Fargo with its 350 participants to New York City with one million, which 
makes this study a more complete representation of Pride events.  Third, most research on 
Pride parades comes from the disciplines of geography, economics, and leisure studies 
and not from a social movements perspective.  With this perspective I examine Pride 
parades as explicit cultural tools used to further the LGBT movement goal of cultural 
equality. 
Public Contention at Pride 
 Pride parades take place along public, generally prominent, city streets and are 
open to all.  Each respondent mentioned this public nature as an important feature of 
Pride.  In three cities, Fargo, Burlington, and New York, the parade ran along the main 
commercial downtown street; in Salt Lake City it was along peripheral but still central 
downtown streets.  In the other two cities, Atlanta and San Diego, the parade was mainly 
in the city's “gayborhood”: central neighborhoods known for high LGBT populations and 
containing gay bars, bookstores, and community centers.  All parades blocked traffic on 
city streets for one to eight hours, but the extent to which each parade disrupted everyday 
routines of city residents depended on their size and the day on which they were held.  
The least disruptive parades were those in Fargo and Salt Lake City because they were 
                                                          
3 One notable exception is the work of Joseph (2010) on the year round work of Pride planning 
committees in three cities: Boise, ID, St. George, UT, and New York City.  While concerning Pride 
parades, this work analyzes them as community service organizations and does not consider their 
meanings as one-day demonstrations. 
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held on Sunday mornings when their smaller and more conservative mainstream 
populations were less likely to be in commercial districts.  Parades in Atlanta, San Diego, 
and New York City were also held on Sunday mornings but were slightly more disruptive 
due to their size and the size of the cities' populations.  Burlington's parade was took 
place on Saturday afternoon on the city's pedestrian-only thoroughfare and caused the 
biggest disruption to normal routines, but this was mitigated by the parade's relatively 
small size. 
 Most respondents (43 out of 50) described cultural contention in relation to the 
public nature of Pride parades.  That is, they expressed a sense that parades run counter to 
social norms and that there are people who object to the events.  Participants described 
three reasons they believed Pride parades are contentious: unwillingness to discuss queer 
sexuality, misunderstanding of LGBT people, and intolerance for LGBT people.  
Participants in non gay-friendly areas in particular said people in their communities 
simply did not want to talk about queerness.  Jessica, a straight ally from Fargo, said that 
 JESSICA: In the community I live in it's not something that's always 
talked about, or not something that's always brought up in conversation, 
it's still kind of under the rug. 
 
For these participants Pride parades were contentious because they went far beyond 
talking about queerness by staging public parades in celebration of it.  When queer 
sexuality was talked about, participants thought that dominant understandings were 
characterized by misunderstanding and intolerance.  Many said that people in their 
communities misunderstand LGBT people by thinking of them as categorically different 
from straight people and characterized by deviance rather than acceptable difference.  By 
contrast, Pride parades challenge those in the mainstream to see the humanity and 
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diversity of LGBT people.  Similarly, participants viewed dominant macro-level culture 
as intolerant to LGBT sexual and gender difference. They described a cultural climate in 
which it is wrong to be queer and LGBT people are not fully accepted.  For participants, 
Pride parades run counter to these three cultural attitudes – invisibility, misunderstanding, 
and intolerance – because they are loud spectacles that present LGBT people as they are 
without apology.   
 Importantly, each of these reasons for contention was cultural, not political.  
Moreover, most participants' descriptions of the reasons Pride parades are contentious 
accord with my argument that LGBT inequality is rooted in their struggle for cultural 
legitimacy.  All marginalized groups may contend with invisibility, misunderstanding, 
and intolerance, but the way participants described these points to a macro-level 
conception of LGBT people as deviants rather than as a legitimate minority group.  
Participants said that members of their communities wanted to treat queerness as if it did 
not exist, which is possible only if it can be hidden. Likewise attitudes characterized by 
misunderstanding and intolerance both regard queer sexuality as a changeable individual 
feature and not a group identity.   
 Not all participant descriptions supported my claim about cultural legitimacy.  A 
few described intolerance towards LGBT people as the same type of hatred or bigotry 
that is directed at other marginalized groups.  They said that people in their communities 
were intolerant towards LGBT people because they are different but not necessarily 
morally objectionable.  Many participants also referred to the most extreme examples of 
contentiousness, such as protesters who demonstrated against Pride parades or particular 
142 
 
friends or neighbors that reacted strongly against parades.  While participants talked of 
these examples as representative of macro-level culture, this is not possible to verify. 
 With the exception of Atlanta, there was little overt backlash to the parades.     
Burlington's parade marched through downtown on a busy Saturday at lunchtime and 
received cheers from the diners at restaurants along the routes.  Protesters at Pride 
parades are often religious groups who object to the social acceptance of LGBT people 
because they believe homosexual behavior is immoral. At three parades – Fargo, 
Burlington, and New York City - I did not see any protesters and at two – Salt Lake City 
and San Diego – protesters were confined to one area and police kept them physically 
separated from participants.  While isolated, the scene around the three protesters at Salt 
Lake City was quite contentious.  Encircled by police for protection, they held large signs 
declaring homosexuality (along with a long list of other things they consider sinful) while 
a constant crowd of participants argued with them loudly.  One participant held a sign 
near them saying “I'm not with these assholes”, which drew cheers and many pictures.  In 
Atlanta, there were six separate groups of protesters at locations along the parade route.  
All held signs announcing their belief in the immorality and unnaturalness of 
homosexuality, such as, “Jesus Lord of All or Hell Awaits You” and “I Now Pronounce 
You Pervert and Pervert”.  The largest group had a public address system with which 
they played gospel music before the parade and issue condemnations during.  This group 
was located at a crowded corner and became a site for many contentious displays.  In one 
such display, the parade's official Pride marching band approached the corner playing 
“Poker Face” by Lady Gaga (a favorite in the LGBT community). They stopped in front 
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of the protesters, turned to face them, and played the spirited chorus while the crowd 
reacted with loud cheers.   
 While protesters were present at some parades, participants described the 
contention of the parades coming from the contrast of the atmosphere there with that of 
their daily lives.  According to participants, in their everyday lives LGBT people feel 
alternately invisible, misunderstood, or condemned but at Pride parades they were put on 
celebratory display.  Protesters represented the most visible and extreme cultural 
opposition to LGBT people. 
 A few participants described the contestation of Pride by referencing parades as 
cultural symbols.  As Ruth, an older straight ally marching in Fargo, ND explained, 
RUTH: I think people -- I like to remind people that we're public about 
lots of things that we care about.  We have patriotic parades because we 
care about our country.  We have veterans parades because we want to 
honor people who have served our country in the military service.  We 
have lots of ways in which we're open, we publicly acknowledge things 
that as a society we care about.  And that if we're really open, then we're 
open to seeing a public parade about people being gay or lesbian or 
transgendered or bisexual.   
 
By comparing Pride to patriotic and veterans’ day parades, Ruth identified it as a symbol 
of affirmation.  For her and six others, parades are cultural tools used to officially 
recognize and honor a group of people or an event.  They identified Pride parades as 
culturally contentious because because they publicly affirm a group that is often marked 
as deviant in macro-level culture.  The perceived macro-level cultural objection made 
Pride contentious for participants. 
 On an individual level, respondents talked about the experience of marching 
despite others' negative reactions.  Blake, a gay man from Burlington, VT, illustrated 
contention in the quote that opens this chapter comparing participation in Pride to 
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participation in St. Patrick's Day festivities.  Blake’s assertion that “You have to be pretty 
brave to be gay on Pride Day” is at the heart of the contestation at Pride parades.  For 
him, parades are events in which all who attend identify themselves with the celebrated 
group and there is an amount of risk involved in identifying oneself with LGBT people.  
In other words, straight people who attend Pride may be perceived as gay, and this 
involves risk.  By contrast, there are no longer negative associations in American macro-
level culture with being Irish, so “everyone like to be Irish on St. Patrick's Day”. Ashley, 
a straight participant at Atlanta’s parade, recounted backlash from her family and friends 
after attending the event.  Her boyfriend suggested she may be gay, while her aunt 
admitted her negative reaction was prompted by her own reticence to attend an event 
where she may be perceived as gay. As a strategy, participants identified Pride as a subtle 
cultural statement that dares others to object.   
 Though they saw them as contentious, participants described Pride events as 
parades rather than protest marches.  In form, they certainly looked more like parades.  
Even the smallest events in my study, those in Fargo and Burlington, were made up of 
diverse contingents representing school groups, politicians, commercial sponsors, and 
community activists.  There were marching bands and floats, throngs of spectators 
(depending on size), and even awards for favorite contingents.  Participants identified 
Pride as more contentious than parades like St. Patrick's Day but rejected their 
characterization as protest marches.  They said Pride differs from protest marches in two 
ways: 1) its message is more subtle and diffuse, and 2) it fosters a more upbeat 
atmosphere.  Tobias, a gay man in San Diego, explained how the message of Pride is 
different from more traditional protest marches: 
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TOBIAS: I'm not really sure that there's much overlap between the parade 
and these more focused, politically oriented demonstrations such as a 
march on Washington.  Or perhaps the issue is that it's more subtle.  If you 
see different elements of the parade like PFLAG and the different 
religious organizations, and you know there's a Jewish organization and 
you know there are the Episcopal Cathedral, the law enforcement.  
Perhaps it's more of a subtle sort of support for a group that historically 
over the decades had been, you know closeted as a community -- the 
community had been closeted as a whole.   
 
Tobias called the message “subtle” because it is delivered through the presence of varied 
groups rather than their explicit statements.  Tobias mentioned religious and social 
groups that take the relatively simple action of marching in the parade.  He did not point 
to continued advocacy of these groups (though they may actively promote support of 
LGBT people year-round) but instead found meaning in their participation on the day of 
the parade.  Tobias articulated the sense that Pride’s message is broad cultural support 
rather than more narrow political advocacy.  The more subtle message of Pride may also 
make it less effective.  Protest marches are well established cultural tools to communicate 
the political power of a marginalized group, but parades are not as often used for 
contentious purposes.  Rebekah counted as a positive the lack of an explicit political 
agenda: 
REBEKAH: When you see a parade, there is a suspension of time, there is 
a suspension of reality, there is a suspension of, “do I agree or disagree”. 
It's a spectacle, it's a circus, and there's a certain amount of – unless the 
parade has a certain political agenda, if they're going to bring up 
something that people are signing onto or not signing onto – but if it's a 
celebratory parade then it invites the spectator to come along on the 
fantasy, to come along on the ride. And there's not, it's not asking you to 
take sides. But something like a gay Pride parade in itself asks you to take 
sides because there is an agenda there, but you can make that analogy bake 
to the Irish, to the St. Patrick's Day Parade. By cheering on the revelers 
you are saying that we accept you Irish people as a real entity. So there's 
an engagement and an acknowledgment on the part of the observer who 
sort of inherently I am helping you to legitimate what you're marching for, 
but it's also not asking for a political perspective.  
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To her, parades invite spectators to suspend immediate judgment and to join the 
spectacle.  Other participants, too, thought that the upbeat, parade atmosphere at Pride 
made for a positive experience.  But they worried that those in the mainstream who did 
not participate in Pride would misinterpret its message.  Rather than courageous 
declaration of a stigmatized identity, they might instead see needless and even offensive 
display of private sexual matters.  The parade form at Pride can be effective in shaping 
macro-level cultural codes of what groups are celebrated in society, but ineffective in 
changing individual cultural attitudes.  In the next section, I detail how participants 
viewed the purpose and meaning of Pride and relate these to the contentious cultural 
climate in which the parades happen. 
Visibility, Support, and Celebration 
 Participants used three themes to describe the external, public meaning of Pride: 
visibility, support, and celebration.  Each theme only makes sense in the context of the 
public nature of Pride parades and macro-level cultural construction of queerness.  That 
is, to make visible, celebrate, and support a social group is not by nature contentious, but 
it is in the context of macro-level cultural stigmatization of queer sexuality and gender.  
The first theme is visibility, was mentioned by 38 participants (76% of those 
interviewed). Participants using this theme said that Pride is about making visible the 
existence of LGBT people and their straight allies. They did this, first and foremost, by 
staging the event on public city streets in the middle of the day.  At all parades, streets 
were closed to traffic for at least two hours.  In terms of sheer numbers, with one million 
participants New York City parade drew more people than the 200,000 who participated 
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in the last LGBT March on Washington in 2009, which was a traditional protest march 
(Cloud 2009). 
 Messages of visibility took two main forms: defiant visibility with the message 
that LGBT people exist and deserve to be acknowledged; and educational visibility to 
dispel misconceptions about LGBT people.  The first form combated perceived ignorance 
in macro-level culture, the second combated perceived misunderstanding of LGBT 
people. 
 Defiant visibility was mentioned by 13 people and can be summed up by the 
familiar chant, “We're here, we're queer, get used to it!”  Countering the construction of 
queerness as deviance, the message of defiant visibility is that LGBT people will not 
change to accommodate macro-level culture.  This theme was present at the first Pride 
events in 1970 as well, as participants marched to make themselves visible as gay and 
lesbians.  Like the first Pride marchers, contemporary participants publicly declared their 
sexuality in the face of what they saw as a culture that tried to keep them invisible. 
 Participants referenced aspects of parades, such as sexual displays, that may be 
read as offensive or frivolous in relation to defiant visibility.  Ed, a gay man in Atlanta, 
said these displays were part of the Pride's defiant message: 
ED: On the one hand, I could see that [de-emphasizing sexual displays 
would encourage support]. But on the other hand, I guess maybe their 
point is, yes, we are men who have sex with other men, deal with that. 
 
Sexual displays – scantily clad men or suggestive dancing on floats – were comparatively 
rare but have long been associated with Pride parades.  While many believe these 
displays are detrimental to the image of the LGBT community, participants like Ed say 
they are meaningful by challenging intolerance based on the belief that queerness is 
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deviance and should not be made public.  In a similar vein, Jonah, a gay man from San 
Diego, described the way he understands the defiant visibility of Pride parades: 
JONAH: Sometimes I think that they [mainstream society] just don't get it 
a lot.  But at the same time it's still very important that we do it because 
it's like, no matter what people think of our community, we're not going 
away.  We're here and we're going to have our rainbow parades whatever 
they want to think about it.  You know, we're going to have our crazy 
floats and wear our high heels, and you know, do our thing.  So I think it's 
very important for people to understand that you know, we are a 
community you know that loves everyone and likes to have a lot of fun 
and everything, and we're not going away.  We are a part of San Diego.   
 
Jonah described Pride as a way to claim belonging in the larger city community.  Like 
Ed, he acknowledged that some displays – for him, those that are more stereotypical – are 
judged negatively by the mainstream but he asserted their importance.  For both men, 
Pride is about defying cultural codes that cast LGBT people as inferior and deviant.  By 
refusing to downplay sexual and gender displays that go against heterosexual norms, 
Pride participants lay claim to cultural legitimate minority status.  Defiant visibility 
meant being present despite any opposition – in fact in the face of anticipated opposition.   
 Participants also talked about the defiant visibility of presenting LGBT 
community as a united whole.  They said that Pride parades exist in order to show LGBT 
people and their straight allies as a “united front” against those who wish to ignore or 
condemn them.  One way that participants showed a united front was through the use of 
the rainbow flag. This flag was designed specifically for this purpose by San Francisco 
artist Gilbert Baker in 1978 (Lambda Legal 2004).  Each color was meant to represent 
different aspect of gay and lesbian life such as art, nature, and healing, but as it has also 
come to represent the many parts of the LGBT community (Lambda Legal 2004).  In 
Atlanta, a straight couple draped their baby's carriage with a rainbow flag as they 
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marched with their Presbyterian Church. In San Diego, a group of “bears” (self-
proclaimed large, hairy gay men) repurposed the California state flag with its symbol of a 
bear by replacing the flag's stripe of red with a rainbow.  In Salt Lake City, a mounted 
contingent called “Aces Wild” carried rainbow flags as they rode their horses in the 
parade.  In every city, residences and business along the parade route hung rainbow flags.  
These flags were visible symbols that tied together the diverse participants and were a 
way to present themselves as united in purpose. 
     Participants recognized large diversity in terms of sexual orientation, gender 
expression, race, class, age, and religion in the community of LGBT people and allies. 
An older gay man in Atlanta, Jonathon, related the collective visibility to mainstream 
parades:  
JONATHON: I would describe [Pride] as a fun, uplifting parade that 
shows unity not just in the gay communities, but in the straight, 
transgender, and bisexual communities, because there is every one of 
every denomination there religious as well as sexual. And we are all there 
marching in a parade, basically as a united front. Not for any cause but for 
us. You know, straight people have the opportunity to do that in Fourth of 
July Parades, and Labor Day Parades, and in any other type of parade they 
can do that. But that is our only venue to do that, to show our solidarity as 
a community. 
 
Like others discussed above, Jonathon understood Pride parades as playing on the 
cultural symbol of parades as events to collectively show unity for a cause.  Collective 
visibility was defiant because participants felt that cultural forces sought to silence the 
LGBT community.   
 Participants invoked defiant visibility to contest what they perceived as 
mainstream ignorance of the LGBT existence.  They also said that Pride parades contest 
the stereotype-fueled misunderstanding of LGBT people that they felt dominated macro-
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level culture.  Twenty participants invoked this theme, which I call educational visibility.  
In this form, participants said Pride makes LGBT people visible as they really are, not as 
they are caricatured to be. Blair and Martin, both from Salt Lake City, described the 
educational component of their Pride parade: 
BLAIR: I think [Pride] is important because then other people can see how 
our community is, enjoy what we do and it’s not just what everybody 
thinks it is. 
 
MARTIN: You know, [Pride] is important for the people who are 
participating but it’s also important for the crowd, the people that are 
watching. To actually see and experience something different, and expose 
little kids to it. That it’s not this big scary thing. Especially here in Utah, 
parents teach their kids it’s the most wrong thing you could ever do- to be 
gay or lesbian, transgender. I think it just shows that it’s a fun community 
and they’re proud of who they are. I think it’s almost most important for 
not the people participating but the people watching outside the 
community. 
 
These participants and others argued that if people could only see the LGBT community 
accurately, they would accept it and support greater cultural equality.  In a similar vein, 
others described Pride participants as neighbors and upstanding citizens, stressing their 
similarity to the mainstream.  
 I saw educational visibility through the diversity of parade contingents.  Parades 
represented an impressively wide array groups from local LGBT communities and their 
supporters.  Marching contingents were organized around church congregations, local 
gay sports leagues, political advocacy groups, politicians, gay-straight alliances from 
colleges and high schools, troupes of drag queens and kings, LGBT community health 
initiatives, and local and national corporate sponsors.  Likewise, parade spectators were 
diverse in age, racial/ethnic background, and gender presentation.  I observed more non-
normative personal expressions at the larger parades: scantily clad young men, drag 
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queens and kings, and women and men displaying affiliation with LGBT subgroups such 
as bears and leather. However, participants with non-normative displays mixed with and 
were outnumbered by the more normative crowd.  At all parades I observed gay and 
straight parents with children, seniors, and people dressed conservatively in shorts and t-
shirts.   
 From the perspective of participants who mentioned educational visibility, Pride 
parades on the whole present a positive and accurate image of the LGBT community. 
This is the main distinction between defiant and educational visibility.  In the logic of 
defiant visibility, it does not matter whether the image of the LGBT community at Pride 
is interpreted as positive or wholly accurate because Pride seeks primarily to challenge 
both macro-level codes.  By contrast, the logic of educational visibility is that there is 
nothing truly objectionable about queerness and as an accurate representation of the 
LGBT community Pride seeks to change individual attitudes.  The trouble with this logic 
is that many people, both inside and outside the LGBT community do find some 
representations at Pride objectionable.  Sexual displays, or even more modest displays of 
affection, make queer sexuality visible to an extent that some do not appreciate.  The 
logic of educational visibility harks back to the accommodationist strategy of the pre-
Stonewall homophile movement in which activists emphasized their similarity to 
mainstream heterosexuals.  During the Annual Reminders discussed in chapter 2, 
participants followed strict dress codes to present themselves as upstanding citizens who 
fit into rather than challenge mainstream heterosexual society.  Moreover, this logic 
follows a “bottom up” approach to cultural change by targeting individual attitude change 
in order to achieve broad cultural equality.  While not a negative in itself, it is out of sync 
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with the logics of defiant visibility and other themes that strive primarily for top-down 
macro-level cultural change. 
 The second major theme was Pride as a show of support for LGBT people, 
mentioned by 27 respondents (54%).  Deb, an older lesbian in Salt Lake City, described 
the Pride parade as “a great display of public affection for gays” that was notable for its 
contrast to her everyday experience in which her sexuality was not supported.  The 
important part of this support was its public nature and external focus.  While many 
participants also talked about attending Pride to support individual queer people in their 
lives, or to support the LGBT community more broadly, this theme places Pride as a 
message to those who are intolerant towards this population by saying essentially, “I’m 
on the other side”.  Contestation is inherent in the theme because participants conceived 
of their participation as a way to publicly declare themselves on the side of LGBT people.  
According to straight ally Jessica, in Fargo,  
JESSICA: Participation is huge for Pride parades because I think it's a 
good way for the community to be driving by or walking by and see a 
bunch of people all there for one thing and that's support and the rights of 
the LGBT community.  So I think participation is huge for how many 
people are affected and are involved. 
 
For Jessica simply attending Pride was a way to show support for the LGBT community.  
She imagined those who passed by and saw the parade being impressed by the large 
number of people coming out in support of this marginalized group.  I noticed that 
straight participants in particular visibly emphasized their involvement in Pride as a way 
to publicly support LGBT people.  In Salt Lake City, I saw a number of people wearing t-
shirts that said “I’m Straight and I Support Equal Rights” or holding signs with the 
153 
 
similar phrase, “I’m Mormon and I Support Equal Rights4”.  Likewise in Fargo, the 
women’s soccer team from a local college marched with a banner that read “I love my 
gay teammates”. These slogans suggested that there was something uncommon about the 
person displaying them; that they held strong convictions that ran counter to those of 
most people in their positions.  They may also have been a way for participants to mark 
themselves as straight at these LGBT-centered events. 
One group that stood as perhaps the most potent symbol of support was Parents 
and Friends of Lesbians And Gays (PFLAG).  This group, designed to help people 
embrace their LGBT loved ones, was actually started at a Pride parade.  In 1972, Jeanne 
Manford marched with her son in New York’s parade.  After many gays and lesbians saw 
her and asked that she talk with their parents, she decided to begin a support group 
(PFLAG 2009). The group now has affiliates in 500 communities in the U.S. and abroad, 
with over 200,000 members.  In the parades I observed, PFLAG members often marched 
with their children holding signs declaring “I love my gay son”, “I love my lesbian 
daughter”, and “Hate is not a family value”.  These signs countered the Right's political 
framing of opposition to LGBT rights as “family values”.  They also spoke to the 
rejection experienced by many LGBT people when they come out to their families.      
PFLAG groups received the strongest emotional reactions of all contingents.  I 
heard loud cheers when PFLAG contingents marched, and saw parade goers approach 
individual members to thank them and often receive a hug.  Margaret, a straight ally in 
                                                          
4 This sign held extra weight in the wake of strong advocacy by the Mormon Church for the passage of 
California's Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in the state. 
154 
 
Atlanta who has marched with her local PFLAG group for many years said she often sees 
spectators with tears streaming down their faces as her group walks by.  She described 
the first parade she went to: 
MARGARET: The first time was absolutely amazing. I walked around 
with my son mostly. I felt as I were an anomaly. I had folks, when my son 
would introduced me as his mom, I had folks say, “It’s amazing that 
you’re here supporting your son.” We even had one couple take a picture 
of us, as the son and the PFLAG mom. It was great.  
 
Margaret's experience speaks to the continued cultural challenge that LGBT people face 
at the macro-level.  She “felt as if [she] were an anomaly” for marching in public support 
of her son.  Participants reactions to these supportive displays evince everyday lives 
where support is either withheld entirely or is not made public. 
 Many participants mentioned the support of institutional actors, namely local and 
national businesses politicians, and religious groups.  In addition to Pride as a way for 
individuals to publicly declare their support for LGBT people, then, it is also a venue for 
institutional actors to put themselves on the side of acceptance and inclusion of LGBT 
people. 
Businesses were involved in all parades as financial sponsors and as marching 
contingents – often the two went together.  Sponsors used slogans on banners and t-shirts 
that connected Pride and their business.  Marchers with a local bar and grill in Atlanta 
wore shirts that said “Taking Pride in Our Service”, while San Diego Public Defenders 
marched with a banner that read “Getting You Off Since 1988.”  At the Atlanta parade I 
observed the heaviest business involvement.  The parade itself had an official sponsor, 
Delta Airlines, and the company had a large marching contingent.  Much of the business 
involvement was like Delta's (albeit to a smaller scale), combing financial support, 
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official recognition on parade banners and other paraphernalia, and a marching 
contingent made up of employees handed out souvenirs with rainbow colors or the Pride 
theme.  While participants were aware that it was marketing, many (13) said they 
appreciated the public show of support.  Danielle, a straight ally in Fargo, explained why 
she liked seeing businesses at the parade: 
DANIELLE:  I mean literally I appreciate that they're showing support to 
the community here in town and I would be more likely to go there if I had 
to -- with all other things equal I would choose them just ‘cause they had 
been there.  So that's political, and more just a show of support.   
 
For Danielle and others, marching in the parade or financially sponsoring it was a way for 
businesses to publicly place themselves on the side of the LGBT community.  Even if it 
was a cynical attempt to sell more products, participants appreciated it.  In contrast to 
Chasin's (2000) critique that corporate influence has turned Pride parades into a market to 
sell goods to the LGBT community, Pride participants viewed business involvement as a 
public show of support. 
 Participants took a similar attitude towards politicians’ involvement in Pride 
parades.  While many regarded it as a cynical attempt to advance their own careers, seven 
described their involvement as a public show of support.  Politicians marched in all 
parades,  but I noted considerably more in the gay-friendly cities of Burlington, San 
Diego, and New York than in non gay-friendly cities.  According to Jonathon, an older 
gay man in Atlanta, 
JONATHON: I think the political side is a lot more… politicians are 
getting involved in the gay pride parades. There are a lot more politicians 
that are taking a stand on gay rights and gay marriage and gay issues and 
not just putting their money where their mouth is, they are actually there in 
the parade supporting us. There are so many organizations out there that 
are fighting for our legal rights as well as our civil rights. And so I think 
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it’s good to see all those organizations that are in the parade because that 
does present a positive political and legal force to the parade.  
 
Jonathon and others made an interesting separation between the political and the cultural.  
In this statement, Jonathon identified “taking a stand on gay rights and gay marriage and 
gay issues” as the political side of politicians' jobs.  He viewed their participation in Pride 
as part of the cultural side in which they symbolically supported LGBT people by 
marching in a public Pride parade.  While he and others hoped the two are connected and 
appreciate politician's presence, they were not entirely uncritical of politicians' motives. 
 Finally, eight participants mentioned the public support shown by numerous 
religious groups who marched in Pride parades.  Their support was made more 
meaningful by the fact that the protesters at parades were religious groups whose 
message was that homosexuality is sinful and anti-Christian.  Those religious groups that 
marched in parades held signs declaring their different vision of a religious attitude of 
love and acceptance of LGBT people with phrases like “Jesus Loves Everyone”.  In 
Atlanta, in particular, there was heavy participation by religious groups in support of the 
parade.  The route passed a number of churches and at two members handed out water 
and made their bathrooms available to parade participants.  Ruth, a straight ally who 
marched with her church in Fargo, described how her group was motivated to participate 
because of the negative actions of other Christian groups: 
RUTH: There were probably eight or ten of us last summer who marched 
with a banner that is from our church so people would know that it was a 
church affiliated group because that's so hard for people to -- you know 
there's so many negative associated with a lot of our churches and there's 
really Neanderthalic issues of sexuality.  So we were really eager to be 
known as a group of people from the Episcopal church who were out and 
supportive and so on. 
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For Ruth, marching the parade was a way to align herself and her congregation on the 
side of LGBT people.  Other participants noticed, saying they were surprised and 
delighted to see supportive churches in the parade. 
 Like defiant visibility, the message of public support challenged macro-level 
culture from the top down.  While a few participants said they hoped their support would 
affect individual attitudes, such as those who passed by and saw parades, most talked 
about public support in a general sense.  They hoped that by participating in parades they 
would add to those on the side of LGBT cultural equality and thereby reduce the strength 
of cultural forces against equality.   
 The third major theme, mentioned by half of all participants (25), was Pride as a 
celebration of being queer.  Many invoked this theme simply by saying that the events are 
about being proud of being lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.  Like defiant visibility, 
this theme was also part of the first Pride events in 1970.  Celebration was evident in the 
festive atmosphere of parades.  Particularly at larger parades, Pride was an opportunity to 
have house parties near the parade route or spend a nice summer day with friends.  Many 
bars and restaurants along the routes in every city but Fargo hosted special events, 
advertising drink specials and an opportunity to extend the festivities beyond the parade.  
More so than the other two themes of visibility and support, on its face there is 
nothing contentious about celebration.  In fact, for a minority of participants Pride was 
simply a fun party without contention.  While participants’ intentionality is an important 
piece of a social movement tactic, cultural contestation does not rest on this factor 
(Taylor & Rupp 2004; Taylor et al. 2001).  I argue that the message of celebrating LGBT 
individual and collective identity is powerful in light of the history of the macro-level 
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treatment of queerness as deviance.  Celebration communicates not only the message that 
being queer is not deviant, but that, like minority status, it is a source of pride.   
Though a few participants spoke of celebration irrespective of cultural 
contestation, most did make this connection.  Angela, a lesbian in Burlington and Jonah, a 
gay man in San Diego talked about collective celebration at Pride: 
INTERVIEWER: How would you describe Pride to someone who had 
never been and never heard of it? 
ANGELA: I would say that it's a festival; it's a parade and a festival and it 
celebrates, you know, it celebrates queer people and LGBT people...And, 
you know, it's sort of meant as a day for us to sort of celebrate who we are.  
I think there are lots of days where we get to be like hey I don't get to file 
my joint tax return or hey I don't have [inaudible] rights or hey I don't 
have this.  So like one type of day where we can be excited about -- I 
mean I'm excited about who I am every day, but some people aren't and I 
think it's a great day as a community to be excited together about who we 
are 
JONAH:  It's like every year there's one day, one day a year where my 
entire community mobilizes together and is truly proud and confident 
about all of ourselves.  You know, and I think that's very powerful for us 
to have a day of Pride and being GLBT. 
 
Both Angela and Jonah spoke of Pride as a special day set apart from their everyday 
lives.  Angela referred to her daily life of legal and cultural benefits denied to her as a 
lesbian, while at Pride being lesbian meant celebrating herself with others like her.  This 
celebration is a cultural challenge by a meso-level social group – Pride participants – to 
the implicit macro-level cultural code that links queerness to deviance.   
 For a few participants, the celebration at Pride was explicitly born of the 
oppression LGBT felt in mainstream society.  Rebekah, an older straight ally from 
Burlington, explained the connection: 
INTERVIEWER: What would you say would be the message 
communicated through Pride? 
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REBEKAH: That people who have known a lot of oppression can turn that 
oppression into joy. Not to denigrate or downplay the suffering, but also to 
raise it up in a way that transcends the suffering and brings joy to it. There 
wasn't anger, there was no place for any of the more difficult feelings, it 
was just a time to celebrate. It is a very ancient human ability, to take a 
rough time and find those moments of joy. 
 
This sentiment answers a frequent critique of Pride parades: Why have a parade for Gay 
Pride? It’s not as if heterosexuals hold Straight Pride parades!  As Rebekah explained, 
Pride parades may be a way for people to find hope in the face of opposition.  This 
translation serves both internal community goals of solidarity and strength and external 
cultural goals by offering an alternative narrative about what it means to be LGBT.  By 
marching down the street in a cultural ritual of celebration, LGBT people and their allies 
declare that queerness is a positive human variation worthy or respect and inclusion. 
 LGBT Pride parades contest macro-level culture that constructs queerness as 
deviance through visibility, support, and celebration.  With the exception of one type of 
visibility, educational, all three themes challenge macro-level culture from the top down.  
That is, they challenge the link between queerness and deviance at the macro-level in 
order to change the treatment of LGBT people in their everyday lives.  Educational 
visibility was aimed at the reverse approach, challenging individual implicit attitudes 
about LGBT people as a way to change macro-level culture.   
Variation by Personal Identity, Parade Size, and Cultural Climate 
 To test variation in uses of themes, I ran cross-tabulations of each theme by 
participants’ stated sexual identity, parade size, and the regional cultural climate towards 
LGBT people, and calculated chi-square statistics.  I compare participants’ personal 
identity to test whether this individual characteristic impacts the way participants 
describe the meanings of Pride parades. I treat size as a variable internal to parades and 
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thus something organizers and participants may affect.  Finally I compare use of themes 
by the regional cultural climate of parade sites, a variable that is external to parades and 
may affect their meanings. Table 5.1 presents cross-tabs of each theme with identity, size, 
and cultural climate variables. 
 
Table 5.1 Theme Variation by Individual, Internal, and External Variation 
 Individual Variation by 
Sexual Identity 
Internal Variation by 
Parade Size 
External Variation by 
Cultural Climate Total 
Theme LGBT  N=36 
Straight 
N=14 
Small/ Med  
N=27 
Large 
N-23 
Gay-
Friendly  
N=27 
Non Gay-
Friendly 
N=23 
N=50 
Visibility 31 (86%)* 
7 
(50%) 
20  
(74%) 
18  
(78%) 
20  
(74%) 
18  
(78%) 
38  
(76%) 
Support 17 (47%) 
10 
71% 
16  
(59%) 
11  
(48%) 
19  
(70%)* 
8 
(35%) 
27  
(54%) 
Celebration 16 (44%) 
9 
(64%) 
13  
(48%) 
12  
(52%) 
10  
(37%) 
15  
(65%)* 
25  
(50%) 
* p<0.05 in Chi-square test 
  
The first theme, visibility, varied significantly by individual sexual identity.  
Participants who identify as LGBT were more likely than their straight counterparts to 
say that Pride parades are about making the LGBT community visible. Meanwhile, the 
themes of support and celebration were used more by straight participants, but given the 
small number of straight participants in my sample the observed difference was not 
enough to be statistically significant.  This makes sense at face value; straight participants 
can show their support and celebrate LGBT community at Pride parades, but through 
their presence they only indirectly make LGBT people visible.  Moreover, within the 
broader LGBT community there has been a strong emphasis on individuals’ coming out 
as LGBT since the 1970s (Armstrong 2002).  Activists argue that the visibility of 
individual LGBT people within families and communities is key to movement success, 
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an assertion that is backed up by research on factors that encourage acceptance for 
homosexuality (Becker & Scheufele 2011; Brewer 2008).  Thus, LGBT participants may 
be more personally familiar with the theme of visibility and extend their individual 
visibility to the LGBT community at Pride parades.  
There was very little variation in any themes by the size of the parade; each theme 
was mentioned at roughly equal percentages by participants at small/medium parades and 
those at large parades.  The one exception may be use of the support theme, mentioned by 
59% percent of those at small/medium events compared to 48% large parade participants.  
However, this may be explained by the small sample size and overlap with the cultural 
climate variable (there are two non gay-friendly cities with small/medium parades).  It is 
also notable that there is no variation by size in the use of the visibility theme.  Visibility 
was as important to participants in Fargo, where the parade drew 350 people and lasted 
twenty minutes, as to participants in New York City where it blocked two miles of traffic 
for hours and was attended by one million people.  Though the amount of disruption 
caused by each parade varied its size did not affect participants' view of its importance in 
making the LGBT community visible.  Thus, despite the difference in the look of parades 
from the smallest in Fargo to the largest in New York City, it appears that this internal 
factor did not affect the meaning of Pride for participants. 
There is also no difference in use of the visibility theme between participants in 
gay-friendly vs. non gay-friendly cities.  Though we may suspect that visibility would be 
more important to those in non gay-friendly cities since the cultural climate is harsher, 
this was not the case.  The other two themes, support and celebration, show stark 
variation by cultural climate.  Pride participants from gay-friendly cities used the 
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celebration theme more than their counterparts, while those in non gay-friendly cities 
preferred the support theme.  This finding suggests that participants are responding to the 
challenges of their environments.  In places where LGBT people have some acceptance, 
as evidenced by inclusive laws and surveys showing higher tolerance for LGBT people, 
their cultural challenge is to push for continued equality.  They meet this challenge with 
open celebration.  In places where the climate is harsher, LGBT people and their allies 
have more modest goals and use Pride parades as a way to publicly show that there are 
people on the side of gays and lesbians.   
I tested for interaction between individual-level and parade-level variables.  The 
proportion of LGBT-identified participants varied little by parade size and cultural 
climate.  Two-thirds of respondents at small/medium sized parades identified as LGBT 
compared to 70% of those who attended large parades.  There was a slightly higher 
proportion of LGBT-identified respondents from gay-friendly than non gay-friendly 
cultural climates, 74% vs 63%, respectively, but this difference was not statistically 
significant.  Logistical regressions of parade-level and individual-level identity variables 
on each theme showed no difference in statistical significance from chi-square tests.  
Based on these multivariate tests I can conclude that the observed variation by parade-
level and individual-level variables is properly identified in chi-square tests. 
 Comparisons of theme by variables that are individual, internal, and external to 
Pride parades show variation in each theme.  Participants' sexual identity correlates with 
their use of the visibility theme regardless of the internal size of the parade they attended 
or the external cultural climate in which the parade was held.  LGBT participants 
described Pride parades as about visibility to a greater extent than straight participants. I 
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theorize that this is because visibility impacts LGBT people more in their personal lives 
and they are more aware through the emphasis of visibility in LGBT culture and activism.  
On the parade level, I tested participants' use of themes by internal parade size and 
external cultural climate and found that cultural climate correlates more with how 
participants talk about the meaning of parades than the size of parades.  This finding adds 
to the evidence to identify Pride parades as cultural contests over the construction of 
sexual orientation and gender identity.  Differences in use of support and celebration 
themes suggest different uses for Pride parades depending on the larger cultural climate 
towards LGBT people. Those participants in gay-friendly cultural climates were more 
likely to describe Pride parades as public celebrations of LGBT people, while those in 
non gay-friendly climates described them as opportunities to show public support for the 
LGBT community. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that Pride parades are explicit cultural tools used to 
contest macro-level culture in the pursuit of LGBT equality.  After establishing that 
participants did see parades as contentious, I summarized their meanings and purpose 
with three themes: visibility, support, and celebration.  Participants who identified as 
LGBT emphasized visibility more than their straight counterparts, while the cultural 
climate in which parades were held correspondent with participants' uses of the two 
remaining themes.  Those in gay-friendly areas spoke of Pride more as a celebration 
while those in non-gay friendly areas spoke of it more as a show of public support. 
This research yields two conclusions about the external side of Pride parades.  
First, while most social movements research concerns campaigns and tactics with 
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legal/political equality as their immediate goal, Pride parades directly aim to effect 
cultural equality.  Second,  Pride parades challenge macro-level culture by enacting 
alternative and contentious codes about queer sexuality and gender.  Unlike traditional 
demonstrations aimed at showing political power for or against specific policies, these 
events imagine an alternative through public display.   
Pride parade target cultural change by making culture, not politics, the site of 
conflict. LGBT people in the U.S. live in diverse legal and cultural climates.  In some 
places, like Burlington, VT, citizens are protected against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity and they can legally marry same-sex partners.  The Pride 
parade in this city ran through the center of town on a busy Saturday with what seemed 
like unreserved support.  In other places, like Atlanta, GA none of these legal protections 
exist and though LGBT people have created a thriving neighborhood, the Pride parade 
was met with protesters coming from six different groups. 
Despite these differences in local climate for LGBT people, Pride participants that 
I interviewed consistently reported cultural challenges.  No matter their location, 
respondents said that LGBT people are invisible, misunderstood, and not accepted in 
their communities.  Even in Burlington, VT, all six participants said that Pride was a 
contentious act.  Most pointed to the struggles of LGBT people in more rural areas of the 
state to be visible, accepted, and understood.  Participants in all cities wore t-shirts and 
held signs messages like “God loves all people” and “Love conquers hate” which were 
contentious by implying that many, perhaps a majority or people believed that God does 
not love or approve of LGBT people and that intolerance is motivated by blind hatred.  
All of the contentious struggles identified by participants are cultural rather than political.   
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Participants' descriptions of the negative cultural climate towards LGBT people 
align with my argument that at the macro-level of U.S. culture queerness is constructed as 
deviance rather than as a minority status.  A deviant behavior is one that can and should 
be changed while a minority status, while often maligned as inferior, is nonetheless a 
culturally legitimate basis for group identity.  To participants mainstream invisibility, 
misunderstanding, and intolerance was premised on the idea that it is possible for LGBT 
people to cease to exist as an identity group.  They countered this idea at Pride through a 
public, visible display of unabashed LGBT identity. Participants also identified Pride as 
cultural by aligning it more with a parade than a political march.  While there has been 
little study of the contemporary use of parades to make cultural challenges, parades have 
historically taken many meanings, as “modes of propaganda, recreation, local celebration, 
and national commemoration” (Davis 1986: 3; see also Nagle 2005; Smithey & Young 
2010).  In 1970, activists in Los Angeles staged a Pride event in the form of a parade and 
were met with both celebration and backlash.  For contemporary participants, a parade is 
a public affirmation of a group of people or an important event.  The difference with 
Pride, they said, is that the public – or at least a significant portion of the public – does 
not want to affirm LGBT people as a legitimate and valued group in society.  If Pride 
were not contentious, it would be just another parade.   
Participants compared their events favorably with traditional political marches, 
saying that marches are more serious (or even angry) and more focused on a single issue.  
Participants' comparison to other parades was evident in my observations.  Like other 
parades, Pride events were composed of various contingents that included school groups, 
churches, social groups, marching bands, commercial sponsors, and floats.  Marchers and 
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spectators cheered and applauded rather than chanted political slogans.  Contestation was 
evident but not explicit, except where there were protesters.  It came from the fact that 
this was a different kind of parade, not that it was a political march.   
 Since Pride parades are only one case of cultural contestation, I cannot make 
general conclusions about contentious acts directed at macro-level culture.  What I found, 
though, is in line with previous research on this type of tactic.  Like other examples of 
cultural contestation – drag performances (Rupp & Taylor 2003), multiracial identity 
claims (Bernstein & de la Cruz 2010), and same-sex wedding (Taylor et al. 2009) – Pride 
parades engage in conflict by flipping a cultural code on its head.  Pride parades use a 
cultural symbol of affirmation – a public parade – to make visible, support, and celebrate 
a community that is alternately invisible, misunderstood, and condemned through the 
macro-level cultural construction of queerness.  Whereas traditional political marches 
follow a script in which they communicate political power, Pride parades enact a creative 
display to directly challenge cultural codes.  Marches say what they are about through 
verbal messages and by visually standing on one side of an issue.  Pride parades are 
prefigurative: they attempt to change culture by actually doing what they want the wider 
culture to do.  Participants do not simply say that LGBT people should be visible, 
supported, and celebrated, they do these things by staging a grand parade. 
 I showed variation in use of themes by both individual and parade level variables.  
At the individual level, LGBT participants were more likely to use the visibility theme 
than their straight counterparts.  This made sense as LGBT participants are the ones 
personally affected by lack of daily visibility and the ones able to make themselves 
visible at Pride parades.  At the parade level, the internal variable size of parades 
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participants attended did not affect their use either theme.  Regional cultural climate, a 
variable I identified as external and thus beyond the control of parade participants, did 
affect their use of themes.  Those participants in the more gay-friendly areas of 
Burlington, VT, Sand Diego, and New York City were more likely to describe the 
message of their parades as celebration.  Those in Fargo, ND, Salt Lake City, and 
Atlanta, which I describe as non gay-friendly areas, were more likely to describe their 
parades as public demonstrations of support of LGBT people.  I theorize that this 
difference reflects parades' sensitivity to the needs of their larger cultural environments.  
In regions where LGBT people have less cultural acceptance, participants emphasize 
showing support for them, placing themselves on their side in opposition to the larger 
climate.  In regions where there is greater acceptance for LGBT people, participants push 
even further by emphasizing not just acceptance, but celebration of queer gender and 
sexuality. 
 The downside of the cultural message of Pride is that it is open to interpretation.  I 
did not find much disagreement among participants about Pride parades' positive 
meaning. While they emphasized different themes, participants were not critical of Pride 
parades as explicit cultural tools to bring about LGBT equality.  This is evidence of 
selection bias in my sample as it is reasonable to expect that those who participate in 
Pride are likely to feel positively about it. Despite participants' positive evaluations of 
Pride, I argue that the theme of educational visibility is most problematic as a challenge 
to macro-level culture.  Participants said that Pride parades show LGBT people as the 
diverse yet upstanding citizens they are and thus combat the misunderstanding that they 
are a deviant class.  This assertion is premised on the idea that non-participating members 
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of the mainstream would not find anything at Pride parades objectionable. Educational 
visibility contrasts with the other version of visibility, defiant visibility, with which 
participants said Pride parades are about making LGBT people visible despite aspects of 
the community that some find objectionable.  Defiant visibility was evident in the first 
Pride parades in 1970, while educational visibility was more characteristic of the 
accommodationist strategy of the pre-Stonewall homophile movement. 
 Celebration is another theme that is open to misinterpretation, but I argue that it 
does not suffer the drawbacks of educational visibility.  The latter theme operates through 
a bottom up model of cultural change by relying on individual attitude change to bring 
about macro-level change.  Participants said they hoped members of their communities 
would see LGBT people as they are and change their negative attitudes towards them.  
Celebration, by contrast, operates through a top down model, seeking to make the macro-
level cultural code more favorable to LGBT people.  Rather than attempting to convince 
individuals that LGBT people are not deviant, the public celebration at Pride seeks to 
change queerness from a quality that is deviant and should be changed to a quality this 
defines a culturally legitimate minority group and should be celebrated.  This model is 
about establishing new social norms for behavior based on an altered cultural 
construction, so it does not rely on individual interpretation or attitude change.  Defiant 
visibility and public support operate through this model as well. 
 My findings are in line with previous research on Pride parades that interpreted 
these events as creating important sites of individual resistance to macro-level 
heteronormative culture.  However, by viewing these events as social movement tactics, I 
go beyond the focus of previous research on individual acts of resistance and interpret 
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Pride parades as collective challenges to macro-level culture.  More than creating safe 
spaces for individuals to resist heteronormative culture through partying and consumption 
(Browne 2007; Kates & Belk 2001), Pride parades are explicit cultural tools used by the 
meso-level group of Pride participants to challenge the macro-level construction of 
queerness as culturally illegitimate deviance.   
 Through its focus on state-targeted protest tactics, literature on social movements 
assumes that meaningful social change happens through political change generally in the 
form of favorable policies that create greater legal/political equality for the aggrieved 
group.  Activists advocate for legal/political equality through all means possible – direct 
appeals to legislators, mass displays of political pressure, even attempts to sway public 
opinion.  Often cultural change is a byproduct of this state-directed action as collective 
identities draw people together and issues are framed in new ways.  Cultural equality is 
often the ultimate goal that can be achieved through legal/political equality. Pride parades 
cut out the middleman (political change) and directly challenge cultural codes that 
underpin inequality.  In this chapter I showed that Pride parades communicate cultural 
messages of visibility, support, and celebration in order to establish LGBT people as a 
legitimate social group. 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
INTERNAL COMMUNITY BUILDING AT PRIDE 
 
“For a day on Sunday everyone's covered in rainbows and glitter. I got 
covered in glitter. I did not leave my apartment wearing glitter, but I had 
glitter all over me when I left. So it’s good in that way, it kind of marks 
everybody in a way that we aren’t marked typically. You can obviously 
choose to do that, you can chose to make yourself look the way gay people 
look hypothetically. But you can also not... But especially when you're on 
the train going there and half of your train is covered in rainbows, [you 
think], “Wow that's a lot of gay people.” 
 
- Morgan, a lesbian spectator at the 2010 Pride parade in New York City 
 
 
 Morgan attended the 2010 Heritage of Pride March in New York City.  In this city 
where people live largely anonymous public lives, in a culture where LGBT identity must 
be declared, the Sunday of Pride Week is a day when strangers form a community 
marked by glitter and rainbows.  In the last chapter I argued that visibility is an important 
element of Pride parades in the sense that these are events where LGBT people and their 
allies make themselves visible to a mainstream public that they feel ignores, 
misunderstands, and condemns them.  In this chapter I examine how visibility turns 
inward; for Morgan and other participants Pride parades are a time when LGBT people 
make themselves visible to each other and form a community.  Straight allies join in this 
community as full participants, allies, or supportive outsiders.  Like visibility, the themes 
of celebration and support have internal dimensions for Pride participants.  Again, their 
public nature is key to the work of Pride parades - when oriented outward, these events 
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challenge macro-level culture by publicly celebrating, supporting, and making visible 
LGBT people and their allies; as I turn my focus inward, I show how the public nature of 
Pride parades make community building physically, emotionally, and cognitively 
possible. 
 The primary mechanism for forming community within social movements is 
collective identity - a shared sense of self among movement participants.  Collective 
identity is an implicit cultural feature at all social levels (micro to macro).  For social 
movements, collective identity is most relevant and the meso-level of group cohesion as 
it is a way for people who are otherwise strangers to have some degree of familiarity and 
unity.  In the introductory chapter, I reviewed three ways that mass demonstrations foster 
collective identity.  First, they bring people together physically who then need to 
coordinate their actions to march together at a steady pace (McPhail & Wohlstein 1983).  
Through myriad one-on-one interactions, participants in mass demonstrations develop 
both implicit and explicit cultural tools to facilitate their coordinated actions (Becker 
1982).  Second, mass demonstrations foster shared emotional experiences, which bond 
participants to one another and are components of mutual identification. Third, mass 
demonstrations create literal and symbolic boundaries between participants and non-
participants; particularly those who are blamed for the injustices against which the 
demonstration is held.   
 This information is all from research on mass demonstrations with the 
legal/political equality as their immediate goal.  Research on social movement tactics 
aimed at cultural equality does not address the internal movement effects for those 
participating.  Outside social movement literature, research on public parades point to a 
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few differences with regards to internal effects.  Though there are instances, including 
Pride, where public parades are used explicitly to seek social change, they are generally 
understood as distinguished from protests by their uncontentious nature.  Parades may be 
held by a macro-level social group such as a town-sponsored 4th of July or Christmas 
parade or by a meso-level subcultural group like a neighborhood or community center 
sponsored Puerto Rican or Cinco de Mayo parade.  Spectators at parades usually far 
outnumber marchers, and they have strong elements of entertainment and spectacle.  
Additionally, parades are composed of organized contingents of community groups, 
corporate sponsors, and marching bands while protest participants are generally only 
loosely organized into small groups. 
 The three mechanisms for developing collective identity in social movements – 
interaction, shared emotions, and boundary work - pertain to parades as well but in a 
slightly different way.  Parades facilitate both more and less interaction among 
participants.  Spectators – which do not really exist for protests – have ample opportunity 
for interaction and for some this may be the explicit purpose for participating.  Marchers, 
though, may have less opportunity because their activities are more formally organized 
than those involved in protest marchers.   
 Emotionally, parades tend to create a more celebratory atmosphere than protests, 
leading to positive shared feelings of joy and excitement.  Though not specific to parades, 
dramaturgical theory applied to public rituals helps explain the importance of emotions 
for building community at Pride parades.  Dramaturgy explains social life at the 
interpersonal level as a series of cultural scripts.  Culture in the world at all levels – 
micro-, meso-, and macro- - defines which emotions individuals should experience and 
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express in social situations (Turner & Stuts 2006).  Individuals who break the cultural 
script by not experiencing or expressing prescribed emotions in a given interaction will 
feel shame or embarrassment (Goffman 1967; Scheff 1988).  Negative emotions then 
decrease an individual's bond with the group whose script she broke (Summers-Effler 
2004).  A way to increase social bonds, then, is through shared positive emotional energy 
and one mechanism to produce that is interaction rituals.  By gathering together, sharing a 
focus of attention and mood, and coordinating actions, individuals engaged in rituals 
experience the heightened emotions of collective effervescence (Collins 2004).  The 
positive emotional bond formed in the micro-level cultural group may then counter the 
negative emotions individual experience when they break a macro-level cultural script. 
 The significance for boundary work in community building is that while protests 
are externally focused against an “other” that is the source of injustice, parades are more 
internally focused towards those participating as marchers or spectators.  Contentious 
parades held by meso-level subcultural groups engaged in boundary work by claiming 
public space – a neighborhood, a few blocks – for that group (Abdullah 2009; O'Reilly & 
Crutcher 2006).  The claimed space is then safe for identity expressions that may be 
against macro-level behavioral norms but are celebrated within the subculture (Abdullah 
2009; Davis 1995; O'Reilly & Crutcher 2006).  Rather than creating a boundary by 
defining one's group as in opposition to another, parades create boundaries by allowing 
groups the space to develop and express themselves as if those cultural codes that oppress 
them do not exist. 
 Previous research on Pride parades has addressed both their emotional and 
boundary work.  Browne (2007) found that the upbeat, party atmosphere at Pride parades 
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united diverse participants as they celebrated queer sexuality together.  Kates & Belk 
(2001) argued that Pride parades fostered collective effervescence as participants 
emotions were heightened by the sheer numbers of people engaged in the parade ritual 
and by the collective excess of their celebration.  By establishing parades as sites for 
queer expression, participants enforced boundaries between queer and straight people and 
defined queer collective identity (Johnston 2005).  Similarly, Herrell (1992) argued that 
Chicago's Pride parade reinforced collective identity among LGBT people by generating 
and attaching symbols to the community.  One issue these studies do not address is ways 
some segments of the LGBT community may have been excluded in forming boundaries 
defining collective identity.  In this chapter, I examine the forms of community building 
at 2010 Pride parades and connect this internal work to the external messages of these 
events. 
Barriers to Community and Collective Identity for LGBT People 
 As discussed in chapter 2, LGBT people face distinct structural, demographic, and 
cultural challenges to form community and develop collective identity.  All LGBT people 
face the structural challenge of needing to seek out LGBT community as adults outside 
the families and communities in which they are born.  Demographically, LGBT people 
comprise only a small percentage of the population.  According to the best estimates 
available, 3.8% of the U.S. population identifies as LGBT (Gates 2011).  Though their 
population density does vary across the country, there is not nearly the clustering as 
occurs in racial/ethnic minority populations groups.  Table 6.1 details LGBT population 
density in the metropolitan statistical areas in which each parade in my study was held, as 
measured by the percentage of households with same-sex couples. 
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Table 6.1. Same-Sex Partner Populations at Each Parade MSA.* 
MSA % of Unpartnered households 
% of Same-sex 
partner households 
% of Opposite-sex 
partner households 
Proportion OS to 
SS partner 
households 
Fargo, ND 48.2% 0.27% 51.5% 188:1 
Burlington, VT 42.5% 1.11% 56.4% 51:1 
Salt Lake City, UT 38.3% 0.66% 61.1% 93:1 
Atlanta, GA 46.0% 0.80% 53.2% 66:1 
San Diego, CA 44.7% 0.87% 54.4% 63:1 
New York, NY 51.9% 0.72% 47.3% 65:1 
*Source: American Community Survey 2007-2009 3 year estimates 
 
In the metropolitan statistical areas in which my six parade sites are located, straight 
partnered households outnumber gay households by 66:1.  The highest proportions of 
straight to gay households were in Fargo, ND (188:1) and Salt Lake City, UT (93:1), both 
small/medium size parades in non gay-friendly cultural climates.  The lowest proportion 
was in Burlington, VT (51:1), which is a small population center but was the only site at 
the time of data collection in a state recognizing same-sex marriages (New York has since 
changed).  Even in Burlington, though, LGBT people are far outnumbered and thus face 
the demographic challenge of finding, meeting, and building relationships with other 
LGBT people. 
 Continued stigmatization of homosexuality and racial/ethnic, gender, and class 
diversity present cultural barriers to LGBT community.  The first step to for an LGBT 
person to meet, form community with, and collectively identity with other LGBT people 
is to personally come out and identify as LGBT.  Heteronormativity means that everyone 
is presumed straight until proven otherwise.  It also means that cultural pressure is 
asserted against breaking the norm of heterosexuality such that homosexuality and gender 
variance is stigmatized.  The everyday effect of this for LGBT people is that the macro-
176 
 
level cultural script necessitates experiencing and expressing emotions that conform to 
the heterosexual norm.  When an LGBT individual fails to, say affirm an attraction to 
someone of the opposite sex, she may experience the embarrassment or shame of 
breaking the cultural script.  This script and attending negative emotional energy is a 
hindrance to forming a positive bond with other LGBT individuals.  Evidence of 
employment discrimination, widespread belief in the immorality of homosexual behavior, 
and discourse surrounding LGBT political issues such as same-sex marriage confirm this 
cultural stigmatization.   
 A second cultural barrier to LGBT community is the broad diversity of LGBT 
people.  Sexual orientation is distributed throughout the population such that there is 
comparable racial/ethnic, gender, and class diversity among LGBT people as the 
population as a whole.  The same barriers to racial/ethnic integration that exist in the 
broad population – residential segregation, separate cultural traditions, and overt and 
covert racism – exist among LGBT people.  Regarding gender, while straight men and 
women come together in heterosexual pairs, gay men and lesbians can socialize 
romantically and platonically in separates spheres.  Most LGBT bars and clubs cater 
either to men or women creating large gender imbalances in many LGBT spaces.  Gay 
communities have a history racism and sexism and major activist organizations have been 
overwhelmingly run by white men (Armstrong 2002; Duberman 1993).  LGBT people 
experience divides in social class because most spaces for socializing are commercial and 
located in cities, creating a barrier for the participation of LGBT people with lower 
incomes. 
  In the previous chapter I described the ways that Pride parades contest the macro-
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level construction of queerness as culturally illegitimate deviance through visibility, 
celebration, and public support.  In this chapter, I look at how Pride parades address 
challenges to forming LGBT collective identity and examine whether there are conflicts 
between external cultural contestation and internal community building.  I analyze 
community building according to three functions identified in the literature: physical 
interaction, shared emotional experience, and boundary work.  Moreover, I test for 
variation by the three individual and parade level variables – personal identity, parade 
size, and cultural climate - that I used in the previous chapter.  Rather than performing 
this analysis after describing main themes, as I did in the last chapter, in this one I 
analyze variation throughout the paper. 
Community and Collective Identity at Pride 
Physical Community - Interaction 
 Pride parades draw enormous crowds.  According to my data set of all Pride 
events, in 2009 over six million people attended a parade either as a marcher or spectator.  
In chapter 3, I tested the effect of parade-level variables such as years in existence and 
MSA-level variables such as total population on the size of each U.S. pride parade, as 
measured by the number of people participating as marchers or spectators.  I found that 
larger population in parades' MSA and the earlier parade founded correlated with greater 
parade size.  Region of the country, LGBT population size, racial/ethnic diversity, and 
state legal recognition of same-sex relationships did not affect the size of Pride parades.  
Therefore, data presented above about the relative sizes of LGBT populations at each 
parade site are measures of the ability of LGBT people to meet and socialize with others 
but do not affect the size of each parade. 
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 As public events, parades are open to all and are thus more accessible that 
festivals that are enclosed and often require entrance fees.  Unlike traditional protest 
marches, their public nature functions as an invitation to open participation.  Similar to 
protest marches as public events they are spectacles for passersby and the general public 
through media coverage.  Thus one important aspect of Pride events is to bring people 
together physically. 
 Crowd Data.  As described in chapter 3, I took photographs of spectators at 
various points in each parade and used them to estimate the diversity of crowds.  A 
research assistant and I coded spectators for perceived race/ethnicity, gender, and gender 
presentation.  We each coded a subset of spectators and calculated inter-coder reliability, 
achieving Cohen's kappa scores within excellent to moderate ranges reliability (Cohen 
1960; Landis & Koch 1977).  In Table 5.2 I present estimations of diversity along with 
American Community Survey 5-year estimates for race/ethnicity of the metropolitan 
statistical areas in which parades are located.  
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Table 6.2. Spectator Demographics at Parade Sites 
  Race/Ethnicity Gender Gender Presentation 
 Parade 
Size White Black Other* Woman Man Normative 
 Non-
Normative 
Fargo, ND 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
350  
96.1% 
91.3% 
 
.8% 
1.9% 
 
3.1% 
6.7% 
 
51.9% 
 
45.0% 
 
82.2% 
 
17.8% 
Burlington, VT 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
1,300  
87.1% 
93.3% 
 
0 
1.2% 
 
12.9%  
5.6% 
 
59.6% 
 
40.4% 
 
82.2% 
 
17.8% 
Salt Lake City 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
20,000  
83.9% 
76.9% 
 
3.4% 
1.3% 
 
12.7% 
21.8% 
 
49.2% 
 
47.5% 
 
83.1% 
 
 
17.0% 
Atlanta 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
60,000  
72.5% 
54.0% 
 
15.3% 
30.7% 
 
12.2% 
15.3% 
 
32.7% 
 
64.5% 
 
71.0% 
 
 
29.0% 
San Diego 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
90,000  
61.2% 
54.0% 
 
4.1% 
4.9% 
 
34.7% 
43.8% 
 
52.0% 
 
46.9% 
 
72.5% 
 
 
27.6% 
New York 
   Crowd Data 
   Census 
1 million  
58.8% 
47.0% 
 
9.4% 
18.7% 
 
31.8% 
34.2% 
 
43.5% 
 
55.3% 
 
88.2% 
 
11.7% 
* includes Hispanic/latin@, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, and mixed-race 
  
Crowd data indicate there was slightly less racial/ethnic diversity at Pride parades 
than in their area populations as a whole.  At all parades save one, in Burlington, VT, 
there was a slightly higher percentage of white spectators than in the population as a 
whole.   Attendance by black spectators was generally proportional to the populations 
except in Atlanta and New York City where there was a substantial difference.  These two 
parades also had the largest differences in attendance by white spectators compared to 
their areas' populations, with a difference of over 10 percentage points for each.  One 
reason for this may be that both cities also host Black Gay Pride events catering 
specifically to this community (IFBP 2011).  Participation by people from other non-
white racial ethnic groups was also notably lower than in the general population in Salt 
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Lake City and San Diego.  Part of the difference may be methodological; analysis of 
crowd photographs measured spectators race/ethnicity as perceived by two coders while 
census data measures self-identification.  Overall, these data show that the Pride parades 
in my study were less racially/ethnically diverse that the areas in which they were 
located, but the in most cases this difference was not large.   
 There were interesting differences in gender makeup at parades.  At three parades 
– Fargo, Salt Lake City, and San Diego - there was a roughly even gender split (men and 
women within 10 percentage points). Of the remaining three, Burlington was dominated 
by women while there were more men at the parades in Atlanta and New York.  Atlanta's 
parade in particular had two times as many men than women.  There is no clear pattern to 
parades with even gender splits and those without; I do not know the reason.   
 Finally, I measured spectators' gender presentation as a type of diversity.  As 
detailed in chapter 4, a research assistant and I used specific criteria including hair length 
and styling, clothing, and presence of makeup and accessories to judge individual's 
gender presentations.  Presentations of those coded as normative were on the whole either 
feminine or masculine according to their perceived gender, while those coded as non-
normative incorporated one or more elements typical of the other gender.  At the smallest 
three parades 82-83% of spectators' gender presentation was normative and that of the 
other 17-18% was non-normative.  There was a marked changed with the next two 
parades, Atlanta and San Diego, as nearly one quarter of spectators presented non-
normative gender.  Surprisingly, the highest percentage of gender normativity was 
observed in New York City with nearly 90%.  I attribute the degree of gender normativity 
at parades to two factors: the extent to which parades foster supportive and encouraging 
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atmospheres and the amount of straight people that attend parades.   Non-normative 
gender presentation can be a cultural marker of LGBT identity, and thus is more common 
among those who identify as queer.  I do not have an explanation, however, for why New 
York City would foster either a less supportive atmosphere or draw more straight 
participants.  I will return to the question of supportive atmosphere later in this chapter. 
   Participant Interviews. Two-thirds of participants (33 people) mentioned the role 
of physical interaction at Pride parades, saying they bring LGBT people and allies 
together as a community, draw out a large diversity of people, and are sites for 
meaningful personal interactions.  
 One third of participants (16 people) mentioned the simple fact that Pride parades 
brings a lot of people together in one place and that this physical togetherness builds 
community.  Regardless of the diversity of those who attend, participants found it 
significant that LGBT people simply have a place to gather.  Shane and Court, gay men 
who attended Burlington's and New York's parades, respectively, explained: 
SHANE: I like that there is so much visibility. You know, like I know that 
there are a lot of people in the LGBT community, but often times they are 
real spread out, you know. So it makes it difficult to get together. There 
aren’t really any big events that draw everyone together... But Pride is 
obviously like the biggest one so...It’s just like a little gay town. 
 
COURT: Yes there is [something special about Pride] because on a day to 
day basis, I don't really interact with many gay people.  I’m not saying I’m 
in the closet in any form or fashion, I’m totally out, but I generally don’t 
have many gay friends. And even the ones that I do, I don’t spend that 
much time with when I go out and do the gay things, particularly out to 
bars, like the gay bars or any other gay functions or groups and stuff. So 
its really great to have those events every year where you're able to see 
other people or meet other people who might be going through the same 
things as us or some similar experience. Just something that you know you 
have the common language with them already. 
 
Shane's description of Pride as “a little gay town” is significant given LGBT people's 
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demographic and structural isolation from one another.  LGBT people are a small 
percentage of the population and there are only a few neighborhoods in the country – all 
in major cities – with substantial clusters of LGBT residents.  Pride parades are among 
the few non-commercial spaces, and by far the largest spaces, where one can be primarily 
amongst LGBT people.   According to Court, even living in New York City with access 
to LGBT spaces he does not interact with other gays on a daily basis.  Court described 
having an implicit meso-level “common language” based on the similar experience of 
living as a gay man with which he can connect with gays who are strangers at Pride 
parades.  On a basic level, Pride parades serve an important function as a site for LGBT 
people to come together.   
 In the last chapter I described visibility as an external message of Pride such that 
participants made the LGBT community visible in the broader culture. When considering 
internal community functions of Pride parades, visibility turns inward by making LGBT 
people visible to one another.  Shane and Court, and other participants remarked on their 
physical proximity to many other LGBT people as a special feature of Pride parades.  I 
did not find any conflict in these two functions of Pride parades.  That is, visibility at 
Pride works in both directions, external and internal, without diminishing the function of 
either. 
 Interestingly, mentions of this theme did not vary by size of parade even though 
large parades were all held in cities with LGBT population clusters.  Nor did mentions 
vary by the cultural climate for LGBT people; roughly one third of participants in both 
gay-friendly and non gay-friendly locations said that Pride parades brought LGBT people 
together in community.  There was variance by sexual identity, however, as fourteen of 
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the sixteen participants who commented on bringing people together identified as LGBT.  
Like externally oriented visibility, this finding is understandable because LGBT people 
would be more aware of opportunities to gather and share a personal desire for LGBT 
community spaces.  These data suggest that physically bringing people together is a 
common feature among all Pride parades.  Regardless of the number of people who come 
together to march or the external cultural climate facing LGBT people, many participants 
find it meaningful that parades are able to create sites of LGBT people to congregate and 
interact. 
 Nearly half of respondents, 24 people, remarked positively on the diversity of 
race, age, class, sexual orientation, and subgroups within the LGBT community.  
Participants in my study said that Pride events were unique for  gathering all elements of 
the LGBT community along with straight allies.  Many said that their Pride parade was 
more racially/ethnically diverse than their city at large, though this perception is not 
supported by crowd data.  In my observations I did not see spectators separate themselves 
by race/ethnicity and this did not appear to be a barrier to interaction.  Save the two 
smallest parades, Fargo and Burlington, all others included more than one 
racially/ethnically specific contingent, like the Brazilian dance group in New York or the 
band playing traditional Mexican music in Salt Lake City.  Those who commented on 
parade's lack of diversity pointed to forces larger than the parade such as simple 
demographics and cultural segregation.  A few participants in Atlanta mentioned Black 
Gay Pride events as the reason for lower African-American participation.   
 Regarding gender, participants said that Pride parades brought queer men and 
women together despite separation in their everyday lives.  Howard, a volunteer at 
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Fargo's Pride parade, said that,  
HOWARD: The biggest tension [is that] gay men and lesbians don't tend 
to associate and commingle very often.  And they do at the parade.  It's not 
necessarily a tension so much as a social, I guess, fact. 
 
Like those commenting on racial/ethnic diversity, Howard pointed to broad social forces 
that could not be overcome at an annual parade.  Another Fargo participant, though, did 
see women and men bridge gaps at Pride: 
DEE ANN: I think Pride is an opportunity for us all to come together and 
put those differences aside.  I see gay men dancing with lesbians and I see 
all of the hugging and touching and caressing and all of the good side of 
what we really are, and that's wonderful.  
 
I observed many interactions between men and women at Pride parades, though not to the 
extent characterized by Dee Ann.  Most typically spectators were in single-gender groups 
of three or four but in close proximity to many others and with some interaction.   
 I also observed diversity in personal expression and affinity groups. At all 
parades, marching contingents represented a variety of interests including church groups, 
corporate sponsor, LGBT sports leagues, affinity subgroups (gay dads, “Bears”1, drag 
queens, Dykes on Bikes), politicians, school groups, and more.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
participants at large parades mentioned diversity more than those at smaller parades (65% 
vs. 33%, respectively).  Larger parades simply have more people.  They are located in 
larger population areas where there is more room for differentiation and segmentation 
and with larger racial and ethnic minority populations.  Martin and Tobias, gay men from 
Salt Lake City and San Diego, respectively, described the significance of this diversity: 
 
                                                 
1 Men who self-identify as larger and harrier than average gay men and use this identification as a basis 
of unity. 
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MARTIN: I think it’s just kind of that weekend that absolutely everybody 
is really tied together, and it’s their weekend. No matter if you're the crazy 
club kid or you're the older couple that's been together for years, it kind of 
brings everybody together. Because normally those groups don't, they're 
not in the same places at the same time, they're not doing the same things, 
but only at Pride. 
 
INTERVIEWER: So how do you think it works that it seems to all come 
together even though as you mentioned people come for such different 
reasons? 
TOBIAS: Well, and that's really the beauty of it.  That if you polled a 
thousand people there I think that you really would get generally a sense 
of people wanting to support the community, but the way that that gets 
manifested is probably very different.  Some people do that by getting 
drunk, taking drugs, and having sex, while others are bringing their 
families.  But again, I think the way that it works is the power of a group 
of people coming together and recognizing unity in all the differences 
there are, that are represented in that gathering.  And I think that that's 
probably the major way that it works; that we are different but we are one 
in terms of a community.  
 
For both men, diversity went beyond classic social categories to differences by personal 
expression and interests.  Tobias's statement in particular echoes Armstrong's (2002) 
description of what she calls the gay identity movement, which claimed unified LGBT 
identity through diversity of expression.  According to Armstrong, Pride parades embody 
this theme by “provid[ing] experiential evidence for the claim that unity and diversity 
[are] not in contradiction” (2002: 4).  Statements about diversity did not vary by the 
cultural climate in which parades were held, suggesting that is more a function of the 
number of people participating than of external pressure for certain personal displays.  
Nor did the mention of diversity vary by participants' sexual identity.  From my 
observations and participants' statements, diversity by race/ethnicity, gender, and personal 
expression and interest was visible at Pride parades. 
 The only group that participants mentioned as underrepresented at Pride parades 
was transgender people. Though all parades included at least one marching contingent 
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from the transgender community, six participants said that transgender people were not as 
visible as they should be. Most attributed this to ignorance on the part of gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals about the ways that transgender people fit into the community.  As 
described in chapter 2, sexuality and gender identity/expression are analytically distinct 
categories.  One's sexuality – one's attractions, explicit behaviors, and public 
identification – center around the object of one's sexual and romantic affections.  Gender 
identity, by contrast, is one's internal sense of gender - whether one feels oneself to be 
woman, man, or somewhere in between.  Along with gender identity one communicates 
gender through expressions such as clothes and mannerisms.  My analysis of photographs 
of Pride spectators measured gender expression as a proxy for participants' overt non-
normative presentation; those outside the norm in their gender expression could identify 
as gay, transgender, or even straight.  Though there is considerable overlap between 
sexuality and gender identity/expression, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals break the cultural 
norm of heterosexuality but do not necessarily break gender norms by acting or feeling 
more feminine or masculine than their straight peers.  Likewise, transgender individuals 
break the cultural norm that one must identify with his or her biological sex at birth, but 
they may identify publicly as heterosexual.  If Pride parades, as many participants say, 
are unique sites for LGBT people of all types and their allies to gather, then participants 
must contend with both sexuality and gender identity/expression. 
 In practice, of course, many gays, lesbians, and bisexuals do break gender norms 
in their personal expressions with things as simple as shorter hair cuts for women or tight 
jeans for men, and a number of transgender individuals also identify as gay or bisexual.  
On a grander scale, drag – adopting clothing and mannerism normative for the other 
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gender for theatrical performance – has a long history in gay culture and drag queens and 
kings (men performing as women and women performing as men, respectively) were 
quite visible at Pride parades.  Despite these connections, gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
activists have struggled find common cause with transgender individuals because of the 
difficulty incorporating issues of both sexuality and gender identity/expression (Stone 
2009).  Same-sex marriage, for instance, is an important issue for lesbians, gays, and 
bisexuals to a greater extent than transgender people.  I'll return to the question of gender 
identity/expression and sexuality later when I discuss boundary work and LGBT Pride 
parades.  For now, the important thing is that while a few participants saw Pride as a 
venue for interaction and education around gender identity, others said that ignorance on 
the part of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals inhibited participation by transgender individuals 
at Pride.  
 Though only one participant mentioned it, I also noticed the conspicuous lack of 
visibility of bisexuals at Pride parades.  While lesbian, gay, and some transgender 
participants declared their identities with signs and t-shirts, I did not see any participant 
explicitly identify themselves as bisexual.  Likewise, I did not observe a specifically 
bisexual marching contingent in any parade.  While it has become commonplace for 
community and advocacy organizations to include “bisexual” in their names, I did not 
observe participation of self-identified bisexuals in parades.  Jade, from Fargo, was the 
only self-identified bisexual participant that I interviewed.  She attributed the lack of 
bisexual visibility at Pride to general lack of acceptance of bisexuals in the gay and 
lesbian community in Fargo.  After dating women for a time, she said she was called a 
“traitor” by another lesbian when she began dating a man.  This is only one woman's 
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experience so it is not possible to determine whether it is common, but in this case 
bisexual invisibility was attributed to ignorance about and intolerance towards 
bisexuality. 
 The third aspect of physical togetherness was the way that Pride parades became 
places for interpersonal interaction. Sixteen respondents talked about meeting new 
people, socializing with friends, or connecting with organizations at Pride parades.  In my 
observations at parades, I saw plenty interaction among both friends and strangers.  At 
larger parades, restaurants and bars along the parade route hosted parties to watch the 
event.  In particular I noted many interactions among people from different affinity 
groups.  In San Diego, I watched a twelve year old girl take a picture with a man dressed 
in leather, and saw a woman motorcyclist walking with a drag queen as they prepared 
their respective marching contingents.  In Fargo, college age lesbians mingled with older 
gay men as they waited for the parade to start.  In Atlanta, spectators of all types 
congregated on a corner across the street from a particularly enthusiastic group of 
protesters, talking together and cheering as the parade went by.  I noted the most 
interaction before parades started as those marching socialized with people in their own 
and other contingents and spectators talked with one another about past parades, plans for 
attending other events, and their own and others' creative displays. 
 Brian, a gay participant in New York's Pride parade, described his interactions at 
Pride: 
BRIAN: I try to meet a lot of people, meet as much people as I can, say 
hello to people from out of town, people I think might be from out of 
town, just try to make more new friends. Sometimes I end up on one side 
of it and my friends were on the other side of it and I was talking with 
some of the people I had never met, I didn’t even know them, I just met 
them that day and I was talking with them. 
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Brian sounds like a particularly social person, and for him Pride is an opportunity to 
socialize with whoever is around.  His comment speaks to an environment that 
encourages such interaction, especially in New York City, whose residents are not known 
for their friendliness to strangers. The experience of Ashley, a straight woman who 
attended Atlanta Pride while visiting a friend, also spoke to this open, friendly 
environment: 
ASHLEY: Well, it just like, I think I just mean it in the terms of like 
everyone kind of associates with everyone else even though it was like a 
stranger typing them on the street, like everyone kind of treated each other 
like they knew them, you know.  
 
Ashley said that “the family-type atmosphere” was her favorite part of her first Pride 
parade, and her experience illustrates that for many the openness to socializing with new 
people extended to both LGBT and straight participants.  None of my participants 
mentioned negative interactions with other participants or trouble socializing with 
strangers, nor did I observe scenes counter to the friendly, social environment I have 
described.  This may be because spectators appeared to attend with friends and so had 
people with whom to interact.  Mentions of interpersonal interaction at Pride did not vary 
by respondents' sexual identity.  Nor did it vary by the size of parade or the cultural 
climate in which parades were held.  Across parades, then, interaction with fellow 
participants was part of the process to build community. 
 Pride parades contributed to building LGBT community by drawing together 
people who are geographically spread out and socially diverse; when they get together 
Pride becomes a site for a wealth of interpersonal interactions.  The only exception is that 
some participants felt that transgender people were not fully included in Pride activities.  
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Otherwise I did not find anyone who felt left out of the social experience at Pride.  These 
physical functions of Pride made possible the emotional aspects of community building.   
Emotional Community 
 To participants, Pride parades were more than social gatherings; 43 respondents, 
86% of those I talked to said that Pride was emotionally meaningful to them.  Positive 
emotions were certainly on display as participants smiled, laughed, and cheered together.  
An atmosphere of community celebration was most evident at the kickoff of each parade.  
All parades started with energy as the first contingent was placed there to make a lot of 
noise.  At five parades, groups called “Dykes on Bikes” took the lead spot and at one, 
Burlington, an energetic drumming group filled this spot.  Dykes on Bikes have been 
affiliated with Pride parades since a contingent of 20 women motorcyclists headed the 
1976 San Francisco Pride parade (SFDOB 2011).  Since then loosely organized groups 
calling themselves Dykes on Bikes lead Pride parades.  At each that I observed, women 
clad in leather and rainbows revved their engines loudly to cheering crowds as their 
entrance signaled the start of parades.  In Fargo, the small contingent of five 
motorcyclists rode up and down the street ahead of the parade, while in New York and 
San Diego up to one hundred participants guided the parades slowly down the street.  In 
San Diego the contingent was followed by a group of male motorcyclists.  The loud start 
to parades signaled a high energy celebration. 
 For many participants, the emotional experience of Pride stemmed directly from 
the physical gathering of LGBT people.  Ted, a gay man in San Diego, described this 
emotion when he attended his first Pride parade: 
TED: It was in 1977 in San Francisco and I was just amazed, I was 
stunned to see so many gays, I was like oh my god, it was a feeling like 
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coming home almost yeah so my first one was.....it meant a lot. 
 
Like Ted, many participants said that simply being among a mass of LGBT people and 
allies on a public street was an emotional experience.  For a community that is 
geographically dispersed, that often shared the personal experience of growing up 
without any LGBT social networks, and that lives in a larger cultural climate that 
misunderstands, ignores, and condemns LGBT people, this experience is rare and 
meaningful.  Participants mentioned three specific reasons for the emotional impact of 
Pride parades: the feeling of community, a supportive and loving atmosphere, and sharing 
pride in LGBT identity.  The combination of these aspects describes collective 
effervescence. 
 In addition to commenting on physical togetherness of LGBT people and allies, 
one third of participants (15 respondents) said that Pride parades generated a feeling of 
community for them.  Similar to Ted's experience of feeling “like coming home”, 
participants described a sense of belonging to be surrounded by fellow LGBT people and 
straight allies.  Dee Ann, a transgender woman in Fargo, described her experience: 
DEE ANN: When I see my community come together ... It just wells up 
inside, you know like the feelings people get when they hear the Star-
Spangled Banner or they see rockets exploding. I see that I have other 
people just like me and there's nothing wrong with me. 
 
Being with other LGBT people at Pride parades validated Dee Ann's own identity as 
transgender by giving her the feeling that she is part of a community of like individuals.  
This is how collective identity and community are intertwined: as participants described 
it, feeling part of a community meant sharing a sense of self with others; the basis of the 
community was common identification.  Particularly since LGBT people do not share 
geography, it is the identification with one another that is the foundation of their 
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community.  Interestingly, though LGBT participants mentioned feeling community 
slightly more than their straight counterparts (35% vs. 23%, respectively), this variation 
was not statistically significant.  Nor did mentions vary by parade size or cultural climate.  
The sense of community then was common to all parades in my study.  Community 
feeling is illustrated by the use of the word “family” by LGBT people to describe their 
connection with one another. Six participants used “family” in this way, both to describe 
the supportive atmosphere at Pride and their relationship with other LGBT people. 
 As evidenced by the use of the term “family”, for many participants a second 
emotional aspect of Pride parades was the supportive and loving atmosphere they foster.  
Thirty-two participants, nearly two-thirds of all respondents, remarked on the feeling of 
support at Pride parades.  They described this atmosphere as one in which everyone is 
welcome as they are.  This was most clear when participants described bringing relatives 
with them, saying their relatives came away grateful that their LGBT loved one is part of 
a loving and supportive community.  David, a gay man from San Diego, relayed the story 
of bringing his aunt with him to a parade: 
DAVID: I was going to go out to San Diego for San Diego Pride, and I 
called my aunt and she asked if I could go.  It struck me as odd, but I took 
her.  She said she wanted to go.  The reason being is that her son -- a 
couple, like ten years ago [came out as gay and the family did not react 
well].  So they're estranged, and he no longer has contact with the family.  
Now in hindsight, everyone realizes whatever mistakes they made, and I 
think she just wants to understand culture, she wants to be aware of what's 
going on.  Her reaction to it couldn't have been any better than what it 
was.  When she left she said that she'd never seen such an outpouring of 
love and happiness.  It was like a giant celebration.  I would speculate that 
she felt a little bit more comfortable, because she obviously doesn't know 
where her son is and I think she feels more cool about the whereabouts of 
her son because now she knows he's involved in such a strong supportive 
community.   
 
As David's quote illustrates, many saw Pride as fostering the best a community may offer 
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by showing love and support for all who attend.  Of course some participants felt that 
treatment of transgender people was an exception to general acceptance.  I did not talk to 
anyone who personally felt that they were not fully accepted but many mentioned that 
there was not enough awareness about or outreach to transgender people.  Participants at 
small/medium size parades mentioned the loving and supporting atmosphere more than 
those at larger parades (78% vs. 48%, respectively) and mentions did not vary by cultural 
climate.  Thus, having less people is more conducive to creating and communication an 
environment of support. 
 For some (14 people, 28%), the loving and supportive environment was most 
clear in participants' freedom to express themselves.  In light of the macro-level cultural 
construction of queerness as deviance, participants saw Pride as one place where it was 
safe to express oneself without fear of social sanction.  Participants indicated that there is 
power in creating a safe space for even the most radical displays.  According to Angela, a 
lesbian who marched in Burlington: 
INTERVIEWER: What does someone walking down the street in leather or 
walking down the street topless have to do with equal rights?  What would 
be your response to that critique? 
ANGELA: I think it has to do with self-expression.  I think it has to do 
with having the right in feeling comfortable expressing themselves in the 
way that they would like to in an open community, and a Pride Parade 
seems to be really open and welcoming to people that want to express 
themselves in that way. 
 
Coming from Burlington, the most gay-friendly parade site in my study, Angela's defense 
of free expression is fairly low risk.  According to those I talked to, LGBT people in 
Burlington generally feel comfortable being publicly out about their sexuality and gender 
identity.  In Fargo, by contrast, the situation is quite different.  While the downtown 
business association sponsored rainbow flags along the parade route and there were no 
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protesters at the parade, some participants described the parade as a rare day to be out as 
LGBT.  One participant, Kevin, traveled over an hour from his rural North Dakota home 
to attend Fargo's parade.  Describing his motivation to make the trip, he said 
KEVIN: I wanted, it was kind of like [I am a] closet case everywhere, so 
the parade was the only place that I could be out publicly. 
 
Depending on one's context, risky personal expression could be simply publicly 
identifying as gay or it could be dressing in leather and wearing a collar.  For Kevin Pride 
was a safe space to publicly identify as gay without fear of reprisal.  For others it was the 
chance to wear their most radical outfit or, as I overheard one San Diego participant say, 
to “fag out” by having fun dressing and acting more flamboyant than they would in their 
everyday lives.   
 Pride participants supported each as authentic expressions of self, but they 
balanced this value with possible negative consequences for the image of LGBT people.  
One third of participants (17 people) worried that sexual displays hurt the image LGBT 
people projected to the larger culture through Pride parades.  George, a gay man in San 
Diego, said he noticed that there were fewer sexual displays in 2010 than in previous 
years at the Parade.  He explained why he saw this as a positive development: 
GEORGE: I think in general people just realize that when that stuff gets 
on the media, it doesn't help the cause any. I think there is underlying, if 
you get up there and you act very lurid and vulgar, lewd behavior isn’t 
going to help any. And so toning some of that down, I think helps the 
cause. And it probably helps why more and more people are slowly, 
slowly, coming around with Proposition 82 I think. So I think people are 
going to become much more supportive of gays, especially if they don't 
see a lot of vulgar behavior. 
 
                                                 
2 2008 referendum in California that amended the state constitution to restrict marriage recognition to 
heterosexual  couples. 
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To George and others, sexual displays inhibited individual attitude change by presenting 
LGBT people as deviant and objectionable.  While they did not want to explicitly prevent 
fellow participants' free expression, they saw this goal in conflict with the goal of positive 
social change.  This issue illustrates the downside to educational visibility, discussed in 
the previous chapter, in which Pride parades foster cultural attitude change by educating 
the general public about the respectability of LGBT people.  This bottom up approach to 
cultural change is vulnerable to those that do not present a palatable image and represents 
a tradeoff between an external and an internal function of Pride parades. 
 Nearly one half of respondents, 21 people, talked about a third emotional aspect 
of Pride parades: promoting pride in oneself.  Mentions of this aspect did not vary by 
parade size, cultural climate, or respondent's sexual identity.  The link between queerness 
and deviance in macro-level culture is a cultural barrier to creating LGBT community, 
and one step to removing the barrier is to change LGBT people's internal feelings of 
shame that result in living in a harsh cultural climate.  As a public statement, Pride 
parades challenge the construction of queerness as deviant and shameful by publicly 
celebrating it.  Participants revealed that this celebration also has internal effects for the 
community and LGBT individuals by promoting self-worth and esteem. Jonah, a gay man 
from San Diego and Iris, a straight woman from Salt Lake City, describe the emotional 
feeling of pride: 
JONAH: Every year there's one day, one day a year where my entire 
community mobilizes together and is truly proud and confident about all 
of ourselves.  You know, and I think that's very powerful for us to have a 
day of Pride and being GLBT. 
 
INTERVIEWER: How would you describe Pride parade? 
IRIS: It’s love. Having love for yourself, for everyone you meet, but 
mostly having love for yourself. If you can’t accept yourself, then no one 
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else will either.  
 
An important aspect of Pride for Jonah was facilitating confidence and pride in LGBT 
identity.  Iris connected these feelings to the greater struggle for cultural equality, saying 
that self-acceptance is the first step to cultural acceptance.  For those who experience 
shame from the legal and cultural inequality they face, Pride is a day where the hostile 
cultural climate is replaced by one of celebration for LGBT identity.  As Dee Ann also 
showed earlier, the feeling of community was connected for participants to personal self-
worth as they internalized the collective celebration and support for LGBT identity.  To 
Emmet, a gay man in Salt Lake City, the existence of Pride parades gave him hope even 
from afar when he was not able to attend: 
EMMET: I guess as a young person growing up I always saw reports of 
Pride parades and stuff and I always thought that ‘ok I was different’ but I 
didn’t see any of that in my community so I knew that somewhere, so it 
gave me like hope, or something to look forward to. I didn’t feel as alone. 
 
From Emmet's experience Pride parades may have emotional benefits even for those who 
can not attend.  By creating a meso- level community in which gay sexuality is celebrated 
rather than sanctioned, Pride parades foster self-worth as LGBT individuals follow a 
subcultural script rather than shame as they break a macro-cultural one.  The positive 
emotions created for individuals can then lead them to bond with one another and thereby 
build community.  In the previous chapter I argued that as as it is directed outward to the 
public, the meso-level cultural script celebrating LGBT identity challenges the macro-
level construction of queerness as deviance.  The question for the next section is what 
form of LGBT identity is celebrated and who is excluded as participants construct 
boundaries to define LGBT identity. 
 The feeling of community, loving and supportive atmosphere, and pride in self 
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inspired by parades are all evidence of communal bonding through positive emotional 
energy, or collective effervescence.  Participants described their individual emotional 
experiences as a result of interacting one-on-one with others at Pride and being part of the 
communal celebration and supportive atmosphere.  Collectively the music, cheering, and 
coordinated actions were ritualized group interactions that fostered heightened positive 
emotions.  Those who marched talked about feeling euphoric as crowds cheered for them.  
Margaret, a straight ally in the Atlanta parade, said that Pride was “the closest thing to a 
religious experience without actually having one”.  Similar to religious services, Pride 
parades have the quality of collective effervescence, a uniquely social emotional 
experience.   
 Pride parades bring people physically together, addressing the demographic, 
structural, and cultural isolation that LGBT people experience as members of society.  
Once together, parades are an interaction ritual which foster the positive emotional 
energy that LGBT people lack as they interact in mainstream society.  The result is the 
LGBT people are able to bond as a meso-level subcultural unit.  However, some felt that 
transgender people were excluded from this unit as a result of ignorance among lesbians, 
gays, and bisexuals about how gender identity and expression are connected to sexual 
orientation.  Moreover, one feature that facilitates positive emotions for some, the support 
for diversity of personal expression, caused others to worry that some expressions would 
hurt the external image of LGBT people.  This issue was one example of a trade-off 
between Pride's goals of internal community building and external cultural contestation.   
Boundary Work 
 The third way that Pride parades build community and establish collective identity 
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is by defining boundaries.  Three-fourths of respondents, 36 people, talked about the 
ways that Pride parades enforce group boundaries. Winston, a gay man in Fargo, talked 
about how Pride was an expression of his identity:   
WINSTON: I enjoy participating in Pride just because like I said I do see 
these Pride festivals and parades as being part of a community.  I grew up 
in a very, very small rural town area where the mention of gay sends panic 
throughout the city. A mob will chase you around with pitchforks. So I 
mean it was nice to be part of something that I am. 
 
The entire collectivity at Fargo Pride was for Winston a place where he felt he belonged.  
The boundary here is simply between those who attend and embody the ethos of 
celebration of and pride in LGBT identity and those who do not.  The combination of 
physical and emotional community at Pride contrasted with the other of daily society that 
is structured by the implicit macro-level cultural code that links queerness with deviance. 
 Beyond this simple boundary, I found three types of boundaries worked out at 
Pride.  The first was between LGBT and straight people.  The next two boundaries were 
between sets of each group.  Pride parades divided straight people by those who were 
LGBT-supportive and attended and those who were not. LGBT people divided in their 
inclusion of gender transgression within the LGBT umbrella. 
 The boundary between LGBT and straight people at Pride parades was largely 
implicit; participants rarely questioned whether this boundary existed and instead their 
comments centered on how the boundary was reinforced.  Nearly half of respondents, 23 
people, talked about LGBT/straight boundary work at Pride.  Jade, a bisexual woman 
from Fargo, talked about the first way this boundary was reinforced: 
JADE: I'm not really quite sure how many like heterosexual people come 
in to observe Pride because it still has a very small feel.  And so I don't 
think that a lot of people are going to it that aren't necessarily GLBTQ or 
have gay friends. 
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According to Jade, Pride is an event by and for LGBT people so that straights need an 
“in” through an LGBT friend.  A straight woman at this event, Danielle, expressed the 
same sentiment when she said she marched with a political campaign and while it was a 
great experience, she “can't think of another context where [she] would have felt 
comfortable walking.”  In Fargo this was reinforced by the strong networks between 
LGBT people so that while the boundary may have been partly symbolic it was also one 
between a group of friends and others outside the network.  That is, LGBT people in 
Fargo were a micro-level cultural group in which individuals knew one another rather 
than a meso-level group where mutual identification would suffice for membership.   
 Respondents from other places made similar comments. Eugene, a gay man from 
Atlanta, relayed a recent conversation with a straight friend in which his friend was 
interested in attending Pride but felt she needed an invitation by an LGBT person as an 
unofficial entree to the event. Tony, from NYC, said that a straight person would need to 
go to Pride with LGBT people because “they'd know all the events and what to do and a 
normal person wouldn't know much”.  These statements speak to a view that Pride 
parades are by and for LGBT people so that straight allies are welcome as bystanders but 
not as full participants.  The reason given was that LGBT people have insider knowledge 
and ownership of the events. 
 A similar way that the boundary between LGBT and straight people was 
reinforced was by conceiving of Pride as a commemorative event for the LGBT 
community akin to a religious festival.  Two Jewish participants – Rebekah in Burlington 
and Ralph in NYC – likened Pride to the Jewish commemoration of passover as a time 
when the community remembers past struggles that define them as a people. In this sense, 
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straight people (like non-Jews) are invited to observe but can never be full participants 
without personally identifying as LGBT.  Blake, a gay man from Burlington, related 
Pride to another religious festival: 
BLAKE: I think straight people can get a lot of payment and enjoyment 
out of the parade,  just like I get from the Mardi Gras Parade, even though 
I don’t celebrate Lent or Advent or whatever comes after it. You don’t 
have to be of that mind in order to enjoy free beads, any reason to go 
down to Church Street and enjoy yourself on the street is fun whenever it 
is.  
 
Blake's statement was typical in that he identified features of Pride parades that are 
universally enjoyable – like free beads and a colorful parade – but distinguished the 
implicit meaning of these features for LGBT and straight participants. For LGBT 
participants, the parade was a celebration and commemoration of shared history; straight 
participants did not share this history so may partly find joy through its entertainment. 
 As emphasized in the previous chapter, the public nature of Pride parades give 
them an external focus along with the internal functions described here.  In that chapter I 
argued that Pride parades communicate the main themes of visibility, support, and 
celebration through their festive parade form rather than through verbal statements.  As 
public celebrations to commemorate LGBT culture and history, Pride parades are explicit 
cultural tools used by the meso-level LGBT community to challenge macro-level cultural 
construction of queerness as deviance.  As internally focused celebrations, Pride parades 
construct a boundary between LGBT and straight people by marking the commemoration 
as for LGBT people.  To the extent that the explicit cultural tool is aimed at changing 
individual attitudes through a bottom up approach to cultural change, this may hurt its 
goal by excluding straight people from full participation.  As a tool aimed at top down 
macro-level cultural change, the boundary between LGBT and straight people does not 
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hurt its goal because individual attitudes are not the target.   
 As an in-group activity and commemoration of shared history, Pride parades 
enforce a boundary between LGBT and straight people by marking the event as “for” 
those who identify as LGBT.  Heterosexuals are invited as supporters, spectators, and 
consumers of gay culture but not full and equal participants.  The boundary between 
LGBT and straight people is marked implicitly in the ways participants understand Pride 
and they ways they can be involved.   
 A second way the boundary between LGBT and straight was marked at Pride 
parades is through explicit displays of gay sexuality.  Participants made overt sexual 
displays through their clothing and slogans.  For example, a group of gay men Atlanta 
wore coordinated outfits of short shorts in each color of the rainbow to a man.  In 
Burlington, San Diego, and New York a few participants wore gear distinctive to the gay 
leather community, an explicitly sexual affinity group that eroticizes leather garb and 
symbols (Peacock et al. 2001).  A gay male dance troupe, the DC Cowboys, performed 
suggestively while wearing speedos and cowboy hats on their float in Salt Lake City.  
Many corporate and community sponsors employed sexual imagery in the slogans on 
their parade entries.  The Georgia Humane Society float in Atlanta sported a banner 
picturing a dog with a bone in it's mouth that read, “Who needs balls when you've got a 
bone like this?”  In San Diego, the city's Public Defenders' sign advertised that they'd 
been “Getting You Off Since 1988”.  I observed more sexual displays in the larger 
parades of Atlanta, San Diego, and New York City, perhaps due to the the greater 
diversity of those involved.  The only parade at which I did not see any sexual displays 
was in Fargo.  This was the smallest event and located in a non gay-friendly cultural 
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climate. Participants attributed the lack of sexual displays to a more reserved Midwestern 
ethos and tight-knit community in which a lewd dance would quickly travel the grapevine 
back to the dancer's grandmother.  Additionally, nearly all sexual displays were 
performed by men. 
 Since the first events in 1970 sexualized displays have been a controversial aspect 
Pride events.  As discussed in chapter 1, many found the inclusion of shirtless Groovy 
Guy contestants and a float featuring a large jar of Vasoline in Los Angeles's 1970 parade 
to hurt the cause of cultural equality by putting at the forefront aspects of LGBT 
community that were more objectionable to dominant heteronormative culture.  Likewise 
in 2010, some participants I interviewed argued that overt displays of gay sexuality put 
off straight parade-goers and thus created a boundary between LGBT and straight 
participants.  Christine, a straight woman who attended Pride in San Diego for the first 
time, described her reaction to explicit sexuality: 
CHRISTINE: Well, there was a lot of guys on guys and girls on girls.  It 
was pretty gross.  I'm not gonna lie.  It's more for my taste. 
 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think that it would be a better event if some of 
that were toned down? 
 
CHRISTINE: Yeah, I think it would make more people more comfortable 
to get out there and actually go.  A lot of like straight people don't want to 
see that.   
 
Of all the straight participants I interviewed, Christine was the least comfortable with gay 
sexuality.  She attended a church that condemns homosexuality as a sin and has many 
family members that, as she said, “were more on the side of the protestors that were there 
standing along the bridge” and did not approve of her attendance at the parade.  However, 
though Christine is on the conservative end of the spectrum of straight people who attend 
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Pride, her reaction illustrates the way sexual displays can work as a boundary.  
 Reaction against sexual displays was not limited to straight participants; a 
minority of LGBT participants also expressed discomfort with such displays.  However, 
they were clear that their discomfort was a personal issue and should not mean that others 
should censor what for them may be a true expression of self.  Instead, LGBT participants 
concerned about overt gay sexuality at Pride talked about it in relation to straight 
participants and the image presented of the LGBT community.  For instance, Dean in 
Atlanta described his embarrassment at the city's 1998 parade when, after working with 
his church to set up a water station along the parade route, they watched as a “condom 
man” was followed by a truck playing a song with the lyric, “I want to fuck you like an 
animal.”   
DEAN: [I watched as they were] going by my church with middle aged 
and older volunteers, some straight volunteers here with whom the 
LGBTQ community was trying to build the bridges and here I was facing 
this social embarrassment from one community of which I am a part in the 
face of another community in which I am a part and I felt a lot of role 
conflict. 
 
While Dean may have been uncomfortable with the condom man and sexual lyrics, he 
identified it as part of his community.  His main concern was with the perceptions of 
those in his church community who may be put off by those elements.  According to Ted, 
a gay man in San Diego, toning down the sexual side of gay culture signals an invitation 
to straight supports: 
TED: I think it’s more of a community event now. It’s not just for gays and 
I kind of glad that this year, believe it or not, and maybe it’s because I’m 
older now becoming a little more of a prude, it wasn’t so sexual. The first 
parades I used to go to were real real sexual, a lot of men gyrating and 
stuff like that, but this year you didn’t see a whole lot of that, it was more 
toned down. And I feel like if you tone it down, it’s more accessible to 
more people and it was like opening arms to everyone... 
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[Pride was] a little less risque this year. If it is that way, I think it does 
make it more accessible to everyone. People aren’t afraid to bring their 
children, bring their grandmother- I saw a grandmother there, you know, 
so it’s like, its more inclusive I think now. 
 
To participants like Dean and Ted, displays of gay sexuality construct a boundary 
between LGBT and straight people that signals to straight supporters that they are not 
welcome at Pride.   
 Others countered that these displays are important both as an external cultural 
challenge and an internal signal of acceptance for all types of personal expressions.  
Particularly in a macro-level culture that proscribes gay sexuality, these displays are 
powerful signs of the unique environment enacted at Pride events.  Cameron, a gay 
participant in San Diego, summed up the dilemma over sexual displays: 
CAMERON: I think that what really has to happen is that instead of 
regulating, you know the LGBT community needs to find itself, you know, 
exactly what its boundaries are and decide whether or not the Pride 
celebration is specially for the LGBT community or for the community as 
a whole.   
 
As Cameron articulated, however externally and internally useful they may be, displays 
of gay sexuality mark a boundary between LGBT and straight people and signal that 
Pride is only “for” the LGBT community.   
 As discussed earlier, explicit sexual displays can hurt the public image of LGBT 
people and thus make it more challenging to change individual cultural attitudes through 
educational visibility.  These displays can also hamper efforts to weaken the boundary 
between LGBT and straight people at Pride.  Sexual displays also reveal a conflict in how 
to build community.  Some feel that it is important that Pride parades foster a supportive 
environment in which all feel free to express themselves as they wish and that this 
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environment is essential to building community.  However, if free expression includes 
explicit sexual displays, it may reinforce a boundary between LGBT and straight people 
that marks straight people as outside the community that is built at Pride.  
 Descriptions of an LGBT/straight boundary were more common by those at large 
parades and those in gay-friendly cultural climates. However, separating the data by 
individual parade reveals that the variation may be particular to each parade rather than a 
result of size or cultural climate.  Participants from Burlington and New York City, 
mentioned this boundary at higher rates, while no participants mentioned it from Salt 
Lake City.  Half of participants from the remaining parades talked about the 
LGBT/straight boundary.  I did not observe nor detect from interviews a solid reason why 
this is the case. Given the number of ways this boundary is constructed, the finding is 
difficult to interpret.  Mentions did not vary by respondents' sexual identity, indicating 
that the boundary was noticed by LGBT and straight participants alike. 
 Like physical interaction and shared emotional experiences, the boundary between 
LGBT and straight people reinforced at Pride parades helps to establish LGBT collective 
identity.  I found that Pride parades establish this boundary through implicit meaning and 
explicit displays.  Since they are  structurally, demographically, and culturally isolated 
from one another, LGBT people have few means to create a positive boundary between 
them and the straight majority.  The main boundary is maintained through a negative 
cultural code against LGBT people, defining them by deviance.  Pride parades were a 
venue for the LGBT community to assert its distinctiveness by using symbols with 
implicit meanings for LGBT people, by commemorating shared history of Stonewall, and 
even through explicit displays of gay sexuality. 
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 The second boundary that I found, mentioned by 36% of respondents, was 
between heterosexuals that support LGBT people and those who do not.  The clearest 
way this boundary was constructed at Pride was through the contrast and often physical 
separation of Pride participants and protesters3.  Protesters represented the most extreme 
part of the hostile cultural climate.  They wore shirts, held signs, and yelled to condemn 
homosexuality.  In most places where protesters were present police officers enforced a 
physical barrier between protesters and participants, protecting the civil right of each 
group to publicly voice their opinions.  Interactions between the groups at two parades 
illustrate boundary work.  In the previous chapter I related two stories of direct 
contention between participants and protesters.  In Salt Lake City three protesters holding 
large signs condemning homosexuality as a sin were encircled by police officers and a 
changing crowd of participants engaged in contentious debates with them about the 
validity of LGBT people's existence.  In Atlanta, marchers and spectators cheered to 
drown out the condemnations of a religiously based group with loudspeakers.  
 Interactions with protesters were visible, overt displays of the difference between 
LGBT-supportive and -unsupportive straight people.  Other displays by participants 
showed this by referencing an other with an anti-LGBT view.  Religious groups held 
signs declaring their view that LGBT people are accepted and valued by God, which 
implicitly references a prominent belief that they are not.  In Atlanta, one woman 
marched with a Baptist group holding a sign saying “I'm baptist, I'm Southern, but I'm 
                                                 
3  While in the previous chapter I described how protesters highlighted the cultural contestation at Pride 
parades, in this section I focus instead on the way their presence made visible a boundary between 
LGBT-supportive and -unsupportive people. 
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not Southern Baptist”, in reference to that denomination's anti-LGBT views.  In Salt Lake 
City, I observed a similar statement against the position of the Mormon church as a 
number of participants wore shirts saying “I'm straight, I'm Mormon, I support equal 
rights”.  Like the woman with the Baptist church, those wearing these shirts enforced a 
boundary between themselves and their coreligionists who do not support LGBT people. 
 For many participants (both LGBT and straight), heterosexuals marked 
themselves as supportive simply by attending Pride.  Jonathon, a gay man and drag queen 
from Atlanta, described Pride as “a united front for the [LGBT] community but also a 
united front against hate and bigotry”.  Thus Jonathon described a boundary between 
straight and LGBT at Pride but also a boundary between being supportive and not.  In 
this sense Pride can be seen as an invitation to straight people to join in  as allies to the 
LGBT community.  Beyond building collective identity among those who are LGBT, 
Pride adds a fifth group of straight allies. Mentions of this boundary did not vary by size 
of parade, cultural climate, or sexual identity. 
 While the first boundary enforced at Pride excluded straight allies from LGBT 
community, the second invited them in.  I delineate three ways that straight people 
managed these two boundaries and participated in Pride.  First, straight people can “go 
native” and participate as if they were LGBT.  A few LGBT respondents described 
bringing relatives who participated in this way: Sarita in Burlington said her brother who 
is “a really straight guy” loved attending Pride because he “got to wear a dress”; in San 
Diego, Jonah's “older heterosexual” father rode his motorcycle with a gay men's biker 
group.  Straight participants such as these add themselves to the LGBT community for 
the day regardless of their personal sexual orientation.  Second, straight people may 
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participate as allies, inhabiting a cultural space close but not identical to that of LGBT 
people – like the Ladies Auxiliary to the VFW, supporting the main group from a short 
distance.  These allies march with their churches, sports teams, and political advocacy 
groups or hold signs from the sidelines proclaiming their support as straight allies.  Third, 
straight participants may watch the parade as supportive outsiders.  I talked to a few 
participants with this perspective, who understood the parade as belonging to the LGBT 
community and themselves as outsiders, but welcomed the opportunity to show support, 
learn about, and be entertained by this community. 
 This second boundary, between straight people who are LGBT-supportive and 
those who are not, is interesting to the parade aspect of Pride.  In a traditional political 
protest, one is either part of it or not – one marches or stays home.  At a parade, one may 
participate at various levels (Armstrong & Crage 2006).  In addition to participation 
through one's role as organizer, marcher, or spectator, I found that straight people may 
participate as part of the LGBT community, as allies, or as supportive outsiders.  With all 
levels, straight participants create a boundary between themselves and unsupportive 
straight people represented by protesters who condemn homosexuality.  Pride parades 
create a physical and emotional space for LGBT community that is lacking in dominant 
heteronormative culture.  By having this intermediate status as ally or supporter, Pride 
parades invite those outside the LGBT community inside their cultural space for the day.  
However, they may also reinforce that community membership is limited when they 
reinforce the boundary between LGBT and straight participants. 
 The third type of boundary participants talked about was between gays/bisexuals 
and transgender or gender variant people.  This boundary was mentioned by a small 
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number, eight participants, but was significant particularly as I noted some exclusion of 
transgender people when discussing the diversity of Pride attendants.  There was no 
variation by parade size or cultural climate, but all eight mentions were by LGBT 
participants.  This was an issue that straight participants did not seem to notice.  
Participants said that their parades were dominated by  gender-normative gay men and 
lesbians whose interests are not necessarily in line with those who break gender norms by 
presenting and/or identifying outside their biological sex.  For instance, participants 
pointed to the political expediency of excluding transgender people from legislation 
protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from employment discrimination based on their 
sexual orientation.  The more inclusive form of legislation specifies both sexual 
orientation and gender identity/expression as protected classes.  As Monique, a 
transgender woman from New York, put it: 
MONIQUE: I mean, I’m not saying they [lesbians, gays, and bisexuals] 
are in any less struggle than we are, they are definitely in a struggle for 
rights too, but they have progressed much farther than trans people. So 
were still trying to get the basic rights that gay people have already been 
afforded and they also have gotten federal protection as where we are you 
know, still in the political arena. 
 
For Monique and others, compromises in the political arena translate at Pride to a focus 
on political and cultural equality for sexual but not gender variance.  That is, while Pride 
may challenge macro-level construction of homosexuality as deviance, it does not 
challenge the connection between gender variance and deviance. 
 A few participants felt that it was culturally expedient to downplay the connection 
between gender transgression and sexual orientation.  Howard, a participant and former 
organizer of Fargo's Pride event, explained his view of Pride as a representation of the 
LGBT community: 
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HOWARD: My personal prejudice is I would rather it not be a 
representation of who we are because there are a lot of different groups 
within the gay community that are stereotypical and are attacked by the 
straight community as in this is why they're deviant.  And, you know, that 
might be somebody who is transgender, or a cross  dresser, or it might be 
somebody who enjoys leather.  We don't have that type of representation 
in the parade, but we do have a transgender group here, but I don't think 
that's the purpose of the parade. 
 
As Howard pointed out, those in the mainstream, dominant culture may react more 
negatively against people who are transgender than those who are gender-normative and 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual.  Like the reaction against sexual displays, Howard feared that 
negative reactions towards transgender people may hurt the image of LGBT people.  
They may also, like he did, erroneously equate gender transgression with leather as an 
affinity group4.  According to Dee Ann, a transgender woman from Fargo, many in the 
gay and straight communities alike simply do not understand how sexuality and gender 
identity often go together: 
INTERVIEWER: So what do you say to people who say transgender is 
more radical than people are ready to deal with, let's just focus on gay and 
lesbian for now. 
DEE ANN: That's kind of difficult to do because it's such an intertwined 
part of everything.  What you say to a young boy that's experiencing the 
oppression that he's a girl, or a young girl that's a tomboy. Are we 
supposed to tell them, which I believe doctors and a bunch of others right 
now are doing [unclear] the homosexual by calling them trans. That's a 
misnomer, that's wrong. We need to discover what, why it's there, the 
whole ideology, the whole package. Once we understand it a little more 
than we can see how it's such an integral - a trans man and a trans woman, 
together, are they a legitimate couple any more than two straight, a 
heterosexual couple? What difference does all of the, who cares what kind 
of panties I wear? 
                                                 
4  Gender transgression is an issue of one's gender identity and expression for which many undergo 
extensive medical and surgical alteration, while leather is a personal preference and even identity that 
does not entail significant  or permanent alteration. 
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As Dee Ann described, there is a lot of overlap between non-normative sexuality and 
non-normative gender expression or identity.  Likewise, opposition to both have the same 
roots in heteronormativity, which requires conformity to rules of masculinity/femininity 
and sexuality.  Dee Ann envisioned Pride as a space to educate those particularly in the 
gay community about gender identity and she did this through floats and informational 
displays.  Others thought the boundary between LGB and transgender people was too 
great to be addressed at Pride so that the events only reinforced the boundary existing 
outside of Pride.  From all sides I conclude that Pride is a place in which this boundary is 
made clear and considered, if not resolved.  Like Cameron said about the sexualized 
displays that reinforce the boundary between gay and straight, those involved in Pride 
need to decide who the parade is for – whether and how the “T” fits in with the “LGB”.  I 
would add that Pride is a place for this boundary work. 
 While it is standard practice to include “T” with the initialism “LGBT” my 
findings show that not all Pride parades fully include those who are transgender or who 
otherwise break gender norms.  Interestingly, none of my respondents who attended 
parades in Atlanta or San Diego mentioned a boundary between gays/bisexuals and 
transgender people.  From my analysis of crowd photographs, these parades also had the 
highest percentages of people with non-normative gender presentations.  This suggests 
that these parades may not foster the boundary that I detected at other parades.  Gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals have long struggled with whether and how to include non-
normative gender expressions and identities in their community.  Unfortunately I found 
that some Pride parades exacerbate the division rather than minimize it.  
 Social movement literature specifies three ways that mass demonstrations foster 
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collective identity among participants: by bringing people physically together, creating 
shared emotional experiences, and enforcing boundaries between in-group participants 
and outsiders.  LGBT people have structural, demographic, and cultural barriers to 
forming collective identity and Pride parades provide a venue to develop it.  Pride 
parades draw large numbers of diverse LGBT people together where they interact one-
on-one and as a group.  While together they share heightened emotions by feeling 
community, cultivating a loving and supportive atmosphere, and experiencing personal 
pride in one's identity.  Pride is also a place for establishing bonds between LGBT and 
straight and supportive and unsupportive straight people.  As parades rather than 
traditional protest marches, Pride events are able to draw a greater number of people, 
foster more positive emotions, and invite straight people to participate as allies.   
 On the down side, community building was harmed as not all LGBT people and 
expressions were welcomed at Pride.  A few participants criticized their Pride events for 
not reaching out to the transgender community.  While not mentioned, I noticed that self-
identified bisexuals not visible at Pride parades either.  Some also felt that organizers and 
fellow participants at their parades discourage explicit displays of gay sexuality and 
gender variance, privileging a less threatening image of LGBT community to mainstream 
society and a welcome to straight participants over support for those who preferred 
displays further from the mainstream norm.   
 Throughout this analysis I have made connections between these internal 
functions of Pride and the external functions discussed in the previous chapter.  In the 
following section, I further explore the influence of the public nature of Pride parades on 
internal community building/collective identity.  
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Connection with External Aspects 
 As I emphasized in the previous chapter, Pride parades are public events.  Unlike 
their festival counterparts, parades are staged on public streets which are free and open to 
all.  Their public nature means that Pride parades carry externally directed messages 
along with their internal community building work.  In this section I analyze the role of 
the public nature of Pride for this internal work by showing the connections between its 
external messages of visibility, celebration, and support.  
 In the last chapter I detailed the ways in which Pride parades challenge the macro-
level construction of queerness as deviance.  With queer sexuality and gender marked as 
deviant, heterosexuality is the norm and one's gender identity and expression should 
match one's physical sex.  LGBT individuals break social norms and are sanctioned 
through social exclusion, discrimination, and even violence. Pride parades collectively 
challenge macro-level construction by making LGBT people visible, showing public 
support for them, and celebrating their community.  With the exception of one form of 
visibility, educational, the themes of visibility, support, and celebration challenge culture 
through a top down approach, aiming at the macro-level construction of queerness rather 
than individual attitudes about LGBT people. 
 The cultural stigma against LGBT stigma inhibits their developing a collective 
identity as individual LGBT people must “come out” and face negative social sanctions 
when they do.  Added to this cultural challenge, LGBT people are isolated from on 
another demographically because they are spread throughout the population and have 
only a few weak enclaves in major cities.  Structurally, LGBT people grow up in 
predominantly straight families so that socialization as LGBT must begin later in life.  
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Just as Pride parades externally challenge the cultural construction of LGBT people as an 
illegitimate, deviant social group, they also address internal barriers to forming collective 
identity by bringing LGBT people together physically and emotionally and by enforcing 
boundaries to define the community. 
 The internal and external aspects of Pride parades are intimately connected.  In a 
negative sense, the external goal of publicly challenging the negative cultural code 
regarding LGBT people conflicts with the internal goal of building community by giving 
cause to exclude those who transgress gender norms and who put on overt sexual 
displays.  This presented more of a conflict with a bottom up approach to cultural change 
through individual attitudes.  With this approach it is important to avoid displays that may 
hurt the image of LGBT people and inhibit favorable attitude change.  With a top down 
approach,  the goal is to change the construction of queerness and individual attitudes 
about LGBT people are less important.  In a positive sense, the same mechanisms that 
challenge macro-level culture also build (albeit partially restricted) community among 
LGBT people and allies.  The common thread is the role of the public nature of Pride 
parades.  
 The most consistent theme in regards to both the internal and external aspects of 
Prides parades is visibility.  Pride parades make LGBT people and their allies visible both 
to each other and to the larger public.  The challenge of visibility in both respects is 
demographic and cultural.  By bringing together large numbers of LGBT people and 
allies in a public space, Pride parades show the size of the community and claim cultural 
legitimacy.  Internally, they make LGBT people visible to one another.  At Pride, 
participants have the rare opportunity to interact with fellow LGBT people from diverse 
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backgrounds.  Pride is a place where LGBT people can get together despite demographic, 
structural, and cultural challenges. Moreover, the external and internal aspects of 
visibility reinforce one another: participants build unity by gathering together, which then 
allows them to present a united front to the outside world.  On the downside, boundary 
work that excludes transgender people leads to an external cultural challenge of the 
macro-level construction of homosexuality but not gender transgression.  This limited 
challenge then inhibits unity of LGB and transgender people as some feel it is culturally 
expedient to exclude transgender individuals from the public face of the community. 
 A second feature of Pride parades is support.  Like visibility, Pride participants' 
show of public support for LGBT people is an externally directed cultural challenge with 
internal effects.  Participants remarked on the loving and supportive atmosphere at Pride, 
which shows that support was also internally directed at fellow participants.  By 
attending, Pride participants contributed to its atmosphere of acceptance for non-
normative sexuality (and maybe gender) while as a public event this support contested a 
cultural code that treats this sexuality with disdain.  Moreover, by showing public 
support, straight participants put themselves on the side of LGBT people and constructed 
a boundary between them and those who are unsupportive.  With groups like PFLAG, the 
simultaneous external and internal support is clear – parents holding signs that say “I 
support my gay son” challenged the idea that homosexuality is a source of shame and 
runs counter to “family values” while at the same time these parents showed their own 
children and other LGBT people that they really do love and support them for who they 
are by declaring it publicly.  Unfortunately this support had its limits for participants with 
more sexualized or gender variant displays.  Some felt that these participants were less 
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supported internally because of concerns for the public image of the LGBT community at 
Pride.  Thus, the public nature of Pride parades makes shows of support externally and 
internally meaningful for some, but for others is a source of tension. 
 Celebration is the third feature through which Pride parades challenge macro-level 
construction of queerness as deviance.  Participants turn the tables on the dominant 
cultural code that prescribes shame by instead publicly celebrating LGBT identity.  This 
macro-level challenge is also a meso-level affirmation that participants said strengthened 
their pride in personal identities.  Personal pride addresses the cultural barrier to 
collective identity by removing shame as a reason to hide one's sexuality.  Celebration 
also brings LGBT people and their allies together as they share positive emotions.  
Moreover, by celebrating together at a public event, participants constructed multiple 
boundaries between themselves and those who do not celebrate and between participants 
through the ways they expressed themselves as they celebrated.  LGBT participants 
distinguished themselves from straight participants as they claimed the event as their own 
by celebrating their history and at times presenting sexual displays that marked straight 
participants as outsiders.  Straight participants marked a boundary between them and their 
unsupportive straight counterparts who do not attend Pride by showing up and joining in 
the celebration of LGBT identity.  Finally, at some parades lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
participants marked a boundary between them and transgender/gender variant 
participants by suppressing transgressive gender displays and claiming gay sexuality as 
the main issue of the parade over queer gender identity and expression.  While this may 
serve to clarify and strengthen the collective identity of gays and lesbians, it excludes 
transgender and gender variant people from this group. 
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Differences by parade- and participant-level variables 
 Parades in my study varied by size, measured by the number of marchers and 
spectators in attendance, and cultural climate, measured by the LGBT people's legal and 
cultural status in parade's home states.  The most relevant variation among participants is 
by their sexual identification as LGBT or straight.  Throughout this chapter and the last, I 
have analyzed participants' responses according to these parade- and participant-level 
variables.  Table 6.3 summarizes those themes for which variation is statistically 
significant5.   
Table 6.3. Cross-Tabulations for External and Internal Themes by Parade and Participant 
Characteristics, N=50 
 Parade Size Cultural Climate Personal Identity 
 Small/ 
Medium Large 
Non Gay-
Friendly 
Gay-
Friendly LGBT Straight 
External       
   Visibility 74% 78% 74% 78% 85%* 46% 
   Support 59% 48% 70%* 35% 47% 69% 
   Celebration 48% 52% 37% 65%* 44% 62% 
Internal       
   Diversity (physical) 33% 65%* 41% 57% 50% 39% 
   Loving/Supportive    
      (emotional) 78%* 48% 70% 57% 62% 69% 
   LGBT/straight  
    boundary° 33% 61% 30% 65%* 50% 38% 
   LGB/T boundary 22% 9% 22% 9% 24%* 0% 
* Chi-square test p<0.05 
° Results are skewed by higher percentages in two parades: Burlington and NYC 
 
 
 Analysis of external theme variation resulted in a parsimonious explanation.  
Since the external themes were claims made to dominant culture, as this culture varied so 
                                                 
5  Internal themes were categorized as physical, emotional, and relating to boundaries.  These categories 
are features of building collective identity and relevant variation occurs within each category. 
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did themes.  Thus, Pride as a statement of public support was more prevalent when the 
cultural climate was not gay-friendly and Pride as a celebration of LGBT identity was 
common when it was.  Visibility varied instead by participants’ personal identity as this 
theme was more salient for LGBT than straight participants.  This makes sense as LGBT 
people are personally affected by the invisibility of this community in mainstream 
society.  Parade size did not affect participants’ views of Pride's external themes.   
 Parade size, cultural climate, and personal identity were all factors in the variation 
of internal theme.  Explanation of each is specific its meaning and thus cannot be 
summarized more generally. Parade size affected participants' perceptions of physical 
diversity and emotionally supportive environment Pride fostered.  Those at large parades 
mentioned greater diversity of participants by ascribed characteristics such as 
race/ethnicity and by personal expression and affinity.  My analysis of crowd photographs 
supported this correlation, as larger parades drew more non-white participants and more 
had non-normative gender presentations.  I theorized that since large parades were 
located in more populated areas, they had more diverse populations from which to draw.  
Though the had less diversity, according to participants small and medium size parades 
were more likely to foster a loving and supportive atmosphere.  I explained this finding 
by the more intimate environment created by having fewer people. 
 Mentions of boundary work were affected by cultural climate and participants' 
sexual identity.  Those in gay-friendly environments commented on the boundary created 
between LGBT and straight participants more than their counterparts in non gay-friendly 
climates.  Since explicit sexual displays were one way this boundary was enforced, I 
theorized that those in regions with more acceptance for LGBT people felt freer to put on 
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sexual displays than where there was less acceptance.  Finally, only LGBT participants 
mentioned the construction of a boundary between LGB and transgender people.  With 
straight participants partially excluded from LGBT community by a separate boundary, it 
is understandable that they would be less aware of boundary work within this community. 
Conclusion 
 Pride parades create community by drawing people together physically and 
emotionally and by drawing boundaries between groups that participate and between 
participants and non-participants.  The thing that connects the internal community 
building function of Pride with the external cultural contestation is the fact that parades 
happen in public.  Internally, being in public means that parades are widely accessible 
and thus able to physically draw people together better than if they were enclosed 
festivals.  Their public nature also heightens the emotional aspect because it is a contrast 
to LGBT people's daily lives – no other place than at Pride parades are LGBT people 
together in such numbers, which produces intense feelings of community, mutual support, 
pride in self, and collective effervescence.  Also because they are in public, Pride parades 
are displays for all to see.  They are held on major city streets, blocking off traffic and 
flooding the streets with rainbow flags.  They are covered in the mass media and 
occasionally spark controversy.  Their public nature allows Pride parades to contest 
macro-level culture.  In some instances the internal and external goals of Pride conflicted 
with each other, but this conflict was mitigated by the top down approach to cultural 
change in which Pride contested macro-level construction of queerness rather than 
individual attitudes. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation has been an exploration of the Pride parade phenomenon in order to 
consider the role of culture in the study of social movements.  The majority of research 
on identity-based social movements addresses campaigns for legal/political equality and 
thus tactics that target the state.  In contrast, Pride is a thoroughly cultural protest tactic 
that targets macro-level culture in order to achieve greater equality for LGBT people.  
Rather than seeking legal/political equality as a means to bring about cultural equality, 
Pride events bypass the state and contest the cultural construction of queerness as 
deviance that underpins LGBT inequality.  While externally contesting culture, 
participants internally build community as they interact, share emotions, and define 
boundaries.  Integrating cultural sociology and social movement theory, I understand 
these events as explicit cultural tools used by a marginalized meso-level social group to 
challenge implicit macro-level culture.  This dissertation thus defines cultural protest 
tactics, develops a theoretical framework for their study, and suggests many avenues for 
future research to incorporate cultural protest with existing social movement literature. 
Definition of Cultural Protest Tactics 
 Pride parades are a cultural protest tactic in the sense that they operate within the 
cultural arena, using cultural strategies to target cultural targets.  In the introductory 
chapter, I delineated three ideal types of social equality: structural, cultural and 
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legal/political.  Each type operates in a different arena with its own goals for action and 
rules for fair play.  Social movements strategically act by devising tactics to target those 
that hold power in a given arena.  Structural equality, for example, operates in the 
economic arena so labor activists hold strikes and boycotts to apply economic pressure 
for reform on corporate owners.  Pride parades operate within the cultural arena by 
contesting the macro-level implicit construction of queerness as deviance using meso-
level cultural displays of LGBT visibility, support, and celebration.    
 The cultural arena defines the field of play.  Within this arena Pride parades 
involve culture in three ways.  First, macro-level culture is the target of this collective 
action.  The goal of Pride parades is to change the macro-level cultural construction of 
queerness, not to change laws or policies of the state.  Second, Pride parades strategically 
use culture to make externally directed claims.  These events are explicit cultural tools 
used by LGBT people and their allies.  Third, Pride parades foster internally directed 
meso-level culture among LGBT people and their allies.  In the course of external 
strategic action, LGBT and straight ally participants develop collective identity.  The 
combination of these three cultural elements make Pride parades a thoroughly cultural 
protest tactic. 
 Pride parades strategically use culture to fight culture in many ways.  While I 
describe traditional (political) mass demonstration itself as an explicit cultural tool to 
communicate political power, Pride events mix this form with that of parades.  
Participants described parades as celebrations to honor social groups or commemorate 
historical events.  When applied to LGBT community and history they communicate that 
this group is worthy of cultural legitimacy and respect.  Within each parade participants 
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communicated LGBT visibility through the use of rainbow flags, beads, and emblems.  
They showed public support with slogans on signs and t-shirts that referenced religious 
and cultural beliefs in equality and love for all.  And they celebrated LGBT identity by 
playing songs associated with the LGBT community, displaying affection for one another, 
and promoting a general atmosphere of festivity.   
 In addition to the external cultural message, Pride parades also facilitate the 
development of internal LGBT culture in the form of collective identity.  In each city 
Pride was the largest and most diverse gathering of LGBT people and allies all year.  By 
bringing people together physically and emotionally and by drawing boundaries between 
groups that participate and between participants and non-participants, participants defined 
LGBT and straight ally identity.  The downside, however, is that to some extent 
transgender people, bisexuals, and straight allies were not fully included in the 
community created at Pride.   
 Pride parades have always been a cultural protest tactic.  Activists in 1970 were 
inspired by the disruptive tactics of the movements in 1960s/70s protest cycle when they 
marched for their identities as gays and lesbians in the first Pride events in New York 
City and Los Angeles.  These events were staged to carry on the defiant stance of those 
who rioted against a police raid of a gay bar in New York City the previous year.  Though 
the proximate cause of the Stonewall riots was police harassment, gay and lesbian 
community leaders interpreted the riots as a broader statement against an oppressive 
macro-level culture.  In 1970, Pride marchers mixed celebratory parade elements with a 
political protest march to publicly declare and celebrate their gay identity.  Their march 
did not target the state nor did it carry explicit political demands.  Instead, marchers 
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declared and celebrated gay identity in order to challenge the cultural constraints against 
it. 
 This cultural protest tactic stands in contrast to the state-directed political protest 
that is the subject of much social movement research.  These tactics seek legal/political 
equality either for its own sake or as a means to achieve structural or cultural equality.  
Operating within the legal/political arena, political protests aim to demonstrate political 
power through the disruption of everyday activity and/or the spectacle of mass numbers 
of committed activists.  Social movement scholars have mostly considered the ways 
activists use culture internally to mobilize constituents (via collective identity) and 
externally to persuade new followers (via collective action framing). That is, culture is 
treated as a way to drum up political support for a cause, not as the site of collective 
action. 
Theoretical Framework to Study Cultural Protest Tactics 
 I have integrated cultural sociology with social movement literature to develop a 
framework with which I studied LGBT Pride parades. This theoretical framework may 
guide research on other cultural protest tactics.  First, I delineate three levels of culture in 
the world: micro-level culture that is shared by small groups of individuals who know 
one another; meso-level culture among sub groups in a society, and macro-level culture 
that is shared by all members of a given society.  I describe the struggle for cultural 
equality as one between a meso-level subcultural group and the macro-level culture that 
marginalizes it as illegitimate, inferior, or a combination of the two.  By incorporating 
this language of cultural sociology, I take contentious action out of the political arena 
with which much social movement research is concerned and place it in the cultural 
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arena.  I then understand activists’ contentious actions as contests over cultural meanings 
rather than struggles for political power. 
 Second, I incorporate social movement theory and research to describe the 
cultural arena in which contentious action takes place.  I explore three questions that 
address the source of inequality, its qualitative nature, and the meso-level cultural 
resources that a marginalized group has to fight combat inequality.  The contentious 
politics, multi-institutional politics, and new social movements approaches emphasize the 
relationship between the distribution of power in society and the targets of social 
movement action.  Stemming from these approaches my first question is the source of 
power that underpins a marginalized group's inequality.  Stated in another way, to what 
extent does the state control the structural, cultural, and legal/political equality of a given 
social group and what other institutions or cultural forces influence these types of 
equality?  For the LGBT community, I argue that state power has served to undermine 
rather reinforce LGBT group status.  Additionally, with a shorter history of state attention 
(either positive or negative) to LGBT people, I look beyond the political arena to culture 
as a site of conflict for LGBT equality.  Research on tactics directed at cultural targets 
demonstrates the importance of specifying the nature of a group’s cultural inequality in 
order to understand their use of symbolic meanings to challenge inequality.  I described 
LGBT cultural inequality as centered on the pursuit of legitimacy as a minority group 
over illegitimate deviant status.  Finally, drawing from research on the importance of 
internal movement culture, specifically collective identity among participants, I examine 
the ability of the group to develop meso-level collective identity which can serve as a 
resource to collectively challenge inequality.  I identified three types of barriers – 
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structural, demographic, and cultural - to establishing collective identity in the LGBT 
community. 
 Third, I distinguish between implicit and explicit culture and specify the uses of 
each in contentious collective action.  Implicit culture consists of symbolic meanings, 
norms, values, and attitudes that cannot be directly measured.  Explicit culture is directly 
observable and measurable products such as writings, works of art, and music (Wuthnow 
& Witten 1988).  In a social movement context, activists use explicit cultural tools such 
as collective actions frames to influence implicit culture in the form of individual 
attitudes or macro-level codes.  Specific movement tactics can then be analyzed as 
explicit cultural tools used to contest implicit cultural meanings.  In my analysis of Pride 
parades, these cultural tools communicate visibility, support, and celebration of LGBT 
identity which contests the macro-level cultural construction of queerness as deviance.  
The external function to contest and possibly change macro-level implicit culture also has 
the internal function to minimize barriers to building meso-level implicit culture in the 
form of LGBT collective identity. 
 Fourth and finally, I specify two models through which social movements may 
work to change culture.  Most research on culture in social movements addresses change 
through a bottom up model in which activists seek to change the public's individual 
cultural attitudes so that they join movement organizations, pressure politicians, or vote 
in a way favorable to a movement's cause.  With this model individual attitudes affect 
their behavior, which eventually leads change in macro-level codes, norms, and meanings 
(Swidler 1995).  Top down cultural change is a second model (Swidler 1995).  Through 
this model activists target macro-level cultural codes, norms, or meanings in order to 
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change the behaviors and eventually the attitudes that are acceptable in society.  For 
LGBT Pride parades I found that, with one exception, the meanings of defiant visibility, 
public support, and celebration were directed at the macro-level construction of queerness 
as deviance rather than individual attitudes and thus operated through the top down 
model of cultural change.  The one exception, educational visibility, targeted individual 
attitude change through the (intended) presentation of LGBT people as diverse, 
upstanding citizens deserving of equal rights and respect.   
By applying these models to understand the pathways Pride parades sought for 
cultural change, I could also analyze the tradeoffs between external and internal functions 
of these events.  There were fewer external/internal tradeoffs for those themes that 
operated through top down change and their internal functions than for the theme that 
operated through the bottom up model.  The reason is that the message of educational 
visibility, through bottom up cultural change, was vulnerable to the perceptions of 
mainstream members of the public.  Participants acknowledged that while some 
individual actions at Pride, such as sexual displays, contribute to the events’ internal 
shared emotional experience, the public may find these actions objectionable which 
would then hurt Pride's external message.  Themes that operated through the top down 
model did not depend on individual interpretation and were thus less vulnerable to 
potentially objectionable participant displays.   
 The theoretical framework that I developed to study LGBT Pride parades can be 
applied to other cultural protest tactics.  Its strength is to fully integrate understandings of 
how culture works from cultural sociology with social movement theory and research on 
contentious collective action.  Neither field has addressed concerted, coordinated efforts 
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to change culture; cultural sociologists have studied how culture changes mainly as a 
natural consequence of social structural change, while social movement scholars have 
focused on collective action in the political arena.  By integrating theory and research 
from both fields I have illustrated a framework with which to study protest tactics in the 
cultural arena. 
Avenues for Further Study 
  Cultural protest tactics like Pride parades deserve further study by scholars of 
social movements.  As the field increasingly considers the role of culture in social 
movement activity, it should examine the dynamics of movements in which culture is the 
site of contention.  Pride parades are the cultural side of the LGBT social movement.  On 
the political side, activists campaign for legal/political equality by pressing the state for 
non-discrimination laws and relationship recognition.  On the cultural side, through Pride 
parades, activists seek cultural equality by challenging macro-level culture for 
recognition of the LGBT community as a legitimate minority group.   
 The majority of research on identity-based social movements has focused on their 
political sides.  These are campaigns that operate in the political arena with tactics that 
make claims on the state for change.  As the grantor of legal/political equality, the state 
holds total power in this arena and thus movements who sole purpose is to achieve this 
type of equality focus their activity within the political arena.  But identity-based 
movements seek legal/political equality as a means to ultimately achieve cultural 
equality, a strategy labeled the politics of recognition (Fraser 1995; 2000).  The state has 
only limited power in the cultural arena.  It may protect citizens against overt actions of 
cultural inequality, such as employment discrimination, but it has no control over implicit 
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individual cultural attitudes or macro-level cultural codes.   This leaves a host of potential 
cultural movement activity outside the political arena.  Particularly when cultural equality 
is an ultimate goal, as it is with identity-based movements, scholars need to pay attention 
to collective action staged outside the political arena.  
In this dissertation I have demonstrated the ways Pride parades operates as the 
cultural side of the LGBT movement. Other movements may also have cultural sides that 
are overlooked in scholarly literature.  For instance, feminists have staged cultural 
protests in pursuit of cultural equality alongside campaigns for legal/political change.  
Two of these are Take Back the Night marches and SlutWalks.  Groups mainly on college 
campuses have held the former events for thirty years mainly to protest widespread 
sexual assault against women (TBTN Foundation n.d.).  At these events participants rally 
or march in an attempt to “take back the night” from perpetrators of sexual assault and 
transform it into a safe space for women where they need not fear the threat of sexual 
assault.  The latter, SlutWalks, are a newer phenomenon in which marchers contest the 
cultural victim-blaming of women who have been sexually assaulted.  Since 2011 
activists in major cities in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Asia, and Australia have marched, 
some in what may be considered provocative clothing, to challenge the cultural notion 
that a woman may invite sexual assault through her clothing or actions (Stampler 2011).  
These are just two events that may be described as cultural protest tactics but have not yet 
been studied as part of the women’s movement.  Other events include ethnic parades 
celebrating meso-level minority group cultures.  Researchers may explore whether and to 
what extent these parades contest macro-level cultural constructions of minority groups 
in order to achieve greater cultural equality. 
229 
 
 Beyond the call for more general attention to cultural protest tactics, my study 
raises several questions for future research regarding the connections between the cultural 
and political sides to social movements.  One avenue of research is the crossover between 
participation in cultural protest and political activism.  I argued that with their parade 
form Pride events draw wide diversity of people who can participate in various capacities 
– as organizers, volunteers, sponsors, marchers, or spectators.  As fun and entertaining 
events that are open to the public, Pride parades attract many more people than do 
traditional political protests.  Once present, participants bond with one another and build 
collective identity through physical interaction, shared emotions, and definition of 
boundaries.  This collective identity may serve for future cultural or political activism.  
Taylor, et al. (2009) found that many individuals who participated in cultural protest in 
2004 by staging same-sex wedding in San Francisco were motivated by the experience to 
give money and participate in political demonstrations for marriage equality.  Cultural 
protest tactics, therefore, may mobilize previously disengaged individuals for both 
cultural and political activism.  Future research may specify under what conditions and 
through what forms of participation individuals are mobilized for further action. 
On a second, related avenue, research may examine organizational overlap and 
coordination between those that plan cultural protests and organizers of political protests.  
Political LGBT rights organizations such as the nationally prominent Human Rights 
Campaign and state groups such as Equality California and Equality Utah marched as 
contingents in each Pride parade and circulated petitions and information about LGBT 
rights legislation at festivals held after each parade.  Political advocacy organizations that 
work on causes of interest to many LGBT people, such as Planned Parenthood and local 
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Democratic Party groups, also marched and staffed booths and Pride parades and 
festivals.  Research may consider the ways that these organizations working on the 
political side of social movements use Pride parades to recruit and mobilize activists.  
Moreover, Joseph (2010) found that Pride organizers varied in the extent to which they 
promoted Pride as a political event to achieve legal/political equality.  My research does 
not consider the experiences of those who organize Pride events, so future research may 
also consider the extent of their network ties with political activists.   
A third avenue of research may explore the extent to which various movements 
engage in cultural protest and their strategic choices between cultural and political 
protest.  In their analysis of 4,654 protest events staged between 1968 and 1975, Van 
Dyke, Soule, and Taylor (2004) found that gay and lesbian protests were most likely to 
target the public and African-American civil rights protests to target educational 
institutions.  These results point to differing levels of interest in state-targeted political 
protest.  Further research could match the targets and types of protest with marginalized 
groups’ social histories.  I argue that state power plays a different role underpinning 
LGBT inequality than for other groups and I tie this to the recent historical emergence of 
LGBT people as a social group.  With a short cultural history, U.S. laws are nearly devoid 
of reference to LGBT people.  This means that the path to cultural equality for LGBT 
people may not run through the state.  Pride parades are one tactic through which LGBT 
advocates push directly push for cultural equality.  Research on other movements, such as 
those for women and racial/ethnic minority groups, may follow this model by looking to 
the history and current cultural and political of marginalized groups to explain the extent 
of their cultural and political protest.  Moreover, research may consider activists’ strategic 
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choices for types of protest. 
A fourth avenue of research is the effectiveness of cultural protest tactics. One 
limitation of my study is that I did not measure whether Pride parades do in fact change 
individual cultural attitudes or macro-level cultural codes.  While I show variation in the 
emphasis of public support and celebration according to regional cultural climate, I can 
only suggest that these themes are most effective for each cultural climate.  Research may 
incorporate variation in cultural protest events to understand what messages are most 
effective.  Research may also test the relative effectiveness of cultural and political 
protest tactics to understand the role of each in bringing about greater social equality. 
My discussion of cultural protest tactics has focused on their use in identity-based 
movements.  Scholars of non identity-based movements may also examine the ways that 
collective action in the political and economic arenas also engages the cultural arena.  In 
addition to economic equality, for example, cultural recognition and respect is an 
important part of the labor movement's struggle for social equality.  As illustrated most 
recently in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana, political debates over unions' collective 
bargaining rights frequently engaged cultural questions about the social value of teachers 
and other public sector union workers.  Research may examine the ways in which 
protests surrounding these political battles also operated within the cultural arena.  On the 
political right, scholars may research the ways Tea Party activism is both cultural and 
political.  For instance, Tea Party activists have staged demonstrations in support of gun 
rights in which participants proudly display their guns and celebrate their right to use 
them.  In addition to a political statement of the civil right of gun ownership, this is also a 
cultural statement of the value of guns in society.  Researchers may utilize the framework 
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outlined in this dissertation to better understand the cultural side of all manner of protest. 
I opened this dissertation with two scenes from the 2011 Pride season.  In New 
York, a lesbian police officer proposed to her girlfriend two days after Governor Cuomo 
signed marriage equality for same-sex couples into law.  In San Diego, 250 active duty 
and retired members of the U.S. military marched for the first time as a Pride contingent.  
Neither of these scenes fit our cultural image of protest, but as I have shown in this 
dissertation, they were tremendously meaningful challenges to LGBT cultural inequality. 
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APPENDIX 
DESCRIPTIONS OF CHAPTER 2 INTERVIEWEES 
 
All interviewees were active in the gay and lesbian communities of New York and Los 
Angeles at the time of the first Pride events in 1970.  All save one, Tommi Mecca, 
marched in these first events.  Below is a brief description of each person I interviewed 
for this chapter. All names are real and used by permission except when noted. 
Los Angeles 
 
Pat Rocco. Male, white. Gay filmmaker and performer in Los Angeles from the early 
1960s on.  Prominent in gay community with a large social network and strong ties to 
other community leaders.  With Morris Kight, Troy Perry, and Bob Humphries organized 
the first Pride parade in Los Angeles in 1970.  Was later president of planning committee 
in 1973 and was involved for many years afterward. 
 
Ruth Weiss (pseudonym). Female, white. Lesbian feminist activist who lived both in 
New York and Los Angeles.  Moved from New York to Los Angeles in May 1970 and 
marched in it's Pride parade with the local chapter of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF).  
Outspoken about homophobia within the women's liberation group National Organization 
for Women (NOW) and sexism within male-dominated gay liberation groups.  Attended 
many Pride events in both cities. 
 
Del Whan. Female, white. Analysis is based on memoir about experience at first Los 
Angeles Pride parade.  Had similar experiences with NOW as Weiss. Was part of LA 
Pride planning committee for many years.  Also founded gay and lesbian student group at 
the University of Southern California in 1971. 
 
New York 
 
Martha Shelley. Female, white. Helped organize first Pride march in New York in 1970 
and gave a speech at the end. Got involved through membership in the lesbian group 
Daughters of Bilitis.  Has been cited in many books and articles about the Stonewall era 
of gay activism. 
 
 
Stephen F. Dansky. Male, white. Marched in New York Pride through membership in 
GLF.  Had been part of protests for civil rights, women's movement, and the Poor 
People's movement. 
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Roberto Camp. Male, Mexican-American.  Also marched with GLF in New York Pride. 
Moved back and forth from Berkeley, CA and New York City.  
 
Nikos Diaman. Male, white. Marched with GLF in New York Pride. Described “passing 
through” New York on his way to Paris in 1970. 
 
Paul Guzzardo. Male, white. Marched in New York Pride. Involved with various gay 
activist group in late 1960s and 70s. Lived in New York City throughout this time. 
 
Perry Brass. Male, white. Present at GLF meeting when Pride was first discussed in 
early 1970. Marched with this group in New York Pride. Founded the Gay Men's Health 
Project Clinic, the first clinic for gay men, in New York in 1972.  Has written gay poetry 
and fiction since early 1970s. 
 
Ralph Cohen (pseudonym). Male, white. Marched in first New York Pride. Founded 
GLF chapter at college in Buffalo, NY and participated in protest action in New York 
City during summers.  Currently organizes contingent of participants in first New York 
Pride to march in annual parade. 
 
Philadelphia 
Tommi Mecca. Male, white. Marched in New York Pride in 1971 and organized first 
march in Philadelphia in 1972.  
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